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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic problems in COMECON/CMEA member countries started to grow in the second half 
of the 1970s, which lead to radical economic and political reforms in the second half of the 
1980s and resulted in demise of the economic and political system in these countries. The main 
aim of this thesis is to investigate whether growing economic problems in East European 
planned economies, or in CMEA member countries, were initially triggered by oil crises, 
through international trade and level of indebtedness channels, or not. Countries examined in 
this thesis were the CSSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR; the time covered in 1960 
to 1989. Two time-series econometrics methods used in this thesis to check the causal 
relationship between imports of CMEA member countries from different country groups, their 
level of indebtedness, and their national income, which are the Toda-Yamamoto version of the 
Granger causality tests and the VECM estimations for each country. Econometric results from 
four out of five countries suggest that economies of CMEA member countries were negatively 
affected by the oil crises. These results showed that the economies of CMEA member countries 
were more vulnerable to the effects of external economic fluctuations than conventionally 
assumed. 
 
Keywords: COMECON; CMEA; Oil Crises; International Trade; Debt; NMP; Causality 
Jel Classifications: C32, F49, P24, P33 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The worldwide economic and political order, which was gradually established around the 
Second World War, radically changed in 1980s. Capitalist economies, led by Reagan in US, and 
by Thatcher in UK, implemented neoliberal economic reforms in 1980s. Also, the demise of the 
Soviet Union and, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the two alternatively used 
abbreviations as COMECON and CMEA, member countries, occurred in the second half of 
1980s; their economic systems were shifted from central planning to free market economy, 
based on neoliberal economic policies, and their political system were radically changed as well. 
The first, second, and third world countries started pursuing neoliberal economic reforms in 
1980s, although the pace of reforms changed from one country to another. The majority of 
economists and political scientists have a consensus in the explanation that neoliberal reforms in 
capitalist economies were triggered by oil crises between 1973 and 1982. Oil crises indicated 
economically turbulent period for mainly developed capitalist economies. This turbulent period 
comprised several sequential events: a rapid increase in oil prices between 1973 and 1974 
followed by a stagflation in developed capitalist economies; the further rise in oil prices 
between 1979 and 1980; the Federal Reserve System (Fed) steeply increased interest rates and 
decreased money supply in 1979 to fight high inflation (Volcker Shock), and yet accompanied 
by another stagflationary period in developed capitalist economies.  
 
Most economists, political scientists, and even the Soviet leader Gorbachev confirmed that the 
political and economic transformation in CMEA member countries, in the second half of the 
1980s, was a response to growing economic problems and economic stagnation that began in the 
second half of 1970s. Economists like Kotz and Weir (2007), Levine (1983), and Ofer (1987) 
asserted that economic decline in CMEA member countries, especially in the USSR, was 
initiated in the second half of 1970s, and they also claimed that this economic decline was a 
result of internal economic problems such as, the fall in investment rates, the level of 
industrialization and growing complexities in economies, the decline in research and 
development efforts and associated relaxation in technological progress, and peculiar problems 
in the functioning of central planning. They further argued that external economic fluctuations 
in the second half of 1970s and early 1980s in capitalist economies, namely the oil crises, did 
not have a major effect on CMEA member countries because these economies were relatively 
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closed and isolated; they have several layers of insulation from external economic fluctuations 
and the CMEA as an economic block, and in particular the USSR, is a net oil exporter.  
 
Notwithstanding, conventional wisdom holds that these internal economic problems in CMEA 
member countries would cause a gradual economic decline, but quantitative investigation, 
which is going to be discussed in the following chapters, implies that the economies of CMEA 
member countries were faced with severe economic “shock” between mid-1970s and early 
1980s. The macroeconomic indicators of CMEA member countries, such as national income, or 
net material product (NMP), growth rate, import and export trends, and their level of 
indebtedness, abruptly changed in this period. This relatively rapid intensification of economic 
problems in CMEA member countries in this period arguably implies that they were faced with 
an economic “shock” at the time when capitalist economies were struggling with the effects oil 
crises; and hence both blocks, the first and second world, implemented similar neoliberal 
economic reforms in the 1980s.  
 
Therefore, the timing of both historical events, the relatively rapid growth of economic 
problems in CMEA member countries and the oil crises, and also the similar responses of the 
diverse governments to these economic problems, suggest that the oil crises might have had a 
major impact on the economies of CMEA member countries.  This hypothesis does not reveal a 
direct rejection of the internal economic problems hypothesis, which is claimed by the above 
authors, rather both hypotheses can be regarded as complementary, in that the effects of the oil 
crises on the economies of CMEA member countries amplified the internal economic problems. 
However, as it is suggested above, abrupt changes in macroeconomic indicators of CMEA 
member countries, between mid-1970s and early 1980s, cannot be solely explained by internal 
economic problems per se (Kotz and Weir 2007, 54; Venn 2002, 163–169). 
 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that economies of CMEA member countries were 
negatively affected by the oil crises, and that growing economic problems, caused by the oil 
crises, forced their governments to implement economic and political reforms in the late 1980s. 
The economies of CMEA member countries were heavily affected by the oil crises through two 
main channels; through international trade and through level of indebtedness. The chain of 
causality is asserted as this: due to the impact of the oil crises, CMEA member countries’ total 
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imports increased and total exports declined. These initial changes caused a rise in their trade 
deficit which led to an increase in CMEA member countries level of indebtedness. The rise in 
the trade deficit and level of indebtedness forced economic planners to pursue policies towards 
decreasing trade deficits, mainly via cutting total imports; and in some CMEA member 
countries this policy was accommodated with rise in total exports. The fall of total imports in 
CMEA member countries caused a decline in their economic growth or in their national income.  
 
The related literature suggests that the economies of CMEA member countries were import-fed, 
not export-led. Therefore the import side of the international trade channel in chiefly analyzed in 
the current thesis. The causal explanation is based on two main assumptions; that international 
trade and level of indebtedness indicators of CMEA member countries ‘abruptly’ changed with 
the onset of oil crises, and that these changes in international trade and level of indebtedness 
indicators led to a further change in economic growth, or in national income, of CMEA member 
countries. The causal relationships between the change in international trade and level of 
indebtedness indicators, together with the effects of the oil crises, can be checked by the timing 
of these ‘abrupt’ changes in these indicators through the descriptive statistical analysis which is 
done in the methodology chapter. If international trade and level of indebtedness indicators 
rapidly changed between 1973 and 1984, during the oil crises or within a few years after, it 
would indicate that such violent changes are caused by the oil crises. 
 
However, the causal relationships between the changes in international trade and level of 
indebtedness indicators and the change in economic growth, or in national income, of CMEA 
member countries, can only be tested by econometric methods. Since the orthodox economic 
theories suggest that the decline in economic growth (recession) can cause a fall in the growth 
of total imports or  in the level of imports of the country it can also can lead to a decrease in the 
growth of indebtedness or  in the level of indebtedness of the same country. Therefore, 
econometric results which confirm the causality, more specifically a unidirectional causality, 
running from imports and/or level of indebtedness to national income, or NMP, in CMEA 
member countries, will support the main hypotheses of this thesis. 
 
Five CMEA member countries, namely the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
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Republics (USSR) are analyzed in this thesis. Two European members of CMEA, Bulgaria, and 
Romania, are excluded from the analysis because both countries were outliers in CMEA. The 
Bulgarian economy was relatively more dependent on Intra-CMEA trade, especially on the 
USSR, than other CMEA member countries; and the Romanian economy was relatively more 
dependent on developed capitalist economies. Furthermore, Romania’s political and institutional 
relationship with developed capitalist economies was relatively stronger than other CMEA 
member countries. CMEA member countries’ political and economic systems were relatively 
homogeneous. Almost all of the CMEA member countries had faced significant economic 
troubles in the second half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s; and all of them implemented 
radical political and economic reforms in the late 1980s. Therefore, the results obtained from the 
examination of the effects of oil crises on the economies of several CMEA member countries 
would be valid for the countries having similar economic and political structure and close 
economic and political ties between each other. Thus, overall results obtained from these five 
CMEA member countries are less dependent on unique economic characteristics of one or two 
member countries, but more reliant on the countries showing similar structural characteristics.  
 
The macroeconomic data of these five CMEA member countries cover the time frame between 
1960 and 1989. The analysis period intentionally passes beyond the borders of the oil crises 
because the changes on macroeconomic data caused by the crises can only be detected if it 
covers the period before and after the occurrence of the crises. Additionally, empirical findings 
based on a limited number of observations could not be considered as technically reliable; they 
have to be based on at least twenty-five observations or more. Therefore, relatively long 
analysis periods are preferred for empirical analysis.  
 
To our knowledge, the effects of oil crises on the economies of CMEA member countries, 
through international trade and level of indebtedness channels, are not thoroughly examined by 
quantitative methods, especially with econometric analysis, in the existing literature. Therefore, 
this thesis attempts to investigate the effects of oil crises on the economies of CMEA member 
countries, and also to analyze the various effects of CMEA member countries’ international 
trade with different economic blocks, namely intra-CMEA trade and international trade with 
developed capitalist economies as well, especially for the 1960–1989 period, depending on 
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empirical analysis. This thesis endeavors to fill the significant gap inherent in the related 
literature by doing so. 
 
The plan of this thesis is as follows: The next chapter offers a brief description of the 
COMECON/CMEA and the oil crises.  It also reviews the discussions associated with the 
policies of Détente, Perestroika, and Glasnost, which were deeply affected by international 
trade and the level of indebtedness of the CMEA member countries during that period. The 
second chapter summarizes the literature related to the international trade, structure of CMEA 
member countries, the effects of oil crises on their international trade and their level of 
indebtedness. It also examines the effects of changes in international trade and the level of 
indebtedness of CMEA member countries on their national economies. The third chapter, the 
methodology chapter, focuses first on the explaining the properties of the macroeconomic 
dataset used in this thesis and then concentrates on the descriptive statistical analysis of the 
dataset, and explains the econometric methods used for finding causal relationship between 
variables of interest, namely the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test and the 
VECM estimation. The econometric findings obtained from sample countries’ macroeconomic 
data are reported, and are then briefly interpreted in the fourth chapter. The conclusion contains 
a recapitulation of the results derived from the descriptive statistical and econometric analyses, 
and also a short discussion about the implications of the main results.  
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The effects of the oil crises on the economies of CMEA member countries cannot be grasped 
without a brief description of COMECON/CMEA and the oil crises. The national economies of 
CMEA member countries, their international trade and indebtedness levels, were also affected 
by Détente, Perestroika and Glasnost policies between 1960s and 1980s. Therefore, an 
examination of these policies is also crucial for understanding the economic changes that 
occurred in these countries during that period. For this reason, the first section of this chapter 
gives a description of COMECON/CMEA, the second covers the oil crises, the third Détente 
policy, and finally, the fourth, Perestroika and Glasnost policies. 
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The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance-COMECON/CMEA 
COMECON/CMEA is the abbreviation for the institution Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance which was formed in January 1949 in Moscow. The founding member countries 
were Bulgaria, the CSSR, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR. The GDR joined the 
Council in the following year. Albania joined CMEA in 1949 but left it after the Sino-Soviet 
split in the early 1960s. Non-European countries like Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba also joined 
CMEA in 1960s and 1970s, however, these countries are beyond the scope of the present thesis.  
 
The establishment of CMEA was a result of the bipolar world order that emerged post-Second 
World War. After the Yalta Conference in 1945, the USSR’s de facto control over other CMEA 
founder countries was recognized by the USA and the UK. The USSR established satellite states 
in these countries and pro-USSR governments carried out nationalization policies, without 
compensation, and inaugurated centrally planned economic systems. The USA was trying to 
increase its political and economic influence in Europe through the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan in 1947. The USSR condemned the USA’s intention of controlling the European 
Continent, and together with satellite states in Eastern Europe started to boycott the meetings of 
international corporation institutions like the UN. In return, the USA, the UK, France, and other 
Western capitalist powers started banning economic relations with USSR, Bulgaria, CSSR, 
Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and GDR. The economic and political isolation of these countries 
lead them to the formation of an economic cooperation institution, the CMEA (Kaser 1967, 10–
12). The CMEA was a relatively insignificant institution between 1949 and 1956. There was not 
any charter or legislation signed between member countries, apart from the founding agreement, 
and only ad hoc conferences held between government officials until 1956. The International 
Bank for Economic Cooperation, the International Investment Bank and twelve other economic 
commissions were established after 1956 to facilitate economic relations between CMEA 
member countries (Kaser 1967, 42–43; Schrenk 1991, 1). 
 
The most important aim of the CMEA was to realize the economic integration and cooperation 
of the member countries. Socialist integration, socialist division of labor and economic 
specialization were the most referred objectives of CMEA. Security of input supply for 
industrial production was also an essential goal of the CMEA when CMEA member countries 
were faced with trade boycotts from developed capitalist economies. The industrial cooperation 
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and joint industrial investments were imperative targets of the CMEA, together with horizontal 
specialization agreements signed between member countries for specific final products.  
 
Nonetheless, the fundamental purpose of the existence of CMEA was organizing, coordinating 
and facilitating trade and related financial exchanges between member countries. The trade 
between CMEA member countries had to be planned on the basis of national five-year 
economic plans. The bilateral trade agreements, decisions about trade structures between CMEA 
member countries, and joint investment agreements between and among them, were resolved at 
CMEA meetings, which were held every year with participation by government officials from 
each member country (Schrenk 1991, 4–7).  
 
The Gorbachev administration’s reforms for liberalizing the economic and political system in 
the USSR, Perestroika and Glasnost had a significant impact on the functioning of the CMEA. 
The 1987 and 1988 CMEA meeting sessions had passed resolutions which supported the 
transformation of the CMEA from plan coordination to a unified market framework. Despite 
these declarations of will for such fundamental change in the CMEA, no official change 
happened related to the functioning of the CMEA. Ultimately, Perestroika and Glasnost reforms 
led to the official dissolution of the USSR in 1991, and hence, the CMEA also disbanded in the 
same year (Schrenk 1991, 13). 
 
Oil Crises  
The term oil crises used in this thesis not only to the unprecedented increase in oil prices in 
international markets for 1973–1974 and 1979–1980, but also to the economically turbulent 
period for mainly developed capitalist economies between 1971 and 1982. This period 
contained several sequential events, such as, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, a 
tremendous increase in oil prices between 1973 and 1974, stagflation in developed capitalist 
economies, further rise in oil prices between 1979 and 1980, Volcker Shock, another 
stagflationary period, and finally the beginning of the debt crisis in developing capitalist nations.  
 
The economic boom in developed capitalist economies did not come to an end abruptly in 1973 
after the rapid rise in oil prices. There were warning signs of problems as early as the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The UK devalued Sterling around ten percent in 1967, and inflation rates in the 
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USA, the UK, and Japan rapidly increased between 1970 and 1973. The USA had its first trade 
deficit in 1971, and its fiscal deficit started to rise in the late 1960s and early 1970s, due to the 
cost of the Vietnam War and the Great Society program initiated by the Johnson administration. 
Nixon’s administration devalued the US dollar ten percent against major currencies in 1971, and 
further devaluations took place in 1973 before the occurrence of rapid increase in oil prices. 
Additionally, US gold reserves could only cover the one fifth of the US liabilities in 1971. The 
frequent and substantial fluctuations in exchange rates between major currencies and consequent 
decline in the ratio of gold reserves to liabilities in the US were the initial signs of the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system. The Bretton Woods system de facto collapsed in the summer 
1973, several months before the rapid increase in oil prices, and the major capitalist countries 
had abandoned the fixed exchange rate system prevalent for their currencies, and thus started to 
shift to the floating exchange rate policy (DESA/UN 2017, 53–54; Venn 2002, 150–152).  
 
One month before the break out of the Yom Kippur War in October, 1973, OPEC (Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries) member countries declared that they wanted to increase oil 
prices in September 1973, which were mostly exchanged in the US dollar on international 
markets, because of the decline in real oil prices which had originated both from the rising 
inflation trend in the US and the devaluation of the US dollar (Venn 2002, 8). The Yom Kippur 
War finished without any significant gains for both sides. The USA had sent important military 
aid to Israel during the war, and in revenge, Arab countries desired to take a firm position 
against the countries who supported Israel. The Arab members of OPEC gradually decreased oil 
supplies between October and December in 1973, and ultimately completely ceased supplying 
oil to the countries who supported Israel, the USA, the UK, Netherlands, etc. Furthermore, 
OPEC also decided to increase oil prices in December 1973. This oil boycott lasted until the 
disengagement agreement reached at the end of the May 1973. Nevertheless, the oil prices in 
real terms were doubled in the last three months of 1973 (Hamilton 2011, 48; Venn 2002, 7–21).  
 
This rapid increase in oil prices resulted in a rise in the cost of production for almost all sectors 
of the economy, and therefore, the price of most of the goods exchanged in international 
markets rapidly climbed because oil is used as input for these sectors (Venn 2002, 154). This 
caused a rapid increase in the inflation rate in developed capitalist economies, such as the USA, 
the UK, and Japan. Stock markets crashed at the end of 1973 and 1974. The growth rate in the 
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USA decreased from 5.6 percent to –0.2 percent, in the UK from 6.5 percent to –1.5 percent, 
and in Japan from 9.9 percent to –0.5 percent between 1973 and 1975. The developed capitalist 
economies, except West Germany and Japan, were faced with stagflation in this period, and 
their trade deficits increased. The increasing revenues of oil exporting countries, due to the rise 
in prices, could not be absorbed in their national economies; and therefore, these petrodollars 
flowed to international financial markets.  
 
In the meantime, the developing capitalist economies were also facing with pronounced 
economic troubles in the same period. The demand for their exports from developed capitalist 
economies suddenly dropped due to the evolving recession in these countries and import costs 
tremendously increased owing to the rise in the prices of almost all goods in international 
markets; thus, they encountered huge foreign trade deficit problems. They attempted to cover 
their trade deficit by taking debts from international financial markets with relatively low 
interest rates, due to the flow of petrodollars, in the mid-1970s. The rise in the level of 
indebtedness of developing countries was the principal cause of the prolonged debt crisis 
occurred in 1980s (DESA/UN 2017, 54–59; Venn 2002, 154–161). 
 
All of the developed capitalist economies had recovered from the 1974–1975 recession by 1976; 
however, the inflation rates in these countries were starting to increase between 1976 and 1978 
despite the fact that oil prices in real terms stayed almost at the same level for that period (Venn 
2002, 162). Then oil prices in real terms more than doubled between 1979 and 1980 due to the 
emergence of new crises in the Middle East (Hamilton 2011, 48). Strikes in the oil sector during 
the early phase of Iranian Revolution in late 1978 caused a decrease in the oil supply. The 
Iranian people toppled the Shah, supported by the USA, in January 1979. Iranian students 
occupied the USA Embassy in Tehran and they took USA officials hostage in November 1979. 
The US government stopped oil imports from Iran and froze all Iranian assets in the USA as 
retaliation in the same month. Furthermore, war between Iraq and Iran, two important oil 
exporters, broke out in 1980. These consecutive events happening in the Middle East between 
1978 and 1980 caused further rapid increase in oil prices in the same decade that had already 
seen this happen earlier (Venn 2002, 22–30).  
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The rapid rise in oil prices between 1979 and 1980 led to a decline in growth rates in the 
developed capitalist economies for the same period; however, they did not face recession. The 
developed capitalist economies were more concerned about high inflation rates and they passed 
resolutions which recommended tight monetary and fiscal policies for reducing at the Tokyo G-
7 Summit in June 1979. In accordance with this policy recommendation, the US Federal 
Reserve (Fed) increased interest rates steeply and decreased money supply in October 1979 
when Paul Volcker became its chairman. This high interest rate and tight monetary policy was 
pursued by the Fed in the following years.  
 
Furthermore, tight fiscal policy was adopted by the Thatcher administration in the UK in 1979 
and by the Reagan administration in the USA in 1981. Both administrations not only decreased 
government spending but also deregulated markets and rigorously pursued privatization policies 
that could be considered as milestones of neoliberal reforms. Essentially, these policies were 
contractionary at their nature, and thus led to decline in inflation rates in these countries; 
however, both economies fell into recession in 1981 which lasted into 1982 and 1983. 
Additionally, the recession in developed capitalist economies negatively affected developing 
ones via decreased demand for imported goods in developed capitalist economies, which were 
provided by developing capitalist economies. Moreover, the trade deficits of developing 
countries increased and they could not find cheap credits from international financial markets 
due to the rise in interest rates and the decline in money supply. Consequently, developing 
capitalist economies started encountering debt servicing problems from the increase in interest 
rates and decrease in their export revenues. Mexico announced in August 1982 that it could not 
service its debt; this is considered the beginning of the debt crisis in developing capitalist 
economies (DESA/UN 2017, 54–59; Venn 2002, 163–169).  
 
Détente Policy 
Détente policy identifies the era of increasing economic, military and diplomatic cooperation 
between the First World, especially the USA and Western European countries, and the Second 
World, especially the CMEA member countries, between 1969 and 1976. The diplomatic and 
economic relationships between the First and Second World gad been very low during the Cold 
War from the end of the Second World War to the late 1960s, period marked by political 
tensions and proxy wars in the Third World.  
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This situation gradually changed in the second half of the 1960s. Western European countries 
started improving their diplomatic and economic relations with CMEA member countries. This 
process created a fear in the USA’s administration that their NATO allies were getting closer 
with the enemy bloc. Also, US companies did not want to be left behind by competitors in 
Europe, related to foreign trade with CMEA member countries. In the meantime, the nuclear 
arms race was going on between USA and USSR in mid-1960s; with, both of countries 
producing enough nuclear warheads to more than destroy their rival. Additionally, the US 
military causalities in Vietnam increased very rapidly between 1963 and 1969, causing a strong 
anti-war movement in USA during the same period with the US federal government coming to 
realize that their military intervention in Vietnam was leading to a dead end. This was the 
internal and external political atmosphere when Nixon took office in January 1969. He 
appointed Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor and both politicians gradually started 
to change US international policy, despite the resistance from the federal bureaucracy, the 
Congress and the Senate (Schulzinger 2010, 373–376; Slantchev 2014, 1–4). The USSR was 
also suffering from the isolation policy of developed capitalist economies, and had been further 
hurt by seasonal fluctuations in grain production in 1960s leading it to seek to improve its 
economic relations with developed capitalist economies. Furthermore, the cost of the nuclear 
arms race was too high for USSR, and for the US, military spending associated both with 
sustaining the nuclear war threat and funding proxy wars conducted in the Third World, reached 
to unbearably high levels (Slantchev 2014, 3–4).   
 
Both superpowers realized that the nuclear arms race and proxy wars were too costly and too 
risky, and they recognized that increasing economic relations between them was beneficial for 
both sides. Kissinger initiated personal and direct “back line” diplomatic relations with the 
USSR in 1969. The USA’s main aim in this policy was to improve economic relations with the 
USSR, halt the nuclear arms race, diminish the risk of nuclear war, and create pressure on the 
USSR for decreasing their military support to proxy wars in Third World, especially in 
Vietnam. Kissinger and Nixon further attempted to normalize economic, military and diplomatic 
relations with China at the beginning of 1970s which increased pressure on the USSR since a 
type of Cold War was ongoing in the Second World between the USSR and China. Also, 
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through improving the ties with China, the USA hoped to decrease Chinese support to North 
Vietnam (Schulzinger 2010, 376–378; Slantchev 2014, 2–5). 
 
Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT 
I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) in May 1972. These treaties put a cap on the 
number of nuclear warheads which both countries could have in their stockpiles and also 
restricted the number of anti-ballistic missiles which both countries could have. These treaties 
constituted the backbone of the Détente policy, which led to a halt in the nuclear arms race and 
diminished the possibility of nuclear war between the two superpowers. Improvement in 
military and diplomatic cooperation was only one side of the Détente policy, the USA and the 
USSR further reached agreement on several different pacts dealing with Second World War 
debts, shipping, taxes, and grain purchases between 1971 and 1974. The US lowered tariffs to 
the USSR; they jointly organized the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in 1973 which led to the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which aimed to increase economic, 
military, and diplomatic relations between the USA, the CMEA member countries, and Western 
European countries (Schulzinger 2010, 379–390). 
 
Nevertheless, there was little political support for the Détente policy from US voters, federal 
bureaucracy, Senate or Congress in USA. After the US sold 10 million tons of grain to the 
USSR in July of 1972, it was accused of causing a rise in grain and soybean prices, although 
that price increase was due primarily to oil crisis. Nevertheless, the US public hold the White 
House responsible and it became known as the Great Grain Robbery. 
 
Although there was the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement in 1973, Nixon could not make 
any further steps toward implementing the Détente policy due to domestic opposition combined 
with the Watergate Scandal. Finally, he resigned in August 1974. Ford became president 
afterwards and Kissinger remained as the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. 
Ford and Kissinger tried to partially maintain Détente policy after 1974. For example, Ford 
signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975 with the USSR. However, due to the negative effects of the 
oil crisis and the US military defeat in Vietnam in 1975, opposition to Détente soared. Carter 
defeated Ford in November 1976 and one of his main presidential campaign issues was to 
finalize the Détente policy. This was the end of Détente era (Schulzinger 2010, 385–392). 
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Perestroika and Glasnost Policies 
Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in 1985. Gorbachev already knew that the USSR’s 
economy was facing several problems. He stated that in the latter half of the seventies the 
country began to lose its momentum, economic growth rates fell down to the levels close to 
stagnation, contradictions in the society were consistently mounting, and USSR moved into a 
precrisis dimension in 1987. He called for urgent radical reforms in February 1986. The 
Gorbachev reforms era can be classified under three categories which were; economic reforms, 
democratization in civil society and the media, and democratization in the political system. The 
economic reforms in Gorbachev era were called Perestroika, a Russian term that means 
restructuring. The democratization in civil society and the media was called Glasnost, the 
Russian term used for openness.  
 
In brief, Gorbachev claimed that the main problems in the USSR’s economy were ‘rigid central 
planning’ and lack of work discipline. Gorbachev believed that democratization and 
decentralization of the economic institutions with the introduction of certain elements of a 
market economy, could solve the troubles of the USSR economy. However, his economic 
reforms were not targeted to completely restructure the socialist economy, only with adding a 
few elements of market economy into the system. These did not gradually establish a 
groundwork for the proper functioning of the capitalism and free market economy. He was 
strictly against private property ownership and was openly supporting public property until the 
mid-1990’s (Kotz and Weir 2007, 53–56). 
 
He started Glasnost reforms in 1986. He freed several political opposition leaders from jail, he 
called on the mass media to criticize Soviet bureaucracy, and totally lifted state control over 
civil society, media, public debate and individual expression. He initially started the Glasnost 
reforms because he was fearful about a backlash from the Soviet bureaucracy when he began to 
implement radical economic reforms, and he expected to receive open public support against the 
bureaucratic backlash. He further thought that public debates and intellectual contributions 
towards solving the problems in the USSR would be beneficial for sustaining the reform 
process. However, the majority of mass media and intellectuals started making liberal, pro free 
market propaganda through criticizing not only the current Soviet system but also socialist 
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ideology, the October Revolution and even Lenin. This was the by-product of appointing 
extremely liberal intellectuals to the leadership roles in the mass media by some of the Central 
Committee members. Additionally, the society was extremely fed up with corrupt Soviet 
bureaucrats, with the effects of economic stagnation making society even more critical of the 
system. In fact, the biggest problem was that most of the high-rank Communist Party members 
were corrupt, and not sincere in supporting communist ideology. Others were secretly or semi 
openly advocating liberalism and free market economy, and had become party members to gain 
power within the system (Kotz and Weir 2007, 61–63). 
 
The initial important Perestroika policies were based on two decrees adopted in June 1987 
which were called “Basic Provisions for the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management” 
and “Law on State Enterprise”. This became effective on January 1988. These reforms allowed 
small private property ownership and collective enterprise ownership by workers. Workers 
started to elect managers of the enterprise and, together with the managers to decide on their 
own wages. Enterprises were fully accountable for their profits and losses and they were 
financed through using state bank credits. States, local or regional governments, not central 
planning institutions, started setting some mandatory production targets together with non-
mandatory or advisory ones for enterprises. These governments would buy the mandatory 
production targets and the rest of the production would be sold on the market through wholesale 
trade. The majority of the enterprises’ production was sold through wholesale trade and it 
created market competition. The market prices were semi controlled by central planning 
institutions. Enterprises would decide their own investment plans based on workers and 
managers decisions (Kotz and Weir 2007, 54–76).  
 
These reforms created chaos in the USSR economy after its implementation. The economy 
collapsed after 1987. There was no coordination in the economic activities. Horizontal 
integration in the economy disrupted and creating huge shortages in consumer markets because 
the output level was decided by the enterprise itself; however, prices were decided by central 
authority, and workers started to prefer consumption today over tomorrow, which means they 
increased their wages at the expense of decreasing investments. The shortages in consumer 
markets were caused by rapid increases in wages, coupled with stagnant production and prices. 
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State started encountering troubles in collecting taxes from enterprises, and budget deficits 
increased very rapidly (Kotz and Weir 2007, 54–76). 
 
Furthermore, the Gorbachev administration passed a decree called “On the Foreign Trade 
Activity of State, Cooperative, and Other Enterprises” in December 1988. This decree abolished 
the state institutions’ monopoly over international trade, and therefore enterprises started 
directly conducting international trade by themselves. Moreover, the USSR stopped interfering 
in national political decisions in CMEA member countries after 1987. After regime changes in 
Eastern European countries in 1989 and 1990, USSR became the only country left in the CMEA 
which was ruled by Communist Party. Consequently, Eastern European CMEA member 
countries’ international trade with developed capitalist economies rapidly accelerated and their 
trade with USSR diminished. The USSR lost most of its important international trade partners 
after 1989 which in turn led to further deterioration in the USSR’s economy. In response, 
Gorbachev submitted an economic plan, which passed parliament, called the “Presidential Plan” 
in October 1990. Its main aim was rapid privatization and liberalization of the economy which 
would lead to the formation of a free market and total dismantlement of the planned economy. 
Gorbachev formulated this plan because of the total chaos that appeared in the economy and the 
increasing tension coming from procapitalist forces in the political arena. The USSR’s economy 
rapidly contracted in 1990 at 2.4 percent, and in 1991, 13 percent level. The Communist Party 
abandoned its constitutional right to rule the USSR in February 1990. The small states which 
were part of the USSR also left the country in 1990 and 1991. Russia started to be ruled by the 
capitalist parties in 1991 (Kotz and Weir 2007, 77–102). 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
To recapitulate, the main aim of this thesis is to investigate the effects of international economic 
fluctuations in the 1970s and early 1980s, namely the oil crises, on CMEA member countries’ 
economies by using econometric analysis. The hypothesis is that the international economic 
fluctuations transmitted to CMEA member countries’ economies primarily by international 
trade channels with their level of indebtedness a secondary transmission channel, which is 
effected by international financial conditions, because the level of effectiveness of this channel 
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on national economies is mainly determined through changes in international trade. Thus, 
CMEA member countries’ international trade is the main focus of the thesis. For this reason, the 
first section of the current chapter covers the literature which explains the international trade 
structure of CMEA member countries. Then, second section, has the studies describing how the 
oil crises affected the CMEA member countries’ international trade and indebtedness reviewed. 
The last section is devoted to the discussions about how the changes in CMEA member 
countries’ indebtedness level and international trade in 1970s and early 1980s affected CMEA 
member countries’ national economies. At the end, the general trend in current literatures is 
briefly summarized, as well as how this thesis contributes to the existing literature. Finally, the 
anticipated results from the quantitative analysis are explained. 
 
International Trade Structure of the CMEA Member Countries 
The CMEA member countries’ national economies were based on central planning between 
1949 and 1989, with small variations in different countries and years. Therefore, their 
international trade structures were different from capitalist market economies. Their economies 
were based on five-year economic plans and their international trade was based on these five-
year plans; they did not have flexible international trade structures and adjustment mechanisms 
to cope with external fluctuations (Bognar 1987, 406). CMEA member countries had bilateral 
trade between each other and they were aimed at having balanced trade with other CMEA 
countries as well as with developed and developing capitalist economies (Beckmann and 
Fidrmuc 2012, 41). There was a state monopoly over the international trade in CMEA member 
countries and enterprises had international trade through state institutions, therefore, there was a 
full state control over international trade. The main aim of the CMEA member countries’ 
international trade was importing commodities based on five-year economic plans and exporting 
commodities to meet the cost of importing goods and related foreign currency needs; thus, 
CMEA member countries’ export supplies were primarily determined by their import demands 
(Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 32; Csaba 1980, 94).  
 
CMEA member countries’ imports from developed capitalist economies were mostly dominated 
by raw materials, high technology intermediate goods and high technology investment-capital 
goods between 1960 and 1989. These imported goods have low substitutability due to the 
widening technology gap between CMEA member countries and developed capitalist 
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economies (Dobrinsky 1989, 325; Csaba 1980, 112; Portes 1977, 760). On the other hand, 
CMEA member countries’ exports to developed capitalist economies mostly were dominated by 
raw materials and low technology manufactured goods between 1960 and 1989 (Brown and 
Tardos 1980, 261; Portes 1977, 773). The USSR was an exception to the CMEA member 
countries’ general trend of exports to developed capitalist countries; in the sense that high 
technology manufactured goods and investment-capital goods were also important components 
of their exports to developed capitalist countries. However, due to the price changes in world 
markets, its importance started to diminish in mid-1970s (Treml 1980, 194–196). The USSR’s 
oil exports were 15 percent of its total exports in 1970 but increased to 35 percent in 1977 due to 
the oil crises (Treml 1980, 190). The fuel and raw material imports in 1980 consisted of 27 
percent of total imports in Hungary, 31 percent in Poland, 32 percent in the CSSR, and 37 
percent in the GDR (Maximova 1987, 433).  From 80 to 90 percent of the CMEA member 
countries’ oil imports were supplied by the USSR in 1973, when the oil crises began (Beckmann 
and Fidrmuc 2012, 35). International trade among CMEA member countries, or intra CMEA 
trade, was dominated by small CMEA member countries’ trade with the USSR (Beckmann and 
Fidrmuc 2012, 38). While the five CMEA member countries which are examined in this thesis 
had imports from CMEA member countries consisting of 52 to 72 percent of their total import 
volume, their imports from capitalist economies were limited to 28 to 48 percent. Similarly, 
although the exports of these five countries to all CMEA member countries ranged between 50 
to 71 percent of their total exports; their exports to capitalist economies varied between 29 to 50 
percent of their total exports in 1980 (Raczkowski 1987, 363).  
 
The international trade monopoly, exchange rate or currency system, and international trade 
prices structure in CMEA member countries created layers of insulation from the effects of 
international trade and external fluctuations to their economies. CMEA member countries used 
three different currencies. First was their domestic currencies, ruble, zloty, etc., which were 
nonconvertible to foreign currencies and used for domestic transactions. Second was is foreign 
exchange currencies, Foreign Exchange Ruble, Foreign Exchange Zloty, etc., which were 
convertible to foreign currencies and used for international transactions with capitalist 
economies. The third one was the Transferable Ruble, which was used for transactions between 
CMEA member countries, intra CMEA trade. There was one-to-one exchange rate between 
Transferable Ruble and the Foreign Exchange Ruble. However, the Transferable Ruble was 
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rarely used as a convertible currency before the 1970s, although, it was more frequently used as 
a convertible currency after then, due to the CMEA member countries’ increasing trade deficit 
to developed capitalist economies. CMEA member countries’ international trade institutions, 
generally the Ministry of Foreign Trade, made transactions, exports or imports, with other 
countries or foreign companies either in Transferable Ruble, or in foreign exchange currencies. 
However, these international trade institutions sold imported commodities to, or buy “going to 
be” exported commodities from, domestic enterprises in domestic non-convertible currencies. 
Therefore, the flow of domestic non-convertible currencies and foreign exchange currencies, 
and also Transferable Ruble, were strictly controlled by the state in CMEA member countries. 
Furthermore, the outflow of domestic nonconvertible currencies to other countries and inflow of 
foreign exchange currencies to the domestic economy were totally prevented. There were 
official, or accounting, fixed exchange rates between foreign exchange currencies of the CMEA 
member countries and foreign countries’ currencies; however, there was no exchange rate 
between foreign exchange currencies and domestic nonconvertible currencies (Portes 1987, 
410–417). Non-convertibility between foreign exchange currencies and domestic currencies 
made official fixed exchange rates between foreign exchange currencies and foreign countries’ 
currencies “arbitrary” and economically nonfunctional (Portes 1987, 420; Treml 1980, 198–
199).    
 
Central planning, international trade monopolies and especially “multiple currency structure”, in 
CMEA member countries laid the groundwork for another insulation mechanism, which was 
multiple price structure. There were three different price mechanisms that corresponded with the 
three different currencies in CMEA member countries. The first, domestic prices which were 
determined by each states’ economic planning institutions and accounted, or exchanged, in 
domestic nonconvertible currencies. The domestic prices of consumption, intermediate, and 
investment, or capital, goods were centrally assigned by planning institutions. Second, world 
market prices which were used in international trade with capitalist economies and accounted, 
or exchanged, in foreign trade currencies, or convertible currencies. The domestic prices of 
imported goods, or prices of “going to be” exported goods, which was paid to exporting 
enterprises, were determined by planning institutions which were not directly linked with 
international trade prices, or world market prices. Additionally, there were taxes for imports and 
subsidies for exports in the domestic economy. Due to variations in domestic prices and world 
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market prices, different currencies, and taxes, or subsidies, consumers and enterprises in the 
domestic economy face with inherently different prices than foreign trade institutions for 
example, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, for importing or exporting goods (Ofer 1987, 1794; 
Portes 1987; Treml 1980). Calculations about CMEA member countries’ total gains or losses 
from international trade is very difficult because items on the earnings side, revenue from 
exports sold in international trade, taxes, revenue from imports sold in domestic economy etc., 
and on the costs side, cost of buying “going to be” exported goods from domestic enterprises, 
subsidies, cost of buying imported goods through international trade, etc., were accounted, or 
exchanged, in different currencies which were either nonconvertible to each other, domestic and 
foreign exchange currencies, or the exchange rate between them is arbitrary. Treml (1980), 
calculated the USSR’s total gains, or losses, from international trade using input-output tables of 
the USSR and with several assumptions. The CMEA member countries’ total gains, or losses, 
from international trade were absorbed by the state budget; therefore, it had an effect on national 
income and money supply, both in domestic currency and foreign trade currency (Portes 1987, 
418–423; Treml 1980, 199). 
 
The third price mechanism in CMEA member countries was between CMEA member countries, 
or intra CMEA, trade prices and accounted, or exchanged, in Transferable Ruble. The quantities 
and prices in intra CMEA trade were based on bilateral negotiations. The rules of bilateral 
negotiations were determined multilaterally by CMEA Executive Committee meetings. The 
bilateral trade agreements between CMEA member countries were done every five years (1960, 
1965, 1970, etc.) based on their subsequent five-year economic plans (1961–1965 economic 
plan, 1966–1970 economic plan, etc.). The intra CMEA trade prices were fixed for the next five 
years (for example, the 1960 agreements fixed trade prices for 1961 and 1965) and the price 
calculation method was complex; however, it was essentially based on the previous five-year 
average of world market prices (for example, the price calculation for a specific commodity in 
the 1960 agreements was based on the five-year average world market prices between 1955 and 
1959 of the same commodity). This intra CMEA trade price calculation method was used 
between 1958 and 1975. The lag of adjustment of intra CMEA trade prices to world market 
prices was longer than five years and because of that, short-term price fluctuations in intra 
CMEA trade were eliminated.  
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However, this mentioned intra CMEA trade price calculation method was changed in January 
1975, and a new method became effective in 1976, at the CMEA Executive Committee meeting 
in Bucharest due to high price volatility in world markets after the beginning of the oil crises in 
1973. The new intra CMEA trade price calculation method, called the Bucharest Principle, was 
similar to the previous one but the prices of traded commodities started to change every year 
based on the moving-average method. The intra CMEA trade price calculation of the specific 
commodity in 1976 was based on previous five-year average world market prices between 1971 
and 1976 of the same commodity and in 1977 it was based on the five-year average world 
market prices between 1972 and 1977. Because of these varying intra CMEA trade price 
calculation methods, intra CMEA trade was gradually affected by changes in the world market 
prices (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 36; Hewett 1980, 324; Portes 1987, 411; Raczkowski 
1987, 362). Also, according to several authors’ calculations, the intra CMEA trade prices could 
not be solely explainable by these two “official” calculation methods because real intra CMEA 
trade prices were divergent from prices calculated by these methods. The general claim of the 
authors is that despite the disagreement on the reason, the USSR was “implicitly” subsidizing 
trade with other CMEA member countries by exporting commodities with prices lower than 
related prices based on the two “official” methods, and importing commodities with prices 
higher than associated prices based on them (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 36–37; Hewett 
1980; Portes 1987, 411–412). 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that CMEA member countries’ economies, especially that of the 
USSR, were autarkic and closed (due to the established insulation mechanisms) to external 
economic fluctuations. This assumption is reinforced by the lack of published data, difficulties 
related to the calculation of economic openness, ratio or percentage of sum of exports and 
imports over national income, of CMEA member countries. Economic openness calculations 
were neither published nor done by official Soviet statistical institutions and, due to the multiple 
price and currency system, they are hard to calculate (Ofer 1987, 1794; Treml 1980, 184–186).  
 
As a rule, relatively big economies, like that of the USSR, are more closed than smaller ones, 
like the other CMEA member countries (Ofer 1987, 1794). The USSR’s economic openness 
percentage was between eight and fourteen percent, according to different calculations, in the 
second half of the 1960s. However, it became higher than twenty percent in the second half of 
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the 1970s, which reached similar level that of the USA’s or Brazil’s; therefore, the USSR was 
neither closed, nor autarkic after mid-1970’s (Ofer 1987, 1975; Trzeciakowski 1987, 475).  
 
And, in fact, other CMEA member countries were more open than the USSR. According to 
Maximova (1987), in 1980, the share of export in national income was 29 percent in the CSSR, 
30 percent in the GDR, 31 percent in Poland, and 54 percent in Hungary (Maximova 1987, 
431). According to Brown and Tardos (1980), Hungary’s openness percentage was around 105 
in 1977 (Brown and Tardos 1980, 255). Trzeciakowski (1987) calculated the openness 
percentages of CMEA member countries between 1970 and 1981; the CSSR’s openness 
percentage was increased from 17 to 37 percent, the GDR’s openness percentage was increased 
from 35 to 63 percent, Hungary’s openness percentage was over 100 between 1975 and 1980 
and Poland’s openness percentage was fluctuated between 44 percent (1970) and 68 percent 
(1975, 1980) (Trzeciakowski 1987, 475). As a corollary, the rates of growth of trade between 
CMEA member countries and developed capitalist economies in the 1970s were higher than the 
average growth rate of world trade, and aggregate exports of CMEA member countries to 
Western European countries reached the same level as exports from the USA (Maximova 1987, 
431).  
 
One of the possible important causes of the increase in openness of CMEA member countries 
and rise in international trade with capitalist economies in the late 1960s and 1970s was the 
external economic fluctuations (the oil crises) which is going to be discussed in the next section. 
Another important cause of these increases, especially the rise in international trade with 
capitalist economies, was the implementation of Détente or peaceful coexistence policies. The 
Agreement of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 had given a boost to diplomatic, 
economic and political cooperation between CMEA member countries and developed capitalist 
economies. The Communist parties of CMEA member countries made a collective call for 
foreign economic opening in 1969 (Csaba 1980, 94–96; Shmelev 1979, 315). The international 
trade systems of CMEA member countries were radically changed by the Perestroika policies of 
Gorbachev administration. The state monopoly over the international trade in the USSR was 
abolished in December of 1988. This was the beginning of the liberalization of international 
trade in CMEA member countries and the demise of the CMEA system as well (Kotz and Weir 
2007, 89–90).   
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While Détente and Perestroika policies affected all CMEA member countries’ international 
trade, there were economic reforms which occurred in specific member countries of CMEA 
between 1960 and 1989 that were not directly related to the effects of oil crises per se but 
mostly associated with the political changes in these countries. These reforms essentially 
affected the specific countries, international trade and indebtedness levels both in the short and 
long run.  
 
The short lived economic reforms like the New Economic Model (NEM) in the CSSR between 
1965 and 1968, New Economic System (NES) between 1963 and 1968; and Economic System 
of Socialism (ESS) between 1968 and 1970 in the GDR are beyond the scope of the thesis 
because their long-run effects were very limited.  
 
Meanwhile, the workers riots in Poland caused a political change in 1970, and the Gierek 
administration took power. The Gierek administration tried to decrease workers’ discontent by 
implementing several economic reforms. It started big investment projects in 1970 for 
increasing efficiency and productivity. These investment goods were mostly imported from 
developed capitalist economies and financed by loans obtained from the same economies in 
addition to domestic savings. Therefore, Poland’s trade with developed capitalist economies and 
debt to those economies immediately increased in the early 1970s. The Gierek administration 
also made high real wage hikes through the 1970s to diminish workers’ discontent. The most 
important economic reform of the Gierek administration was the adjustment of domestic prices 
to world market prices in early 1970s via adjusting the domestic prices of “going to be” 
exported goods and imported goods to the world market prices. They used newly introduced 
currency exchange coefficients, not official exchange rates, for making this price adjustment. 
Polish citizens were permitted to hold and acquire foreign currency by Gierek administration’s 
reforms. These economic reforms were one of the causes of inflation, increasing trade deficit, 
and indebtedness levels in Poland after 1973 (Fallenbuchl 1980).  
 
Similarly, the Kadar administration, which took power after the 1956 uprising in Hungary, also 
implemented economic reforms which were called the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 
1968. The Kadar administration abolished the regulation of production through central planning, 
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relaxed price controls, and also, adjusted domestic prices to the world market prices via the 
NEM reforms. These economic reforms were aimed at stimulating profit motivated enterprises 
conforming to the plan through general regulations and adaptation to changes in world markets. 
Attempts were made to equate producer prices to the average cost of production, and domestic 
consumer prices were going to be proportional to the average cost of production with a profit 
margin via NEM reforms. Prices of basic consumer goods and real wages were regulated by the 
state institutions and newly introduced commercial exchange rate, or foreign trade price 
coefficients, were determined by the average cost of exports through these reforms. A new 
exchange rate system was introduced for adjusting domestic prices of imported goods and 
“going to be” exported goods to world market prices. The introduction of this new exchange 
rate system could also be considered as a policy response to the oil crises because it became 
effective in 1976. The state would make investments on high technology sectors for increasing 
the competitiveness of Hungary in world markets and for increasing efficiency in production. 
The Kadar administration also tried to support import substitution and export oriented growth at 
the same time through these reforms.  
 
In short, NEM reforms liberalized the Hungarian economy and it became more vulnerable to 
external shocks due to the abolition of insulation mechanisms; therefore, these economic 
changes were one of the causes of a large number of unfinished investment projects, a rapid 
increase in trade deficit, and the indebtedness level in Hungary after 1973 (Brown and Tardos 
1980). Dobrinsky’s (1989) econometric calculations for the period between 1962 and 1985 also 
verified that Poland and Hungary had different price structures than other CMEA countries. He 
showed that the lag of adjustment between domestic prices and world market prices was 
relatively long in the USSR; however, it was relatively short in Poland and Hungary (Dobrinsky 
1989, 330). 
 
Effects of Oil Crises on the CMEA Member Countries’ International Trade and Level of 
Indebtedness 
The world economy was in turbulence between 1973 and 1982. The Bretton Woods system 
gradually collapsed between 1971 and 1973; oil prices quadrupled in 1973 and doubled again in 
1979, the developed capitalist economies were in recession between 1973 and 1975 and also 
between 1980 and 1982, commodity prices in world markets were increasing, worldwide high 
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inflation occurred throughout the same period, and interest rates in world financial markets rose 
very rapidly between 1979 and 1981 due to Volcker Shock. Yet another important trend in the 
same period was the increasing supply of exports from developing countries. Developing 
capitalist economies accelerated the supply of relatively high quality, low-medium technology 
manufactured commodities to world markets with relatively low prices due to low labor cost, 
high energy utilization and high efficiency (Csaba 1980, 96; Shmelev 1979, 316).  
 
Meanwhile, CMEA member countries were increasing their international trade with developed 
capitalist economies and started taking loans in 1969 from the same economies due to Détente 
policy and economic reforms in specific CMEA member countries. CMEA member countries 
were faced with important economic problems after 1973 due to superimposed effects of two 
new economic trends. These trends, increasing economic and financial relations with developed 
capitalist economies and turbulence in the world economy (oil crises) between 1973 and 1982, 
exogenously affected CMEA member countries’ economies. CMEA member countries’ 
economies were not completely insulated from the effects of the oil crises (Bognar 1987, 406; 
Portes 1987, 423). It affected CMEA member countries through several channels despite the 
existence of the “layers of insulation” which were discussed in the previous section. These 
channels were the acceleration in the general level of world commodity prices, or inflation, 
changes in relative prices of commodities exchanged in world markets, variations in exchange 
rates, changes in demand for exports and import supplies, and finally diversities in world 
financial markets, namely interest rates and credit availability (Brown and Tardos 1980, 255–
256; Csaba 1980; Trzeciakowski 1987, 465).  
 
The USSR’s anticipated increase in foreign trade turnover was 35 percent for the years between 
1971 and 1975, according to the five-year plan; however, foreign trade turnover increased 129 
percent in reality (Treml 1980, 199). The stylized facts about all CMEA member countries 
between 1973 and 1978 are bearing out the proposition that CMEA member countries were 
affected by the oil crises; their openness percentages rapidly increased, their terms of trade, ratio 
of weighted prices of exported commodities over imported ones, changed, they started having 
substantial trade deficits, and they accumulated debt to developed capitalist economies very 
rapidly (Hewett 1980, 341–342; Portes 1987, 410; Raczkowski 1987, 363–364; Trzeciakowski 
1987, 475). Both CMEA member countries’ international trade with other CMEA member 
31 
 
countries, intra CMEA trade, and CMEA member countries’ international trade with developed 
capitalist economies were quickly increased between 1973 and 1978 (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 
2012, 38; Maximova 1987, 430–431).  
 
Notwithstanding, several researchers have varying opinions about whether CMEA member 
countries turned inward (percentage increase of intra CMEA trade in their total international 
trade) or outward (percentage increase of international trade with developed economies trade) in 
their total volume of international trade, as a result of the oil crises. Beckmann and Fidrmuc 
(2012),  Portes (1977) and Trzeciakowski (1987) were arguing that CMEA member countries 
turned inward; however, based on related data, Zimmerman (1980) claimed that CMEA member 
countries turned outward between 1973 and 1978 (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 46; 
Trzeciakowski 1987, 472; Zimmerman 1980, 429). The de facto inconvertibility between 
Transferable Ruble and Foreign Trade Currency, and international trade price differences 
between intra CMEA prices and world market prices, are the main cause of this controversy.  
 
CMEA member countries’ increasing trade deficits to developed capitalist economies between 
1973 and 1982 were not the direct result of the rise in oil prices because CMEA, as a trade 
block, was not a net oil importer but a net oil exporter (Portes 1977, 753). Nevertheless, there 
were structural problems in international trade between CMEA member countries and 
developed capitalist economies. CMEA member countries commodity composition in 
international trade with developed capitalist countries were explained in the previous section. 
Their import demand from developed capitalist countries was relatively inelastic and developed 
capitalist countries import demand from CMEA member countries was relatively low and 
elastic, despite the fact that their goods were relatively cheap, and only the exception would be 
the oil exports of the USSR. Therefore, CMEA member countries had a structural comparative 
disadvantage to developed capitalist countries due to relatively low technology usage in 
production and the low quality of commodities (Portes 1977, 762). Developing capitalist 
countries had started to dominate the world market for low technology manufactured goods in 
1970s due to low labor costs and improvements in their production technologies and efficiency; 
therefore, CMEA member countries low technology manufactured goods exports to developed 
capitalist economies declined (Csaba 1980, 96; Shmelev 1979, 315). The recession in developed 
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capitalist economies between 1973 and 1982 also caused a decrease in demand for imports from 
CMEA member countries (Csaba 1980, 98; Shmelev 1979, 316).  
 
Another structural problem of CMEA member countries was the low efficiency of material and 
energy utilization in production despite high material and energy intensity in their production. In 
this respect, the world oil consumption increased 2 percent and OECD member countries oil 
consumption increased 1.8 percent; however, CMEA member countries oil consumption 
increased 30 percent between 1973 and 1978. This situation also originated from the intra 
CMEA trade price structure, where oil importing CMEA member countries, through intra 
CMEA trade, were faced with increase in oil prices fully only after 1978. CMEA member 
countries oil import from the USSR increased; however, developed capitalist economies oil 
import from the USSR decreased between 1973 and 1978 (Csaba 1980; 104). The USSR’s oil 
exports consisted of 15 percent of its total exports in 1970 but it rose to 35 percent in 1977; 
however, the USSR’s oil exports to capitalist economies consisted of 53 percent of its total 
exports in 1970 but that declined to 39 percent in 1977 for the same reason. According to 
Treml’s (1980) calculations, the USSR’s export to NMP ratio, in domestic currency and prices, 
did not increase much in 1970’s.  
 
Additionally, the USSR’s terms of trade with capitalist economies deteriorated 3.5 percent 
between 1970 and 1977 (Rosefielde 1980, 155; Treml 1980, 190). This phenomenon was partly 
originated by international trade price differences between world market prices and intra CMEA 
trade prices; and also, from CMEA member countries’ dependence to two different trade 
structures; the intra CMEA trade and the international trade with developed capitalist 
economies. This resulted in inefficiencies in international trade and production. Some oil 
importing CMEA member countries, for example Hungary and Poland, also started importing 
oil from capitalist economies after 1973 (Brown and Tardos 1980, 258; Fallenbuchl 1980, 300).  
 
A deterioration of CMEA member countries’ terms of trade with developed capitalist economies 
between 1973 and 1978 was caused by relative price changes in their export and import 
commodities. CMEA member countries were importing high-quality, high technology 
manufactured commodities, and intermediate and capital-investment goods, from developed 
capitalist economies; however, they were exporting low quality, low technology manufactured 
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commodities to developed capitalist economies. High quality, high technology manufactured 
commodities have higher energy/labor ratio in their inputs (capital intensive) than low quality, 
low technology manufactured commodities’ energy/labor ratio in their inputs (labor intensive). 
Therefore, an increase in energy, or oil, prices in world markets would lead to an increase in the 
relative price ratio of high quality, high technology manufactured commodities to low quality, 
low technology manufactured commodities (Brown and Tardos 1980, 260–261).  
 
Furthermore, developed capitalist economies rapidly implemented energy and material saving 
techniques to their production processes in 1970s, due to the increase in oil prices; however, 
CMEA member countries either slowly implemented energy and material saving techniques to 
their production processes or efficiency of material and energy utilization in production was 
declined in 1970s, due to relatively long lag of adjustment of intra CMEA trade prices to world 
market prices, and a relatively low feedback effect of increase in production cost to changes in 
production technique (Csaba 1980, 104–106). CMEA member countries’ volume, or quantity, of 
imports from developed capitalist economies was increased more rapidly than CMEA member 
countries’ volume, or quantity, of exports to developed capitalist economies between 1973 and 
1978 (Fallenbuchl 1980, 284–291; Rosefielde 1980, 152). These are the main causes of the 
CMEA member countries’ increasing trade deficits, or imbalances, to developed capitalist 
economies during the oil crises, especially between 1973 and 1978.  
 
It should be underlined that intra CMEA trade was mostly dominated by the trade between the 
USSR and other CMEA member countries. Intra CMEA trade grew rapidly between 1973 and 
1980, due to the oil crises, and decreased slowly between 1980 and 1986, and then rapidly after 
1987, because of Perestroika reforms (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 46). Beckmann and 
Fidrmuc (2012) showed that there was a structural break in intra CMEA trade in 1975. They 
found the structural break with econometric analysis by using intra CMEA trade data between 
1958 and 1985 (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 42). The intra CMEA trade price calculation 
system changed in 1975; as a result, the lag of adjustment of intra CMEA trade prices to world 
market prices diminished and rapid increases in world market prices that occurred in 1973, due 
to oil crises, were fully conveyed to intra CMEA trade prices in 1978. The USSR’s terms of 
trade with other CMEA member countries did not change between 1970 and 1974; however, it 
improved 13 percent between 1975 and 1976, and further improved 4.5 percent in 1977. The 
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speed and magnitude of change was very high when we compare these with the previous two 
decades. (Brown and Tardos 1980, 257; Fallenbuchl 1980, 284; Hewett 1980, 340–341; 
Rosefielde 1980, 155).  
 
However, if the new intra CMEA trade price calculation system was fully implemented, the 
USSR’s terms of trade with other CMEA member countries would be improved by around 40 
percent between 1974 and 1978, but it only improved around 20 percent. In a light of this fact, 
several authors argued that the USSR was implicitly subsidizing international trade with other 
CMEA member countries (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 36–37; Hewett 1980, 340). The 
volume, or quantity, of intra CMEA trade grew between 1973 and 1978; however, it declined 
between 1975 and 1976 and restarted increasing after 1977 (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 43, 
Hewett 1980, 341; Rosefielde 1980, 152).  
 
The USSR’s terms of trade with other CMEA member countries improved not only because of 
the increase in the oil prices, but also because of the relative price increase of USSR’s 
manufactured commodities and capital-investment commodities exports to CMEA member 
countries, to the CMEA member countries manufactured commodities and capital-investment 
commodities exports to USSR between 1973 and 1978 (Hewett 1980, 328–330). This relative 
price change trend was similar to the change in relative prices in trade between CMEA member 
countries and developed capitalist economies in the same period. In addition to the relative price 
changes, the USSR’s share of machinery imports from CMEA member countries in total 
machinery imports declined, and the share of machinery imports from developed capitalist 
economies increased in the same period (Treml 1980, 190).  
 
The USSR’s trade surplus from intra CMEA trade increased rapidly between 1974 and 1978; 
and as a mirror image, other CMEA member countries trade deficit from intra CMEA trade 
rapidly rose at the same period. Therefore, the USSR was accumulating a trade surplus from 
intra CMEA trade, but giving a trade deficit to developed capitalist economies; and when the 
effects of international trade with two trade blocks summed, the USSR trade deficit was 
increasing between 1973 and 1978. The total trade deficit of other CMEA member countries 
was also increasing between 1973 and 1978 (Hewett 1980, 334; Rosefielde 1980, 153–154). 
These results are indicating that intra CMEA trade was also affected by the oil crises. Hungary 
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started using US dollars, along with Transferable Ruble, in intra CMEA trade transactions in 
1970’s to cover up its trade deficit with developed capitalist economies, due to the de facto 
inconvertibility between Transferable Ruble and Foreign Trade Currencies (Brown and Tardos 
1980, 271).     
 
Moreover, the level of indebtedness of CMEA members started to rise in mid-1970’s. The level 
of indebtedness of Poland, Hungary, and the GDR became substantial in the early 1970s 
because these relatively small economies were more open and their international trade with 
developed capitalist economies were relatively high. In addition to that, Poland, and to a certain 
extent Hungary, started taking loans from developed capitalist economies for financing new 
investment projects and improving economic efficiency. However, all CMEA member 
countries’ level of indebtedness increased very rapidly in the mid-1970’s, due to the persistent 
balance of payments, or trade deficit, problems caused by the oil crises (Portes 1997, 754; 
Portes 1987, 410; Raczkowski 377).  
 
CMEA member countries took most of their loans from financial institutions in European 
developed capitalist economies. CMEA member countries received further loans from non-
European developed capitalist economies, like Japan and the US, but proportionally it was very 
low (Portes 1977, 759). CMEA member countries’ loans from financial institutions in European 
developed capitalist economies were denominated in European currencies (Portes 1977, 758). 
30 percent of CMEA member countries’ debt was European government backed export credits 
which had relatively low interest rates with longer maturity; however, more than 30 percent of 
their debt was directly taken from financial institutions in European developed capitalist 
economies, which had relatively high interest rates- most of the time London Interbank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR) which is the global reference rate for unsecured short-term borrowing in the 
interbank market- with shorter maturity in 1975.  
 
In general, CMEA member countries preferred direct Euromarket credits from financial 
institutions over export credits mostly because the former had lesser political constrains. In 
addition to that, the percentage of direct Euromarket credits in CMEA member countries’ total 
debt had been increased after 1975 (Portes 1977, 756–759). CMEA member countries’, except 
the USSR, debt to developed capitalist economies increased from $ 6 billion (US) to $ 21.2 
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billion (US) in 1975, and it further increased to $ 59.6 billion (US); a rise of roughly 10 times 
between 1970 and 1981. The USSR’s debt to developed capitalist economies increased from $ 1 
billion (US) to $ 7.8 billion (US) in 1975, and it further rose to $ 15.5 billion (US); manifesting 
a rise of almost 15 times between 1970 and 1981.  
 
One should notice that there was huge turbulence in world financial markets between 1978–
1982 due to the second climax in the oil crises and the Volcker Shock. Interest rates increased 
very quickly and financial institutions started credit rationing in the same period. This 
turbulence in world financial markets severely hit the CMEA member countries. They 
encountered more than 14 percent interest rates, with margin over LIBOR, around 1981 and 
1982. The USSR, Hungary, Poland, and the GDR were included in the group of countries with a 
high degree of risk in 1981. Therefore, they could not rollover their debt with long or medium 
maturity, and they gradually started taking loans with higher interest rates and shorter 
maturities. CMEA member countries’, except the USSR, liabilities increased 1,5 times between 
1977 and 1981; however, their interest payments increased 3,3 times in the same period 
(Maximova 1987, 433–434; Raczkowski 1987, 378). Hungary, Poland, and the GDR faced debt 
servicing troubles in this period because their debt to yearly export to capitalist economies, this 
is the main factor for earning convertible currencies, ratio became 2,0, 2,7 and 2,3, respectively 
in 1976 (Portes 1977, 761). Poland was forced to make an agreement with the Paris Club, (an 
umbrella organization of creditor countries and financial institutions), for debt restructuring in 
1981 and 1985 due to debt servicing problems (Rieffel 2003, 71). Hungary was an exceptional 
case. The USSR gave a 700 million rubles credit to Hungary between 1976 and 1980 to cover 
its debt (Beckmann and Fidrmuc 2012, 47).  
 
Effect of Changes in CMEA Member Countries’ Indebtedness Level and International 
Trade on Their National Economies 
The CMEA member countries’ economies were affected by the oil crises with varying levels of 
severity. This severity was dependent on; openness of economies, percentage of international 
trade with capitalist economies, or intra-CMEA trade, in total international trade of these 
countries, trade composition, efficiency and technology level in production of these countries, 
and degree of economic reform, or economic liberalization.  
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There is an apparent consensus in the associated literature. The more open economies, like 
Poland, GDR, and Hungary were more severely affected by the oil crises than the closer 
economies, like the USSR. The CMEA member countries’, like USSR, Poland, and Hungary, 
economies had relatively higher percentages of international trade with capitalist economies, or 
relatively lower percentage of intra CMEA trade, in their total international trade were deeply 
affected by the oil crises, or vice versa, like the GDR and the CSSR. The countries which were 
exporting oil, whose high technology manufactured commodities and capital-investment goods 
made up a relatively large portion of their exports and production, performed with relatively 
higher efficiency. The countries such as the USSR, were less severely affected by the oil crises 
than countries which were importing oil, and whose low technology manufactured commodities 
constituted a relatively bigger portion of their exports and production done with relatively lower 
efficiency, like other CMEA members countries. The countries which had experienced 
relatively radical economic reforms towards liberalization of the economy, like Poland and 
Hungary, were more severely affected by oil crises than more “traditional” centrally planned 
economies like the USSR (Maximova 1987, 431; Portes 1987, 423; Raczkowski 1987, 467–468, 
473; Trzeciakowski 1987, 361–363).  
 
The increase in world market prices, originating from the oil crises, transmitted to domestic 
prices to different degrees on CMEA member countries (Shemelev 1979, 316). Traditionally 
state institutions in CMEA member countries controlled retail prices, input prices and wages. 
Also, direct earnings or loses from international trade, net exports, were absorbed by the state 
budget, and state institutions were giving subsidies to enterprises, especially export oriented 
ones, to decrease the cost of production and increase “profitability”, competitiveness in 
international markets, and to stabilize domestic prices. States were also collecting retail taxes, 
duties and special taxes from imported goods. This system was based on international trade 
monopoly of the state, the inconvertibility of domestic and foreign trade currency, and the 
differences between domestic and international prices (Brown and Tardos 1980, 266–270; 
Fallenbuchl 1980, 286–292; Raczkowski 1987, 371–372; Treml 1980, 196).  
 
This system promoted a relative domestic price stability in the medium run; however, domestic 
prices were adjusted to world prices with a delay; therefore, the main aim of the system was not 
efficiency but stability. The general trend of domestic prices in CMEA member countries was 
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upward between 1975 and 1980, mainly caused by the oil crises. There were several domestic 
price changes in CMEA member countries to adjust domestic prices to world market prices 
between 1975 and 1982. Nevertheless, as a general rule, when one group of goods’ domestic 
prices increased, another group of commodities prices decreased in order to smooth inflationary 
pressure (Raczkowski 1987, 371–372). This system’s Achilles’ heel was the short-term price 
fluctuations in world markets and rapid turbulence in the balance of payments. The absence of 
price signals in domestic markets, however, prevented rapid import substitution of enterprises 
which used imported raw materials, capital-investment goods, or intermediate goods, and export 
oriented enterprises, or whole economy, and could not direct resources to the production of 
export commodities which become relatively expensive. Also consumers in the retail market 
would not quickly adjust their consumption pattern based on the new world prices. There is a 
trade-off then, between the inflationary pressures and deficit pressures on state budgets and 
trade balances in this system (Brown and Tardos 1980, 266–270; Fallenbuchl 1980, 286; 
Raczkowski 1987, 371, 376).  
 
In addition to that, when subsidies for price stability, or for supporting exports, exceed taxes 
imposed for the sake of price stability, they will cause a deficit pressure on the state budget. 
Although the CMEA member countries’ economies were in full employment such budget 
deficits may have accelerate inflation, and so for preventing inflation, the state must cut other 
expenditures (Fallenbuchl 1980, 292). Treml (1980) also claimed that surplus caused by 
international trade, when taxes, subsidies, imports, and exports are taken into total 
consideration, will increase a surplus in state budget; and this surplus can result in an upheaval 
in state expenditures, credit expenditure of state banks, and increases in the money supply, 
which are inflationary as well. Treml further argued that the USSR would face an inflationary 
pressure due to its trade surplus and transmission of the increase in commodity prices in world 
markets to domestic prices (Treml 1980, 197). Domestic retail prices did not change in the 
USSR, the CSSR or the GDR between 1970 and 1975; however, it increased 13 percent in 
Poland and 16 percent in Hungary in the same period; and while between 1975 and 1980 
domestic retail prices in the USSR and the GDR stayed the same, they increased 10 percent in 
the CSSR; and in Poland and Hungary the increase was more than 40 percent in the same period 
(Raczkowski 1987, 375). Poland and Hungary had adjusted most of their domestic prices to 
world market prices, with control over prices of essential goods, via a new exchange rate 
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system, in the early 1970s and 1976, respectively. Therefore, relatively high inflation in Poland 
and Hungary was not surprising because, the new price system was prioritizing trade balance 
and efficiency over price stability. There was a cost push inflation in Poland in 1970s. The main 
cause of inflation was the rise in oil and energy input prices; however, real wages also increased 
very rapidly, in response to workers’ discontent, between 1973 and 1982 (Fallenbuchl 1980, 
286–299; Raczkowski 1987, 373–375). Nevertheless, Hungarian workers’ wages stayed stable 
in 1970’s (Brown and Tardos 1980, 264–265).  
 
The deficit caused by the difference between price equalization taxes and subsidies, which was 
absorbed in the state budget, in turn, rapidly increased between 1973 and 1982 in Poland and 
Hungary; therefore, they gradually increased domestic prices, directed subsidies to export 
oriented enterprises, and revaluated exchanges rates to decrease the cost of burden of price 
equalization on the state budget, increase exports, and make import substitution (Brown and 
Tardos 1980, 267–270; Fallenbuchl 1980; 286–293; Raczkowski 1987, 376–377). These 
evaluations, from several different authors, indicate that the rise in commodity prices in the 
world market, due to the oil crises, affected domestic commodity prices in CMEA member 
countries to varying degrees. 
 
The effects of the oil crises between 1973 and 1982 on CMEA member countries’ economies, 
apart from inflation, were; rising trade deficits, increasing indebtedness levels, and increasing 
interest payments, due to turbulence in the world financial markets between 1978 and 1972. The 
only solution to these problems was simultaneous implementation of two economic policies. 
First, decrease imports, or import substitution, and increase in exports; second, boost domestic 
savings so that they exceed investments, or in other words, growth in consumption and 
investment must be smaller than that of total economic growth (Brown and Tardos 1980, 265; 
Csaba 1980, 101; Portes 1977, 760; Portes 1987, 419).  
 
In theory, CMEA member countries could make the proper investments for decreasing imports, 
by investing in import substituting sectors, and increasing exports, through investment in export 
oriented enterprises, financed by efficiently using already taken credits or increasing domestic 
savings (Portes 1977, 760).  However, the structure of the domestic economies and international 
trade of CMEA member countries was not flexible enough for the efficient implementation of 
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both policies at the same time. CMEA member countries’ economies were not export-led but 
import-fed. The economic planners saw exports as a necessary evil to pay for the required 
imports (Portes 1987, 418). They were inward looking economies and their economic structure 
did not support an increase in exports but only substituting imports (Balassa and Tyson 1987, 
439–440). The CMEA member countries tried to direct some of the domestic resources to 
export oriented enterprises, and also increased subsidies to these enterprises: However, such 
efforts did not cause a very rapid export growth due to the recession in the developed capitalist 
economies originating from the oil crises, and the decrease in import demand in these countries 
(Fallenbuchl 1980, 289–291). There were also structural reasons, which prevented rapid export 
growth, such as the export composition of CMEA member countries, the price system and so 
on, which were discussed in the previous section. Also, Hungary appreciated its own foreign 
trade currency against other currencies after 1973 (Balassa and Tyson 1987, 457).  
 
Furthermore, there were also problems related to investment which are discussed below. In the 
case of import substitution, or decrease in imports, the economic policy was more problematic 
than the policy concerning the increase in exports in CMEA member countries. CMEA member 
countries’ imports mostly consisted of “productive” imports such as raw materials, high 
technology commodities, capital-investment commodities, and high technology intermediate 
goods (Dobrinsky 1989, 325; Portes 1977, 760; Portes 1987, 419). Therefore, the income 
elasticity of imports was relatively low, i.e., inelastic (Csaba 1980, 101; Fallenbuchl 1980, 289–
291; Portes 1977, 760). Hungary in 1973 and 1975, and Poland in 1975 and 1977, could made 
small import substitution, which are indicated by decreases in the income elasticity of 
substitutions in these countries (Balassa and Tyson 1987, 454; Brown and Tardos 1980, 270–
271; Fallenbuchl 1980; 289–291). However, the cost of import substitution, the cost of 
investment on import substituting sectors, in CMEA member countries in the short run and 
medium run was too high; therefore, the level of import substitution was very low in these 
countries (Portes 1977, 760). The investment for import substitution and the increase in exports, 
through increasing competitiveness, requires high technology investment and CMEA member 
countries were importing high technology capital-investment goods from developed capitalist 
countries; therefore, trade balance could not be achieved by new investments in the short-run. 
Additionally, there was a high correlation between imports and investment in CMEA member 
countries until 1974 (Brown and Tardos 1980, 273–274).  
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Another policy for increasing investment was financing the investments through the rise in 
domestic savings, or fall in consumption; however, this was also politically impossible for most 
of the CMEA member countries (Fallenbuchl 1980; 301). Eventually, planners in CMEA 
member countries chose, or were forced to choose, the worst policy, which is the restrictive one. 
The planned decline in imports, followed by a fall in investment rates, or increase in unfinished 
investment plans ultimately lead to a fall in the growth rates of national incomes. These 
restrictive policies occurred in most of the CMEA member countries to decrease the trade 
deficits and increasing resources which were directed to the financing of debt and interest 
payments between 1974 and 1982. This way especially true in Poland, Hungary and CSSR 
(Balassa and Tyson 1987; 457–458; Brown and Tardos 1980, 273–274; Csaba 1980, 101; 
Fallenbuchl 1980; 289–291; Portes 1987, 418). Some researchers claimed that the direct aim of 
these restrictive policies, the decrease in imports and in investment, was the slowing down of 
the economic growth because of the low-income elasticity of imports; i.e., inelasticity (Csaba 
1980, 101).  
 
However, according to orthodox economic approaches, a decrease in imports will positively 
affect the national income, or economic growth, because imports are considered as leakages 
which are equivalent to the marginal propensity to save (Holzman 1974, 126). Nonetheless, if 
the decrease in “productive” imports, like raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital-
investment goods, occurred due to exogenous factors, like balance of payment pressures, such a 
decrease will eventually cause a decline in national income greater than the initial decline in 
imports. This is called the “bottleneck effect”, or “bottleneck multiplier” if it refers to the ratio 
of the decrease in national income to the initial decrease in imports (Holzman 1974, 127). Portes 
(1987) and Fallenbuchl (1980) explained the simultaneous process of decreasing imports, 
decreasing investment rates, and the decrease in growth in national income for several CMEA 
member countries between 1974 and 1982 through the “bottleneck effect-multiplier” 
(Fallenbuchl 1980, 290–291; Portes 1987, 415). This economic policy caused shortages, a 
decrease in capacity utilization and also disrupted production in export oriented enterprises 
(Csaba 1980, 101; Portes 1987, 415). This recessionary process which CMEA member countries 
faced after 1973 due to the oil crises was not completely different from the recessionary process 
42 
 
that inward looking developing capitalist economies like Brazil, Mexico and Turkey confronted 
at the same period (Balassa and Tyson, 1987).  
 
The research of Dobrinsky (1989) was the only one which partially examines the effect of 
international trade on CMEA member countries’ economies by econometric methods. 
Dobrinsky’s research was based on a larger research project which created dynamic world scale 
macro model for projections. Different economies were dynamically interrelated in this project 
with their imports and exports. Each countries’ exports were dependent on total world imports 
and each countries’ imports were dependent on their own GDP, or national income. Dobrinsky 
examined the USSR, the GDR, the CSSR, Poland, and Hungary with data between 1960 and 
1985. His economic model was based on the supply driven Cobb-Douglas production function. 
In his model, the dependent variable were gross output and independent variables are total factor 
productivity (TFP), employment, capital and import, consisting only of raw material and 
intermediate goods imports (Dobrinsky 1989, 314–321). He found that there was a relatively 
high import growth in CMEA member countries during the 1960s. The contribution of import 
growth to the growth in gross output was between a low of 23 percent in GDR, and a high of 39 
percent in Hungary, in all CMEA member countries in 1960s, except the USSR. The 
contribution of import growth to the growth in gross output was only 7 percent in USSR, due to 
the relative size and closeness of the economy. The import growth decreased in CMEA 
countries during 1970’s, therefore, the contribution of import growth to the growth in gross 
output also declined. The contribution of import growth to the growth in gross output was 
between a low of 13 percent, in GDR, and a high of 30 percent in Poland, in all CMEA member 
countries except the USSR in 1970’s. The contribution of import growth to the growth in gross 
output was again limited to 7 percent in the USSR.  
 
Dobrinsky also found that there is a correlation with the increase in total factor productivity and 
import growth, or vice versa, especially for countries with a high contribution of import growth 
to the growth in gross output, such as Poland, Hungary, and the CSSR, but not in the USSR or 
the GDR. He explained it by the import composition of these countries which consisted of 
investment-capital goods, intermediate goods and high technology goods. Therefore, the 
decrease in import growth in Poland, Hungary, and the CSSR between 1971 and 1985, was due 
to the balance of payment problems accompanied by a decrease in total factor productivity and a 
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decline in growth rates of the gross output. He showed that the growth rate of imports was 
procyclical in CMEA member countries (Dobrinsky 1989, 323–325).  
 
Additionally, Dobrinsky also found that consumption was highly stable and investment was 
procyclical in CMEA member countries between 1960 and 1985. He further indicated that the 
import demand of these countries depended to a larger extent on domestic absorption, 
consumption plus investment, rather than export revenue or intended increase in export 
capacity. Furthermore, he found low price elasticity of imports for CMEA member countries 
(Dobrinsky 1989, 328–329). In the light of these findings, the chain of causality can be formed 
as imports had a huge effect on investment, and/or total factor productivity, and all these factors, 
import, investment and total factor productivity, were determining the growth rate of gross 
output, and the effect of employment was negligible due to full employment in CMEA member 
countries. This also reinforced the “bottleneck effect-multiplier” explanation for the relationship 
between growth in national income and imports in CMEA member countries. 
 
According to the related literature, the oil crises between 1973 and 1982, and financial 
turbulence between 1979 and 1982, affected CMEA member countries’ international trade and 
level of indebtedness. Moreover, many researchers claim that the balance of payment problems 
of the CMEA member countries and increasing level of indebtedness in those countries, 
reinforced with the rise in interest rates in the world financial markets and credit rationing, 
affected CMEA member countries’ economies through the decrease in imports, in investment 
rates, in growth rates of national incomes and in the unprecedented rise in inflation. However, 
this relationship, the effect of changes in CMEA member countries’ indebtedness level and 
international trade on their national economies, is not thoroughly examined by quantitative 
methods, especially with econometric analysis, in the existing related literature with the 
probable exception of Dobrinsky (1989). The main aim of Dobrinsky’s research however, was 
not to examine this relationship, and he did not check the effects of CMEA member countries’ 
indebtedness level or debt-interest payment obligations on their national economies. This thesis 
attempts to investigate this relationship and also to analyze the various effects of CMEA 
member countries’ international trade with different economic blocks; intra CMEA trade, 
international trade with developed capitalist economies and international trade with developing 
capitalist economies on their nation economies as well, for the relatively longer timespan 
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covering the 1960–1989 period depending on econometric analysis. In this way, this thesis 
endeavors to fill the significant gap inherent in the related literature. The anticipated results 
from quantitative analysis in this thesis are that the external economic fluctuations in capitalist 
economies between 1973 and 1982, due to the oil crises, negatively affected CMEA member 
countries national economies, through changes in CMEA member countries’ international trade, 
indebtedness level, and debt repayment conditions, for example, changes in interest rate on their 
debt. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The related literature suggested that the economies of CMEA member countries were import-
fed. The trade deficits of CMEA member countries increased between 1973 and 1982 due to the 
effects of the oil crises in these period. CMEA member countries took credits from developed 
capitalist economies during this period for covering up their deficit. However, the increasing 
indebtedness level of CMEA countries in this period, and turbulence in international financial 
market between 1979 and 1982, through a rise in interest rates and decline in credit supply, 
caused a debt servicing problem for CMEA member countries to varying degrees. Therefore, 
economic planners in these countries implemented policies to diminish imports to deal with this 
debt servicing problems. CMEA member countries’ imports mostly consisted of “productive” 
imports; therefore, the decrease in imports caused a bottleneck effect and NMP growth rates 
decreased in CMEA member countries.  This chain of causality, or causal hypothesis, explained 
above, suggests that the economies of CMEA member countries were negatively affected by the 
oil crises through changes in their imports, variations in their indebtedness levels, and relatedly 
changes in interest rates in international financial markets.  
 
Five CMEA member countries, namely the CSSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR, 
are examined in this thesis for the time frame between 1960 and 1989. This time frame covers 
preoil crises, oil crises, and postoil crises periods. Because the change in trends of variables of 
interest and causality between them cannot be found by only checking the period of oil crises; 
therefore, time frame of quantitative analysis is extended to preoil and postoil crises period. The 
hypothesis is tested by two methods, detecting the change in trends of variables, namely NMP, 
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import, export and level of indebtedness, by plotting variables with respect to time, and by 
checking the causal relationship between these variables by econometrics.    
 
Data 
The variables of interest for the five CMEA member countries, the CSSR, the GDR, Hungary, 
Poland, and the USSR, for the time frame between 1960 and 1989 are summarized in the table 
below.  
 
Table 1. Summary of Variables of Interest for Five CMEA Member Countries, 1960–1989 
Variables Abbreviation of Variables 
in Econometric Analysis 
Unit of Account  
Net Material Product 
(NMP) 
nmp  In Real Terms, In Domestic 
Currency 
CSSR: Constant 1977 Prices in 
Domestic KCS, Koruna 
Ceskoslovenska 
GDR: Constant 1980 Prices in 
Domestic Mark 
Hungary: Constant 1976 Prices in 
Domestic Forint 
Poland: Constant 1982 Prices in 
Domestic Zloty 
USSR: Constant 1973 Prices in 
Domestic Ruble 
 
Total Exports extot 
Total Imports imtot 
Imports from Socialist 
Economies 
imsoc 
Imports from Developed  
Capitalist Economies 
imind 
Imports from Developing 
Capitalist Economies 
imdev 
Level of Indebtedness, 
External Debt  
debtdomes 
Debt Repayment intdomes 
 
One of the biggest challenges in this thesis is obtaining the dataset. Plus, none of the data series 
are digitalized. The associated data series were obtained from hardcopy sources, manually 
digitalized and combined. All the data series have been converted to the same unit of account, 
the domestic currency of CMEA member countries in real terms, for internally consistent and 
comparable results, and also for removing the effect of price changes. Several data sources are 
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used in this thesis, Dobrinsky (1986), Marer (1972), Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic 
Studies (WIIW) (1979–1990), FRED (2018), United Nations (1974–1975), Glowny Urzad 
Statystyczny (1973–1974), Federalni Statisticky Urad (1972–1975), Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal (1973–1975), and Ministersvto Vneshney Torgovli (1972–1976). However, the data 
series are heavily based on two principal sources; Dobrinsky (1986) and Vienna Institute for 
Comparative Economic Studies (WIIW) (1979–1990). Dobrinsky (1986) is used as a data series 
between 1960 and 1982, and the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies (WIIW) 
(1979–1990) is used for data series between 1983 and 1989. Two series are combined in order 
to get one set of data for the analysis period 1960 and 1989. All the series have one observation 
per year. Two data series are extrapolated; the level of indebtedness between 1960 and 1971, 
and conversion rates between foreign exchange currencies, or valuta, and domestic currencies 
for the period between 1983 and 1989. It should be mentioned that the quality of the economic 
data from CMEA member countries is questionable and the dataset produced for this thesis is 
based on the data sources referred above. Ex-CMEA member countries’ statistical institutions 
could republish and digitalize the economic data for the period between 1945 and 1990 to 
diminish doubts about the quality of the data.  
  
NMP is the national income calculation method of CMEA member countries. NMP is the 
equivalent of the GDP; however, NMP is only calculated for sectors which produce tangible 
commodities; therefore, most of the service sectors are not included in the NMP because most 
of the services in CMEA member countries are not commodified and do not have any exchange 
values. Another difference between NMP and GDP calculation is that depreciation of fixed 
assets is subtracted in NMP calculation, but in standard GDP calculation it is not. NMP 
calculations are done in domestic currencies and with domestic price indices; henceforth, they 
are converted from nominal to real terms.  
 
The total exports and imports are aggregate variables which cover CMEA member countries’ 
international trade with all other countries in the World. They are published in foreign exchange 
currencies, or valuta, in nominal terms. While total export variables in foreign exchange 
currencies are converted to domestic currencies with export conversion rates between foreign 
exchange currencies and domestic currencies, total import variables are converted with import 
conversion rates.  Furthermore, total export and import variables are converted from nominal to 
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real terms with export and import price indices. Imports from socialist economies, from 
developed capitalist economies, and from developing capitalist economies variables were the 
subset variables of total imports and when we add up all three variables we reach the total 
import variable. The conversion method employed for the total import variable is also used for 
these three subset variables. The imports from the socialist economies variable does not solely 
cover imports from other CMEA member countries but also from other socialist economies as 
well (China, Yugoslavia, Albania, etc.). The total import variable is divided in three subsets for 
detecting possible distinct effects of imports from different country groups on the economies of 
CMEA member countries.  
 
The level of indebtedness variable is based on the net debt data of CMEA member countries to 
developed capitalist economies, therefore, it is a close proxy for the total level of indebtedness 
of CMEA member countries. The level of indebtedness variable indicates the level of external 
debt of CMEA member countries. In the case of CMEA member countries there was no 
distinction between public and private external debt since there was not any private sector at all. 
The level of indebtedness data is published in US dollars; therefore, first it is converted to 
foreign exchange currencies by using foreign exchange rates. Then the level of indebtedness in 
foreign exchange currencies is converted to domestic currencies via import conversion rates. 
Ultimately, the level of indebtedness is converted from nominal into real terms through the 
domestic price indices.  
 
The debt repayment variable indicates yearly debt payments, both principal and interest 
payments, of CMEA member countries to creditors. Comprehensive data for maturity dates and 
the level of interest rates for CMEA member countries’ debts do not exist; therefore, the level of 
indebtedness variable in domestic currencies and in real terms, multiplied by the Fed’s effective 
federal funds rate, (FRED 2018), for the last month of every year, is used in order to create a 
proxy for the debt repayment variable.  
 
After describing the multi-level construction process of the data set, principal macroeconomic 
indicators of the CSSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR; which are real NMP, total 
exports, total imports, level of indebtedness, openness ratio, real NMP growth rate, debt to NMP 
ratio, and trade balance covering total exports minus total imports as a ratio to NMP are plotted 
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(in the graphs below), against the analysis period 1960 to 1989. (A negative trade balance to 
NMP ratios means a trade deficit to NMP ratio, and a positive trade balance to NMP ratios 
means a trade surplus to NMP ratio.) The main trends in the indicators encompassing the 
changes are thoroughly examined for each country after drawing the graphs. Additionally, 
probable causal relationships between the variables, together with the reasons for the change in 
the main trends, are briefly discussed for each country. In the final stage, possible answers to the 
question of why these countries were affected by the oil crises to this individual levels, are 
evaluated.  
 
CSSR 
Figure 1. CSSR’s Real NMP, Real Export, Real Import, and Real Level of Indebtedness, 
1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
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Figure 2. CSSR’s Openness Ratio, 1960–1988 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
Figure 3. CSSR’s Real NMP Growth Rate, Debt to NMP Ratio, and Trade Balance to 
NMP Ratio, 1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
The real NMP growth rate of the CSSR was relatively stable between 1967 and 1975, then 
decreased in the second half of the 1970’s. After that, the CSSR’s real NMP stayed stagnant 
from 1980 to 1983, and at the end of the analysis period, it started to grow. The total imports 
growth trend in the CSSR was relatively stable between 1960 and 1973. It increased rapidly 
between 1973 and 1976, then, remained stagnant until the end of the 1970s. It decreased in 1980 
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
P
er
ce
n
t
Openness Ratio
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
P
er
ce
n
t
Real Growth Rate, Constant 1977 Prices Debt to NMP Ratio Trade Balance to NMP Ratio
50 
 
followed by a very slow growth trend between 1981 and 1984, and the trend accelerated 
afterwards. The total exports growth trend in the CSSR was relatively stable between 1960 and 
1979, then it became stagnant between 1979 and 1981. It started to grow between 1981 and 
1984, and until at the end of the analysis period its growth trend diminished. The level of 
indebtedness of the CSSR was almost negligible from 1960 to 1973, however, it grew very 
rapidly between 1973 and 1979, with a spike in 1980. The CSSR’s level of indebtedness 
increased around 10 times between 1973 and 1979, from 4.6 billion domestic koruna 
ceskoslovenska (KCS) to 41.6 billion KCS. It increased around 85 percent in 1979.  The 
CSSR’s level of indebtedness slowly declined between 1981 and 1984, and then stayed stagnant 
until the end of the 1980s. The average real NMP growth rate of the CSSR in the 1960s was 4.6 
percent, in 1970s it was 4.4 percent, and in 1980s it dropped to 1.6 percent. On the other hand, 
the average openness ratio of CSSR in the 1960s was 71 percent, in 1970s it was 82 percent, and 
in the 1980s it attained to level of 87 percent. A similar historical trend is observed for the 
average debt to NMP ratio in the CSSR. In the 1960s, it was limited with 0.6 percent; in 1970s, 
it reached to the level of 4.5 percent, and in the 1980s, it was 16.2 percent. The average trade 
balance to NMP ratio of the CSSR in 1960s was –1.1 percent, in the 1970s it was –2 percent, 
and finally, in the 1980s it was 7.9 percent.  
 
The trade deficit of the CSSR grew rapidly between 1973 and 1978, mostly due to the effects of 
the oil crises, which caused a rapid rise in total imports between 1973 and 1976. The rise in the 
trade deficit, however, resulted in a rapid increase in the level of indebtedness in the CSSR 
between 1973 and 1980. The acceleration in the level of indebtedness in turn forced the CSSR’s 
planners to implement policies for closing the trade deficit through cutting imports. Hence, 
imports became very stagnant between 1976 and 1984, and decreased in 1980. The stagnation in 
imports, however, caused a decline in the real growth rate of the CSSR between 1976 and 1980, 
and after that, imports decreased in 1980 following a relatively slow growth period during 1981 
and 1983, leading to stagnation in the CSSR’s NMP for the same period.  
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GDR 
Figure 4. GDR’s Real NMP, Real Export, Real Import, and Real Level of Indebtedness, 
1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
Figure 5. GDR’s Openness Ratio, 1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
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Figure 6. GDR’s Real NMP Growth Rate, Debt to NMP Ratio, and Trade Balance to NMP 
Ratio, 1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
The real NMP growth rate of the GDR was relatively stable between 1964 and 1981. It 
decreased between 1981 and 1983 followed a rise between 1983 and 1985. The total import 
growth trend of the GDR was relatively stable between 1960 and 1968. It increased between 
1968 and 1974. Total imports of the GDR became relatively stagnant between 1974 and 1977, 
and then, declined between 1977 and 1980. Total imports of the GDR stayed stagnant between 
1980 and 1985, and then after, increased between 1985 and 1988. As for the total export growth 
trend of the GDR, it was relatively stable between 1960 and 1972. Total exports became 
relatively stagnant between 1972 and 1980, then rapidly increased between 1980 and 1982. 
From 1982 until 1988 it again turned to the state of stagnancy. The level of indebtedness of the 
GDR was relatively low between 1960 and 1972, however, it grew rapidly between 1972 and 
1980. The level of indebtedness of the GDR increased around 7 times between 1972 and 1980, 
from 6.6 billion domestic marks to 47 billion domestic marks. The indebtedness level of the 
GDR drastically declined between 1981 and 1984, and then stayed relatively stagnant between 
1984 and 1988. The average real NMP growth rate of the GDR in the 1960s was 4.3 percent; in 
the 1970s it was 4.7 percent; and in the 1980s it was 3.7 percent. The average openness ratio of 
the GDR in the 1960s was 79 percent, in the 1970s it was 89 percent, and in the 1980s, it was 72 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
P
er
ce
n
t
Real Growth Rate, Constant 1980 Prices Debt to NMP Ratio Trade Balance to NMP Ratio
53 
 
percent. The average debt to NMP ratio of the GDR in 1960s was 3.1 percent, in 1970s it was 
11.2 percent, and in 1980s it was 20 percent. The average trade balance to NMP ratio of the 
GDR in 1960s was –10 percent, in 1970s it was –11.2 percent, and in 1980s it declined to the 
relatively acceptable levels of –1.9 percent. 
 
The total imports of GDR increased quickly between 1968 and 1974, due to the combined 
effects of Détente policies and the oil crises. The increase in total imports of the GDR caused a 
relatively rapid rise of its trade deficit between 1968 and 1980. The rise in the trade deficit of 
the GDR, arguably caused a rapid increase in the level of indebtedness of the GDR between 
1972 and 1980. The rise in the level of indebtedness obligated the GDR’s planners to pursue 
policies for diminishing the trade deficit through cutting imports and rising exports. The total 
imports of the GDR decreased between 1977 and 1980, and total exports of the GDR rapidly 
rose between 1980 and 1982. The lagged effect of decline in total imports between 1977 and 
1980, and increase in exports between 1980 and 1982, arguably resulted in a decrease in real 
growth rate of the GDR’s NMP between 1981 and 1983.  
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Hungary 
Figure 7. Hungary’s Real NMP, Real Export, Real Import, and Real Level of 
Indebtedness, 1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
Figure 8. Hungary’s Openness Ratio, 1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
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Figure 9. Hungary’s Real NMP Growth Rate, Debt to NMP Ratio, and Trade Balance to 
NMP Ratio, 1960–1988 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
While the real NMP growth rate of Hungary was relatively stable between 1965 and 1975, it 
decreased between 1975 and 1976; then increased between 1976 and 1977. Hungary’s real NMP 
growth rate once more declined between 1977 and 1980, but then increased between 1980 and 
1982, becoming relatively stagnant thereafter. The total import growth trend of Hungary was 
relatively stable between 1960 and 1969; it grew rapidly between 1969 and 1971, then became 
relatively stagnant between 1971 and 1973. Total imports accelerated very rapidly between 
1973 and 1974, and also between 1976 and 1978, however they declined between 1978 and 
1979, and afterwards stayed relatively stagnant until the end of the analysis period. As for the 
total export growth trend of Hungary, it was relatively stable between 1960 and 1968; then 
increased between 1968 and 1973, but then decreased between 1973 and 1979. The total exports 
of Hungary became stagnant between 1979 and 1981, grew between 1981 and 1984, becoming 
stagnant again between 1984 and 1986, and at the end, grew between 1986 and 1988. The level 
of indebtedness of Hungary was very low between 1960 and 1973, however, it grew very fast 
between 1973 and 1978. The skyrocketing trend in the level of indebtedness between 1975 and 
1978, was mainly caused by the very rapid devaluation of the forint in this period. Hungary’s 
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level of indebtedness increased more than 7 times between 1973 and 1979 in constant US dollar, 
from 0.9 billion to 7 billion. However, the level of indebtedness decreased between 1978 and 
1981 in constant domestic forints, and stayed relatively stagnant in that period in constant US 
dollars as well. The level of indebtedness of Hungary grew again between 1981 and 1987 both 
in constant US dollars and in constant domestic forints. The average real NMP growth rate of 
Hungary in the 1960s was 5.5 percent, in the 1970s it was 4.6 percent, and in the 1980s it was 
1.1 percent. The average openness ratio of Hungary in the 1960s was 69 percent, in the 1970s it 
rose to 101 percent, and in the 1980s it attained its highest level of 117 percent. The average 
debt to NMP ratio of Hungary in the 1960s was only 1.7 percent, in the 1970s it steeply rose to 
17.4 percent, and in the 1980s it attained 57.5 percent. The average trade balance to NMP ratio 
of Hungary in the 1960s was –6 percent, in the 1970s it was –6.7 percent, and in the 1980s it 
recovered to 7.8 percent. 
 
Hungary’s trade deficit grew between 1969 and 1972, and also between 1973 and 1979. The 
growth in the latter period was due mostly to the impact of the oil crises which caused a rapid 
increase in total imports between 1973 and 1974, and also between 1976 and 1978. This rise in 
the trade deficit between 1973 and 1979 caused a rapid increase in the level of indebtedness of 
Hungary between 1973 and 1979. In turn, the rise in the level of indebtedness forced Hungarian 
planners to implement policies for closing the trade deficit through curbing imports. Total 
imports declined between 1978 and 1979, and stayed relatively stagnant between 1979 and 
1988. The decline in imports between 1978 and 1979, and its following stagnation caused a 
decrease in Hungary’s real NMP growth rate between 1978 and 1980, and relative stagnation in 
Hungary’s real NMP between 1980 and 1986, except the relatively small growth in NMP 
between 1980 and 1982. 
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Poland 
Figure 10. Poland’s Real NMP, Real Export, Real Import, and Real Level of Indebtedness, 
1960–1989 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
Figure 11. Poland’s Openness Ratio, 1960–1989 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
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Figure 12. Poland’s Real NMP Growth Rate, Debt to NMP Ratio, and Trade Balance to 
NMP Ratio, 1960–1989 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
The real NMP growth rate of Poland was relatively stable in the 1960s. However, it increased in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, becoming relatively stable again between 1972 and 1976. Then 
Poland’s real NMP growth rate declined between 1976 and 1979, and it contracted rapidly 
between 1979 and 1982, before growing again until the end of the analysis period. The total 
import growth trend of Poland was relatively stable between 1960 and 1970; the trend increased 
from 1970 until 1976. Poland’s total imports became stagnant between 1976 and 1980, and then 
declined between 1980 and 1982. Its total imports grew at a relatively slow rate between 1983 
and 1988. On the other side of the foreign trade activities, the country’s total export growth rate 
was relatively stable between 1960 and 1979; however, it decreased between 1979 and 1982. 
Afterwards, Poland’s exports grew between 1982 and 1989. As for the level of indebtedness, it 
was negligible between 1960 and 1972, grew very fast between 1972 and 1979. It rose 
tremendously, roughly 26 times between 1972 and 1979 in constant US dollars, from 0.86 
billion to 22.6 billion, and it increased around 15 times in the same period in constant domestic 
zlotys, from 12 to 186 billion. The level of indebtedness of Poland became relatively stable 
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between 1979 and 1981 both in constant US dollar and in constant domestic zloty terms. 
However, it spiked between 1981 and 1982, mostly because of the very rapid devaluation of the 
zloty. The level of indebtedness of Poland decreased between 1982 and 1984 both in constant 
US dollars and in constant domestic zlotys terms. Afterwards, it grew between 1984 and 1987 
yet again both in constant US dollars and in constant domestic zloty terms. Poland’s the average 
real NMP growth rate in the 1960s was 6 percent, in the 1970s it was 5.3 percent, and in the 
1980s it was restricted with 1.9 percent. The average openness ratio of the country in the 1960s 
was 28 percent, in the 1970s it was 38 percent, and in the 1980s it reached 42 percent. The 
average debt to NMP ratio of Poland in the 1960s was only 0.2 percent, in the 1970s it was 1.5 
percent, but in the 1980s it reached to 43.5 percent. The average trade balance to NMP ratio of 
the country in the 1960s was –0.6 percent, in the 1970s it was –3.3 percent, and in the 1980’s, it 
was 1.1 percent. 
 
The relatively fast growth in total imports of Poland between 1970 and 1976, more or less 
corresponds to the rapid growth in its NMP between 1969 and 1977. The increase in the rate of 
growth of Polish imports in the early 1970’s was arguably caused by Détente policy. The trade 
deficit of the country grew between 1972 and 1979, mostly from the effects of the oil crises. The 
rise in the trade deficit of Poland between 1972 and 1979 resulted in a rapid increase in its level 
of indebtedness in the same period. This rapid increase in the level of indebtedness forced 
Polish policy makers to pursue policies for diminishing trade deficits via lowering imports. The 
total imports of Poland became stagnant between 1976 and 1980, and then declined between 
1980 and 1982. The stagnation and then decline in imports caused a decrease in the real NMP 
growth rate of Poland from 1976 to 1979, and then contraction in the Polish NMP between 1979 
and 1982.  
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USSR 
Figure 13. USSR’s Real NMP, Real Export, Real Import, and Real Level of Indebtedness, 
1960–1989 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
Figure 14. USSR’s Openness Ratio, 1960–1989 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
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Figure 15. USSR’s Real NMP Growth Rate, Debt to NMP Ratio, and Trade Balance to 
NMP Ratio, 1960–1989 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data sources mentioned in the methodology chapter. 
 
The real NMP growth rate of the USSR exhibited a cyclical trend, fluctuating between 4 and 9 
percent, between 1960 and 1973. It decreased from 1973 to 1984. The real NMP growth rate of 
the USSR further decreased between 1984 and 1986 but at a higher proportion, and it became 
relatively stagnant between 1986 and 1987. It then started to grow between 1987 and 1989. The 
total import growth trend of the USSR was relatively stable between 1960 and 1974. It grew 
rapidly between 1974 and 1975, then after, total imports for the USSR became relatively 
stagnant between 1975 and 1980. Total imports of the USSR grew rapidly one more time, 
between 1980 and 1981, and then after, its growth trend increased between 1981 and 1985, 
when it is compared with the growth trend observed between 1975 and 1980. The USSR’s 
imports declined between 1985 and 1987, but started to grow again between 1987 and 1989. 
The total export growth trend of the country was relatively stable during the whole analysis 
period. As for the level of indebtedness of USSR, it was negligible from 1960 to 1974. 
However, it increased very rapidly between 1974 and 1978. It rose around 7 times in this period, 
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from 2.7 billion domestic rubles to 21.4 billion domestic rubles. The level of indebtedness of the 
USSR became stagnant between 1978 and 1980, and then grew rapidly between 1980 and 1981, 
before declining between 1981 and 1984. The level of indebtedness of the USSR started to grow 
yet again in the latter part of the analysis period. The average real NMP growth rate of the 
USSR in the 1960s was considerably high attaining 7.3 percent, in the 1970s it was 4.7 percent, 
and in the 1980s it was 2.7 percent. The average openness ratio of the country in the 1960s was 
15.3 percent, in the 1970s it rose to 17.9 percent, and in the 1980s, it achieved 20.6 percent. The 
average debt to NMP ratio of the USSR in 1960s was only 0.2 percent, in the 1970s it was 2.5 
percent, and in the 1980s it arrived at 5.3 percent. The average trade balance to NMP ratio of the 
USSR in 1960s was –3.9 percent, in the 1970s it was –5 percent, and in the 1980s it was –6.5 
percent. 
 
The USSR’s trade deficit grew quickly between 1974 and 1985, due to the rapid increase in total 
imports between 1974 and 1975, and also between 1980 and 1981, which were mostly caused 
by the effects of the oil crises. The rapid increase in the USSR’s trade deficit between 1974 and 
1978 resulted in a rapid increase in its level of indebtedness between those years. This rapid 
increase obliged USSR’ planners to implement policies for closing the trade deficit through 
restricting imports. The total imports of the USSR became relatively stagnant between 1975 and 
1980, which arguably caused a relatively low real NMP growth rate between 1975 and 1980, 
when it is compared with the NMP growth trend of the country for the 1960–1974 period. The 
decrease in total imports of the USSR between 1985 and 1987 coincides with the stagnation of 
the country’s NMP at the same time.  
 
As the above descriptive statistical analysis shows the CSSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and 
the USSR were affected by the oil crises at different levels of severity. The level of severity in 
this context, indicated mainly by the downward trend in real NMP growth rate, stagnation in 
national income, or NMP, or recession, and to a lesser degree by the rise in level of 
indebtedness. The severity was dependent on; openness ratio of economies, percentage of 
international trade with capitalist economies in total international trade of these countries, trade 
composition, efficiency and technology level in production of these countries, and last but not 
least, on the degree of economic reform, or economic liberalization. Conventional wisdom holds 
that the main determinants of the level of severity were the openness ratio and the percentage of 
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international trade with capitalist economies in their total international trade, because the oil 
crises started in the developed capitalist economies and the speed of transmission of the effects 
of the oil crises to CMEA member countries, together with its intensity, was dependent on the 
sample countries’ openness ratio and percentage of international trade with capitalist economies 
in their total international trade. This interpretation can explain why the USSR was less severely 
affected by the oil crises, as its openness ratio was relatively low and its international trade more 
concentrated on intra CMEA trade. On similar grounds, we may suggest that Hungary was more 
severely affected by the oil crisis, since its openness ratio was relatively high and its 
international trade more focused on developed capitalist economies.  
 
This explanation partly describes the whole picture. Poland had a relatively low openness ratio 
but was severely affected by the crises. On the other extreme, the GDR had a relatively high 
openness ratio and its international trade was more concentrated on developed capitalist 
economies, and so the country was less severely affected by the oil crises. Such variations in the 
level of severity can be explained by the differences in trade composition, efficiency and 
technology levels in the production of these countries, plus the degree of economic reform, or 
economic liberalization. For example, the USSR was a net oil exporter and because of it, the 
country was less severely affected by the oil crises. And, as noted, the differences in trade 
composition and in efficiency and technology level of production between these five countries 
were significant determinants of the level of severity as well.  
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, the price gap between low technology 
manufactured goods, raw materials (except oil) agricultural products, and high technology 
manufactured goods widened during and after the oil crises. Therefore, it can be suggested that 
countries with a relatively higher percentage of high technology manufactured goods, high 
technology intermediate goods, and capital-investment goods in their total import bundle, and 
with a relatively high percentage of low technology manufactured goods, raw materials (except 
oil) and agricultural products in their total exports, such as Hungary and Poland, are more 
severely affected by the oil crises then countries with a relatively higher percentage of high 
technology manufactured goods, high technology intermediate goods, and capital-investment 
goods in their total export bundle, and with a relatively high percentage of low technology 
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manufactured goods, raw materials (except oil) and agricultural products in their total imports, 
like the USSR and the GDR. 
 
It can thus be claimed that, the severity, or intensity, of the effects of the oil crises on different 
countries was dependent on that countries’ position within the international labor division. For 
example, the GDR managed to decrease its trade deficit and level of indebtedness by increasing 
its exports in the early 1980s, which was a unique situation when it is compared with the other 
four CMEA member countries. Another determinant of the difference in the level of severity 
among these countries was the variation in the degree of economic reform, or economic 
liberalization. Poland and Hungary were more severely affected by the oil crises, arguably 
because their economies were relatively more liberalized than the others. Poland, in the early 
1970s, and Hungary, in the mid-1970s, implemented reforms for a relative liberalization of their 
economies, such as, decreasing price controls, relaxing centralization, and allowing autonomy 
for the enterprises. Additionally, Poland and Hungary’s domestic currencies became convertible 
against other foreign currencies, and prices in domestic consumer markets gradually converged 
to prices in the international markets. These reforms were broadly discussed in the literature 
review chapter.  
 
After evaluating the main findings of the descriptive statistical analysis, the emphasis of the 
thesis is now shifting to more advance quantitative techniques, namely econometric analysis in 
the next section.  
 
Econometric Methodology 
The main hypothesis in this thesis is that the economies of CMEA member countries were 
negatively affected by the oil crises through changes in their international trade, and/or in their 
level of indebtedness, and associated changes in interest rates in international financial markets. 
Related literature suggests that the economies of CMEA member countries were not export-led 
but import-fed economies, therefore, this econometric analysis focuses only on the import side 
of their international trade.  
 
The econometric analysis is based on three variable groups which are; national income variable, 
nmp, import variables, imtot, imsoc, imind, and imdev, and level of indebtedness variables, 
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debtdomes, and intdomes. The main hypothesis can be restated in a more formal way as the 
decrease in import and/or increase in the level of indebtedness, or increase in yearly debt 
repayments, will cause a decrease in the national income of CMEA member countries. 
However, conventional wisdom holds that changes in national income can also cause changes in 
imports, and changes in the level of indebtedness; hence, also changes in yearly debt 
repayments. Therefore, the causal relationship, especially the direction of causality, between 
these variables should be checked by econometric methods to test the main hypothesis.  
 
Initially, the balanced panel data method was used in the econometric analysis based on the 
assumption that the economies of CMEA member countries had similar structural 
characteristics. However, it is found, as can be also observed from the above graphs, that the 
various variables of the different countries had structural breaks in variant years. Also, tests 
showed that there was a cross-country or cross-section dependence. Due to these problems, 
econometric results based on balanced panel data method are inconclusive. Thus, the times 
series method is used in subsequent econometric analyses instead of the balanced panel data 
method. Causal relationships between variables of each country are examined separately; 
therefore, five groups of results are obtained from the econometric analysis. Initial econometric 
results also show that the variable of imports from developing capitalist economies, imdev, is 
not statistically significant for most of the empirical analyses, possibly due to the fact that the 
share of imports from developing capitalist economies in the total imports of CMEA member 
countries is very small; therefore, that variable of imports from developing capitalist economies, 
imdev, is not employed in subsequent econometric analyses. 
 
Six similar econometric models were specified in the time series analysis for testing the causal 
relationships between variables for each country. Econometric models are presented in the table 
below. 
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Table 2. Econometric Models Used in the Time Series Analysis 
Model 1 𝒏𝒎𝒑 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒊𝒎𝒕𝒐𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒅𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒖 
Model 2 𝒏𝒎𝒑 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒊𝒎𝒕𝒐𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒅𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒖 
Model 3 𝒏𝒎𝒑 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒐𝒄 + 𝜷𝟐𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒅𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒖 
Model 4 𝒏𝒎𝒑 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒐𝒄 + 𝜷𝟐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒅𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒖 
Model 5 𝒏𝒎𝒑 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒅 + 𝜷𝟐𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒅𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒖 
Model 6 𝒏𝒎𝒑 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒅 + 𝜷𝟐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒅𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒖 
 
The national income variable, nmp, is the response variable in all the specified models. 
However, one of the three different import variables, imtot, imsoc, and imind, and one of the two 
different level of indebtedness variables, debtdomes, and intdomes, are used as explanatory 
variables in diverse models. The rationale in using one of the three different import variables as 
an explanatory variable in distinct models is to capture possible different effects of imports from 
various country groups on the national incomes of CMEA member countries. On the other hand, 
one of the two different level of indebtedness variables is used as an explanatory variable in 
different models because a first level of indebtedness variable, debtdomes, only represents the 
level of indebtedness of CMEA member countries in each year; however, a second level of 
indebtedness variable, intdomes, is a proxy variable for a yearly debt repayment of CMEA 
member countries which is determined by both CMEA member countries’ level of indebtedness 
and interest rates in international financial markets. Therefore, two different level of 
indebtedness variables can have different effects on the national incomes of CMEA member 
countries, and these possible distinct effects can be captured by different models. 
 
The main hypothesis of this thesis, based on causal relationship between variables, is tested 
using two different econometric methods; therefore, results are crosschecked. The first method 
is the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) version of the Granger causality test, for testing the general 
causality. The second method is the estimation of vector error correction model (VECM), for 
testing both long-run and short-run causality. If the results from the two methods confirm almost 
the same unidirectional causal relationship between variables, the hypothesis is supported by 
econometric methods. 
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The first step of econometric analysis is the application of a unit root test to each variable of 
interest, nmp, imtot, imsoc, imind, debtdomes, and intdomes in six models for each country, for 
finding the order of integration of each variable. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is applied to 
each variable of interest, with intercept and appropriate lag length based on the Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC), to find the order of integration of each variable. However, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test can give spuriously high orders of integration results when there 
is a structural break in the time series of the variable. Therefore, the breakpoint augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test is applied to each variable of interest, with intercept and appropriate lag 
length based on the SIC. The breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller test automatically finds one 
non-specified breakpoint in the series and adds two different dummy variables to the model, 
which are dummy variable for only the break date, and dummy variable for all the dates after 
the break date. The order of integration results from these two tests are compared for each 
variable of interest, and the minimum order of integration result from these tests is accepted as 
the order of integration of the tested variable of interest. 
 
The second step of econometric analysis is the specification of the vector autoregressive models 
(VAR) for each country, based on six econometric models, for the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) 
version of the Granger causality test. The minimum lag length of variables in the VAR must be 
equal to or higher than the maximum order of integration of variables in the model. However, 
the ultimate decision about the lag length of variables in the VAR, is based on the results of the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), the SIC, the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) and 
also the VAR residual autocorrelation Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests, when the minimum lag 
length is also taken into account. Thus, there is no autocorrelation problem in each VAR. 
Afterwards, extra exogenous lags are added to the VAR, and the length of extra exogenous lags 
must be equal to the maximum order of integration of the variables in the model. Furthermore, 
the block exogeneity Wald test is applied to the final specification of VAR for the Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) version of the Granger causality test. The results from the block exogeneity 
Wald tests are going to be the first empirical findings concerning the causal relationship 
between variables.  
 
The third step of econometric analysis is the specification of the VAR for each country, based 
on six econometric models, for the Johansen cointegration test. The Johansen cointegration test 
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can only be applicable if all variables in the VAR have the same order of integration. However, 
results from two unit root tests showed that some variables of interest are I(1), and some 
variables of interest are I(2), for each country, when the minimum order of integration result 
from these tests is accepted as the order of integration of the tested variable of interest. 
Therefore, the first difference of I(2) variables are taken to transform I(2) variables to I(1). (d 
prefix used for abbreviation of first differenced variables in econometric analysis, for example, 
dnmp, dimtot, dintdomes, etc.) The economic interpretation of the first differenced variables 
from I(2)  to I(1) will be based on yearly change of these variables, not real levels of them. The 
lag length decisions about each VAR, with first differenced and level variables, based on results 
of AIC, SIC, HQ, and also VAR residual autocorrelation LM tests. Therefore, there isn’t any 
autocorrelation problem in each VAR. Afterwards, the Johansen cointegration test is applied to 
each VAR for obtaining the cointegration relation between variables in each VAR. Three 
different versions of Johansen cointegration test are applied to each VAR, which are; variables 
having deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept, variables 
having deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation having intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend, and variables having quadratic trends and cointegrating equation 
having intercept and non-deterministic linear trend. Both maximum eigenvalue and trace results 
of cointegration rank test, based on Johansen cointegration test, are checked for determining the 
cointegration relation between variables in each VAR, for each country.  
 
The fourth step of econometric analysis is the specification of VECM, for each country, based 
on cointegration results from three different versions of the Johansen cointegration test for six 
econometric models. Each VECM has the same lag length with corresponding VAR having 
already specified in the previous step. The cointegrating vectors, 𝜷, of each VECM have been 
normalized to nmp. The negative and statistically significant adjustment coefficients, 𝜶, are 
indicating the long-run causal relationship between variables. Statistically significant lag 
coefficients of explanatory variables are indicating the short-run causal relationship between 
explanatory and response variables.  
 
In the end, results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests and results 
obtained from estimations of VECMs, for the same econometric models, are compared. If both 
results are supporting each other by confirming almost the same unidirectional causal 
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relationship from explanatory variables to response variables, the main hypothesis of this thesis 
is supported by econometric methods. 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests, the Johansen 
cointegration tests, and VECM estimations were based on the implicit assumption that there are 
not any structural breaks in the time-series variables. The existence of possible structural breaks 
in the series wasn’t taken into account in these tests and estimations because conventional 
solutions to the structural break problem, adding time dummy variables or dividing the time 
series into several sub-time series, cannot be applicable in this econometric analysis due to the 
relatively small number of observations, 30. The breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
results show that different time series variables of five CMEA member countries have at least 
one break in different dates and there is a possibility of the existence of more breaks in these 
series, due to the instability caused by the oil crises. These results indicate that conventional 
solutions to the structural break problem cannot be applicable in this econometric analysis. 
Therefore, econometric results should be interpreted cautiously. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The quantitative results obtained from econometric analysis, which is explained step by step in 
the last part of the methodology chapter, are briefly presented in this chapter. Econometric 
results are reported with the same sequential order of the econometric analysis and presented 
country by country. At the end of each country subchapter, after all the econometric results are 
reported, they were briefly evaluated as well. Tables of full raw econometric results from each 
test and estimation are located in the appendix chapter and there are references to the 
corresponding tables in each brief report about the results of the econometric analysis in this 
chapter. 
 
CSSR 
The results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller and breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
show that the debtdomes, and intdomes time series variables are I(1), and nmp, imtot, imsoc, and 
imind time series variables are I(2), at 5 percent significance level for the CSSR between 1960 
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and 1989. Therefore, the first difference of time series variables nmp, imtot, imsoc, and imind 
are going to be taken for the Johansen cointegration tests and VECM specifications. The 
abbreviations of first differenced variables in econometric analysis will become dnmp, dimtot, 
dimsoc, and dimind (See Table A3 and A4) 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for the CSSR’s first 
model indicate that variables imtot and debtdomes jointly, and individually, and unidirectionally 
Granger causes nmp, at 5 percent significance level, between 1960 and 1989. The results from 
the CSSR’s second model show that variables, imtot and intdomes jointly, and also imtot 
individually, and unidirectionally Granger causes nmp, at 5 percent significance level, between 
1960 and 1989. However, unidirectional causality can be questionable because, nmp   and imtot 
jointly, and also imtot individually, Granger cause intdomes, at 5 percent significance level. 
Nonetheless, this finding is in line with the hypotheses of the thesis, which is that a change in 
imports will cause a change in level of indebtedness and debt repayment, and the results from 
the second model of the CSSR showed that imtot unidirectionally Granger cause intdomes; 
therefore, the direction of causality supports the thesis hypotheses.  
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for the CSSR’s third 
model does not indicate a statistically significant causal relationship between variables of 
interest at 5 percent significance level. The results from the CSSR’s fourth model only suggest 
that imsoc unidirectionally Granger cause intdomes, at 5 percent significance level, which is in 
line with the thesis hypotheses. The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger 
causality test for the CSSR’s fifth model show that variables imind and debtdomes jointly, and 
also debtdomes individually, and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, at 5 percent significance 
level, between 1960 and 1989. The results from the CSSR’s sixth model confirms that, imind 
and intdomes jointly, and also both of them individually, and unidirectionally Granger causes 
nmp, at 5 percent significance level (See Table A5 and A6) 
 
The results from the third version of Johansen cointegration test for the CSSR’s first model 
showed that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to the results obtained 
from both trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at a 5 percent significance level, 
during the analysis period.  The results from the second and third versions of the Johansen 
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cointegration test for CSSR’s second model indicate that there is one cointegrating relation in 
the model, according to the result from the trace rank test at 5 percent significance level; 
however, the result from the maximum eigenvalue rank test of the third version of the Johansen 
cointegration test is also giving statistically significant results for one cointegrating relation for 
the CSSR’s second model, at 5.4 percent significance level. Furthermore, the results from the 
third version of Johansen cointegration test for the CSSR’s third model show that there is one 
cointegrating relation in the model, according to the results from trace rank test, at 5 percent 
significance level; however, the result from the maximum eigenvalue rank test is also giving 
statistically significant results for one cointegrating relation for the CSSR’s third model, at 5.6 
percent significance level. The Johansen cointegration test result for the CSSR’s fourth and 
sixth models indicate that there is no cointegrating relation in the fourth and sixth models of the 
CSSR at 5 percent significance level. The findings from the first version of the Johansen 
cointegration test for the CSSR’s fifth model suggest that there is one cointegrating relation in 
the model, according to the result from trace rank test at 5 percent significance level; however, 
the second version of the test indicates that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, 
according to results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent 
significance level. However, the third version of the test show that the CSSR’s fifth model have 
two, or may be one, cointegrating relation(s), according to the results obtained from both the 
trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent significance level (See Table A7 
and A8). 
 
Moreover, the findings obtained from the CSSR’s first VECM, with quadratic trend, indicate 
that variables dimtot (change in imtot) and debtdomes jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause 
dnmp (change in nmp) in the long run, at a 5 percent significance level, between 1960 and 1989. 
The results from the CSSR’s second VECM, from both linear trend and quadratic trend 
versions, only indicate that variable dimtot (change in imtot) unidirectionally Granger cause 
intdomes both in the long-run and in the short run, at 5 percent significance level, which 
supports the thesis hypotheses. The results from the CSSR’s third VECM, with quadratic trend, 
confirm that variables dimsoc (change in imsoc) and debtdomes jointly and unidirectionally 
Granger cause dnmp (change in nmp) in the long run, at 5 percent significance level. The results 
from the CSSR’s fifth VECM, without linear or quadratic trend, indicate that, variables dimind 
(change in imind) and debtdomes, jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause dnmp (change in 
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nmp) in the long run, and also variable debtdomes unidirectionally Granger cause dnmp (change 
in nmp) in the short run, at 5 percent significance level. The findings from the CSSR’s fifth 
VECM, from both with linear trend and with quadratic trend versions, indicate that, variables 
dimind (change in imind) and debtdomes, jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause dnmp 
(change in nmp) in the long run, at 5 percent significance level (See Table A9 and A10). 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests and VECM 
estimations of the CSSR’s time series data between 1960 and 1989, are jointly indicating that 
variables imtot and debtdomes are jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, and also, 
variables imind and debtdomes are jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, at 5 percent 
significance level. At the same time, results do not support the unidirectional causality from 
imsoc to nmp, at 5 percent significance level; therefore, it can be argued that the unidirectional 
causality from imtot to nmp, are mainly caused by imind component of imtot. Therefore, 
econometric results show that the CSSR’s imports from developed capitalist economies and its 
level of indebtedness Granger cause the CSSR’s national income, or NMP. The effects of the oil 
crises on CSSR’s total imports and level of indebtedness can be observable from the graph in 
the previous chapter. The CSSR’s total imports decreased and its level of indebtedness 
increased due to the oil crises. Therefore, empirical findings obtained from the CSSR’s time-
series data strongly support the main hypothesis of this thesis which is that the oil crises 
negatively affected the economies of CMEA member countries through international trade and 
level of indebtedness channels. 
 
GDR 
The results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller and breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
show that the nmp, imsoc, imind, and intdomes time series variables are I(1), and imtot, and 
debtdomes time series variables are I(2), at 5 percent significance level for the GDR during the 
analysis period. Therefore, the first difference of time series variables imtot, and debtdomes is 
going to be taken for the Johansen cointegration tests and VECM specifications. The 
abbreviation of the first differenced variables in econometric analysis will became dimtot, and 
ddebtdomes (See Table A11 and A12). 
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The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for GDR’s first 
model indicate that the variables imtot and debtdomes jointly, and also debtdomes individually, 
and unidirectionally Granger causes nmp, at 5 percent significance level, between 1960 and 
1989. The results from the GDR’s second, third, fourth, and fifth models indicate bidirectional, 
or multidirectional, causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance 
level; therefore, the results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for 
the GDR’s second, third, fourth, and fifth models neither support nor reject the main hypothesis 
of this thesis. However, the results from the GDR’s sixth model indicates that variables imind 
and intdomes jointly, and also both of the variables individually, and unidirectionally Granger 
causes nmp, at 5 percent significance level (See Table A13 and A14). 
 
The results from the second and third versions of the Johansen cointegration test for the GDR’s 
first model show that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to the results 
from both trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent significance level, 
between 1960 and 1989.  The results from the first and third versions of the Johansen 
cointegration test for the GDR’s second model indicate that there is one cointegrating relation in 
the model, according to results from the maximum eigenvalue rank test, at 5 percent 
significance level; however, results from the second version of Johansen cointegration test for 
the GDR’s second model indicate that there is one cointegrating relation in the model according 
to results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent significance 
level. The findings from the first, second, and third versions of Johansen cointegration test for 
the GDR’s third model suggest that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to 
the results from both the trace rank and the maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent 
significance level.  First and second versions of Johansen cointegration test results for the 
GDR’s fourth model indicate that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to 
the results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent 
significance level. The findings from the first, second and third versions of the Johansen 
cointegration test for the GDR’s fifth model show that there is one cointegrating relation in the 
model, according to the results from the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 
percent significance level. The results from both the first and second versions of the Johansen 
cointegration test for the GDR’s sixth model indicate that there is one cointegrating relation in 
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the model, according to the result from the maximum eigenvalue rank test, at 5 percent 
significance level (See Table A15 and A16).  
 
The findings from the GDR’s first VECM, both with linear trend and with quadratic trend 
versions, indicate that variables dimtot (change in imtot) and ddebtdomes (change in debtdomes) 
jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the long run, at 5 percent significance level 
during the analysis period. The results from the GDR’s first VECM with linear trend, estimation 
also indicate that variable ddebtdomes (change in debtdomes) unidirectionally Granger cause 
nmp in the short run, and results from first VECM with quadratic trend estimation show that 
both variables dimtot (change in imtot) and ddebtdomes (change in debtdomes) individually and 
unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, also in the short run, at 5 percent significance level. The 
results from the GDR’s second VECM estimations indicate bidirectional, or multidirectional, 
causal relationships between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level; therefore, the 
findings from the GDR’s second VECM estimations neither support nor reject the main 
hypothesis of this thesis. The results from the GDR’s third VECM, both with linear trend and 
with quadratic trend versions, indicate that variables imsoc and ddebtdomes (change in 
debtdomes) jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the long run, and also both 
variables individually in the short run, at 5 percent significance level. The results from GDR’s 
fourth VECM, with linear trend, estimation only indicate that variables nmp and imsoc jointly 
and unidirectionally Granger cause intdomes, in the long run, at 5 percent significance level. 
This finding is against the main hypothesis of this thesis; however, it can be an outlier, because, 
it is not supported by other results. The results from the GDR’s fifth VECM, both with linear 
trend and with quadratic trend versions, showed that variables imind and ddebtdomes (change in 
debtdomes) jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the long run, and also ddebtdomes 
individually in the short run, at 5 percent significance level. The results from the GDR’s sixth 
VECM, with linear trend, indicate bidirectional, or multidirectional, causal relationship between 
variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level; therefore, the results from the GDR’s sixth 
VECM estimation neither support nor reject the main hypothesis of this thesis (See Table A17, 
A18, and A19). 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests and VECM 
estimations of the GDR’s time series data between 1960 and 1989, are jointly indicating that 
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variables imtot and debtdomes jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, both in the long 
run and in the short run, at 5 percent significance level. Therefore, econometric findings confirm 
that GDR’s total imports and its level of indebtedness Granger, cause GDR’s national income, 
or NMP. The effects of the oil crises on GDR’s total imports and the level of indebtedness can 
be observed from the graph presented in the previous chapter. The GDR’s total imports 
decreased and its level of indebtedness increased due to the oil crises. Therefore, the 
econometric findings from the GDR’s time series data strongly support the main hypothesis of 
this thesis. 
  
Hungary 
The results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests showed that all times series variables, nmp, imtot, imsoc, imind, debtdomes and intdomes, 
are I(1), at 5 percent significance level for Hungary between 1960 and 1989 (See Table A20 and 
A21). 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for Hungary’s first, 
second, third, and fourth models do not indicate statistically significant causal relationships 
between the variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level, during the analysis period. 
However, the results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for 
Hungary’s fifth model show that variables imind and debtdomes jointly, and also imind 
individually, and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, at 5 percent significance level. The results 
from the Hungary’s sixth model indicate that variables imind and intdomes jointly, and also 
imind individually, and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, at 5 percent significance level (See 
Table A22 and A23). 
 
The results from the Johansen cointegration test for Hungary’s first and third models suggest 
that there is no cointegrating relation in these models, at 5 percent significance level. However, 
the results from first version of the Johansen cointegration test for Hungary’s second model 
show that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, as to the result from the trace rank 
test, at 5 percent significance level, between 1960 and 1989. The first version of Johansen 
cointegration test results for Hungary’s fourth model indicate that there is one cointegrating 
relation in the model, according to results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue 
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rank tests, at 5 percent significance level. The results from the first version of Johansen 
cointegration test for Hungary’s fifth model further show that there is one cointegrating relation 
in the model, according to results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, 
at 5 percent significance level. The first, second and the third versions of the Johansen 
cointegration test results for Hungary’s sixth model indicate that there is one cointegrating 
relation in the model, according to the results from both in trace rank and maximum eigenvalue 
rank tests, at 5 percent significance level during the analysis period (See Table A24). 
 
The results from Hungary’s second and fourth VECM estimations do not indicate a causal 
relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level. The results from 
Hungary’s fifth VECM, without linear or quadratic trend, show that variables imind and 
debtdomes jointly, and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the long run, at 5 percent 
significance level, between 1960 and 1989. The results from Hungary’s sixth VECM, from all 
three versions, without linear or quadratic trend, with linear trend, and with quadratic trend, 
indicate that variables imind and intdomes jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the 
long run, at 5 percent significance level (See Table A25 and A26). 
 
The findings obtained from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests and 
VECM estimations of Hungary’s time series data between 1960 and 1989, are jointly indicating 
that variables imind and debtdomes are jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, and 
also, variables imind and intdomes are jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, at 5 
percent significance level. 
  
Therefore, empirical findings confirm that Hungary’s imports from developed capitalist 
economies, its level of indebtedness, and yearly debt repayments Granger cause Hungary’s 
national income or NMP. The effects of the oil crises on Hungary’s total imports and level of 
indebtedness can be observable from the graph in the previous chapter. Hungary’s total imports 
decreased, its level of indebtedness, and therefore, its yearly debt repayments, also caused by an 
increase in interest rates in international financial markets, increased due to the oil crises. 
Therefore, the econometric findings from Hungary’s time series data strongly support the main 
hypothesis of this thesis which is oil crises negatively affected the economies of CMEA member 
countries through international trade and level of indebtedness channels. 
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Poland 
The results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests show that imsoc, debtdomes, and intdomes time series variables are I(1), and nmp, imtot, 
and imind time series variables are I(2), at 5 percent significance level, for Poland during the 
analysis period. Therefore, the first difference of time series variables nmp, imtot, and imind are 
going to be taken for the Johansen cointegration tests and VECM specifications. The 
abbreviation of the first differenced variables in econometric analysis will become dnmp, dimtot 
and dimind (See Table A27 and A28). 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for Poland’s first 
model show that variables debtdomes and nmp jointly, and also both variables individually, and 
unidirectionally Granger cause imtot, at 5 percent significance level between 1960 and 1989. 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for Poland’s second 
model indicate that variables intdomes and nmp jointly, and also nmp individually, and 
unidirectionally Granger cause imtot, at 5 percent significance level. The results from the Toda-
Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for Poland’s third model show that variables 
debtdomes and nmp jointly, and also both variables individually, and unidirectionally Granger 
cause imsoc, at 5 percent significance level. The results the from Toda-Yamamoto version of the 
Granger causality test for Poland’s fourth model indicate that variables imsoc and nmp jointly 
and unidirectionally Granger cause intdomes, at 5 percent significance level. The results from 
the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for Poland’s fifth and sixth models 
does not indicate a statistically significant causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 
percent significance level during the analysis period. The results from the Toda-Yamamoto 
version of the Granger causality test for Poland’s first, second, third, and fourth models do not 
support the main hypothesis of this thesis; moreover, these findings don’t support the main 
hypothesis, and none of the results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality 
test for Poland are supporting the main hypothesis. Possible explanations are going to be 
discussed in the following paragraphs (See Table A29 and A30).  
 
The results from Poland’s six VECM estimations, based on the Johansen cointegration test 
results of the models, are in line with the results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the 
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Granger causality test which are indicated above. Therefore, only the summary of the results 
from Poland’s six VECM estimations are stated. The results from Poland’s first VECM, without 
linear or quadratic trend, indicate bidirectional, or multidirectional, causal relationship between 
variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level; therefore, the results from Poland’s first 
VECM, without linear or quadratic trend, neither support nor reject the main hypothesis of this 
thesis, at 5 percent significance level. The results from Poland’s first VECM, with linear trend, 
indicate that variables dnmp (change in nmp) and dimtot (change in imtot) jointly and 
unidirectionally Granger cause debtdomes in the long run, at 5 percent significance level during 
the analysis period. The results from Poland’s second VECM, from both without linear or 
quadratic trend and with linear trend versions, show that variables dnmp (change in nmp) and 
dimtot (change in imtot) jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause intdomes in the long run, at 
5 percent significance level. The results from Poland’s second VECM, with quadratic trend, 
indicate bidirectional, or multidirectional, causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 
percent significance level; therefore, the results from Poland’s second VECM, with quadratic 
trend, neither support nor reject the main hypothesis of this thesis, at 5 percent significance 
level. The results from Poland’s third VECM, without linear or quadratic trend, show that 
variables dnmp (change in nmp) and imsoc, jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause 
debtdomes in the long run, at 5 percent significance level.  The results from Poland’s third 
VECM, both with linear trend and with quadratic trend versions, do not indicate causal 
relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level. The results from 
Poland’s fourth, fifth and sixth VECMs indicate bidirectional, or multidirectional, causal 
relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level; therefore, the results 
from Poland’s fourth, fifth, and sixth VECM neither support nor reject the main hypothesis of 
this thesis, at 5 percent significance level. The VECM results for Poland’s first, second, and 
fourth models do not support the main hypothesis of this thesis; moreover, the majority of the 
estimated results from these models don’t support the main hypothesis, and none of the 
estimated results from VECMs for Poland support the main hypothesis. 
 
None of the results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests and VECM 
estimations of Poland’s time series data during the analysis period, support the econometric 
hypothesis that import variables and/or level of indebtedness variables unidirectionally Granger 
cause national income variable, nmp; moreover, some of these results don’t support the 
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hypothesis by indicating causality between variables of interest in opposite direction, at 5 
percent significance level. There are two possible explanations for these unexpected results from 
empirical analysis of the Polish data. The first explanation is the poor quality of the data which 
creates doubts about the reliability of econometric results; however, econometric results from 
other CMEA member countries’ data are quite consistent; therefore, this explanation is not very 
plausible.  
 
The second explanation concerns the structural difference of the Polish economy. The related 
literature, which was examined in the literature review chapter, the graphs of Polish 
macroeconomic indicators, in the methodology chapter, and several historical facts (debt 
restructuring negotiations between Poland and Paris Club in 1981 and 1985, rapid devaluation 
of the zloty, and very high inflation in 1980s) suggest that Polish economy is effected the most 
severely by the oil crises among the five CMEA member countries which are analyzed in this 
thesis. The econometric methods used in this thesis failed to capture the relationship between 
time series variables of Poland because these methods are designed for capturing one particular 
relationship between variables in the whole-time period, in this case 30 years. However, due to 
the severe effects of the oil crises on the Polish economy, trends in the time series variables 
changed several times, in other words, several break points exist in time series variables, these 
changes happened in very short time period and trends moved to opposite direction.  
 
Therefore, the econometric methods used in this thesis poorly indicate the relationship between 
variables of interest of Poland for the analysis period. Furthermore, due to the relatively small 
number of observations (30) and the existence of several breaks in the different time series 
variables at different dates, the application of the econometric methods such time dummy 
variables, or dividing the time series into several sub-time series, cannot solve the existing 
empirical problem. The increase in the number of observations and the application of regime-
switching models, such as the Markov-switching one, could be a possible solutions for this 
problem. 
 
USSR   
The results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the breakpoint augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests show that the nmp, imtot, imsoc, imind and intdomes time series variables are I(1), and 
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debtdomes time series variable is I(2), at 5 percent significance level, for the USSR in the 
analysis period. Therefore, the first difference of the time series variable debtdomes is going to 
be taken for the Johansen cointegration tests and VECM specifications. The abbreviation of first 
differenced variable in econometric analysis will become ddebtdomes (See Table A31 and A32). 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality test for the USSR’s first 
model show that variables imtot and debtdomes jointly, and also both variables individually, and 
unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, at 5 percent significance level, between 1960 and 1989. 
The results from the USSR’s second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth models do not indicate a 
statistically significant causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent 
significance level during the analysis period (See Table A33 and A34). 
 
The first version of the Johansen cointegration test results for the USSR’s first model indicate 
that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to the result from the trace rank 
test, at 5 percent significance level, between 1960 and 1989; however, results from the 
maximum eigenvalue rank test of the first version of the Johansen cointegration test also gives 
statistically significant results for one cointegrating relation for the USSR’s first model at 5 
percent significance level. The results from second version of Johansen cointegration test for 
USSR’s first model also show that there is at least one cointegrating relation in the model, for 
the results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent 
significance level. The results from the first version of Johansen cointegration test for the 
USSR’s second model indicate that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to 
the results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent 
significance level. The results from the second and third versions of the Johansen cointegration 
test for the USSR’s third model show that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, 
according to the results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 
percent significance level. The results from the Johansen cointegration test for USSR’s the 
fourth model indicate that there is no cointegrating relation in this model, at 5 percent 
significance level. However, the third version of Johansen cointegration test results for the 
USSR’s fifth model show that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to the 
results from both the trace rank and maximum eigenvalue rank tests, at 5 percent significance 
level. The third version of the Johansen cointegration test results for the USSR’s sixth model 
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suggest that there is one cointegrating relation in the model, according to the results from the 
trace rank test, at 5 percent significance level for the analysis period (See Table A35). 
 
The finding from the USSR’s first VECM, without linear or quadratic trend, does not indicate a 
causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance level. However, the 
result from the USSR’s first VECM, with linear trend, show that variables imtot and 
ddebtdomes (change in debtdomes) jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the long 
run, at 5 percent significance level; also, both variables imtot and ddebtdomes (change in 
debtdomes) are individually and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the short run, at 5 
percent significance level, between 1960 and 1989. The result from the USSR’s second VECM, 
without linear or quadratic trend, does not indicate a causal relationship between variables of 
interest, at 5 percent significance level. The results from the USSR’s third VECM, from both 
with linear trend and with quadratic trend versions, show that variables imsoc and ddebtdomes 
(change in debtdomes) jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the long run, at 5 
percent significance level; also, both variables imsoc and ddebtdomes (change in debtdomes) are 
individually and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp in the short run, at 5 percent significance 
level. The results from the USSR’s fifth VECM, with quadratic trend, indicate bidirectional, or 
multidirectional, causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent significance 
level; therefore, the results from the USSR’s fifth VECM estimation neither support nor reject 
the main hypothesis of this thesis. The result from the USSR’s sixth VECM, without quadratic 
trend, does not indicate causal relationship between variables of interest, at 5 percent 
significance level (See Table A36, A37, and A38). 
 
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto version of the Granger causality tests and VECM 
estimations of USSR’s time series data between 1960 and 1989, jointly indicate that variables 
imtot and debtdomes are jointly and unidirectionally Granger cause nmp, both in the short run 
and in the long run, at 5 percent significance level. Therefore, empirical findings confirm that 
the USSR’s total imports and its level of indebtedness Granger cause the USSR’s national 
income or NMP during the analysis period. The effects of the oil crises on the USSR’s total 
imports and level of indebtedness can be observable from the graph in the previous chapter. The 
USSR’s total imports became stagnant between 1975 and 1980, and its level of indebtedness 
increased, in the same period, due to the oil crises. Therefore, the econometric results from the 
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USSR’s time series data strongly support the main hypothesis of this thesis which is oil crises 
negatively affected the economies of CMEA member countries through international trade and 
level of indebtedness channels. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Descriptive statistical analysis, in the methodology chapter, suggests that five CMEA member 
countries analyzed in this thesis, which are the CSSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the 
USSR were affected from the oil crises with variant levels of severity. The level of severity was 
dependent on; the openness ratio of economies, percentage of international trade with capitalist 
economies in total international trade of these countries, trade composition, the efficiency and 
technology level in the production of these countries, and the degree of economic reform, or 
economic liberalization. As discussed in the methodology chapter as well, the USSR and the 
GDR were less severely affected by the oil crises than the CSSR, Hungary and Poland, due to 
several reasons stated above and their position in the international division of labor.  
 
Descriptive statistical analysis also indicates that trends in macroeconomic indicators of the five 
CMEA member countries, such as total imports, total exports, level of indebtedness, and 
national income or NMP, were abruptly changed between 1973 and 1984. These violent changes 
imply that the economies of CMEA member countries encountered economic shocks 
simultaneously; also the timing of these abrupt changes together with their effects on the 
international trade indicators of these countries suggest that the common cause of these 
alterations is the effects of the oil crises.  
 
The econometric findings, given in the results chapter, about the causal relationship between the 
variables of interest, based on yearly macroeconomic data between 1960 and 1989, from the 
five CMEA member countries examined in this thesis, confirm that unidirectional causality runs 
from import variables and level of indebtedness variables to national income variable, at 5 
percent significance level, for four out of the five sample countries, all except Poland. The 
possible explanations, about why similar causal relationship between variables of interest are 
not indicated by the econometric results of Poland, are briefly discussed in the results chapter.  
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The findings from the econometric analysis also suggest that in three out of four countries, total 
imports Granger cause national income or NMP; in two out of four countries, imports from 
developed capitalist economies Granger cause national income or NMP; in all countries, the 
level of indebtedness Granger cause national income or NMP; in one out of four countries, 
yearly debt repayment Granger cause national income or NMP; and imports from socialist 
countries that are not Granger cause national income or NMP, in any country, at 5 percent 
significance level. These econometric results suggest that imports from developed capitalist 
economies have a stronger impact on the national income of the CMEA member countries than 
imports from socialist economies; and level of indebtedness also has a stronger effect on the 
national income of CMEA member countries, than the yearly debt repayments of these 
countries, implicitly suggesting that fluctuations in interest rates in international financial 
markets have a relatively weaker effect on national income of CMEA member countries.  
 
In general, descriptive statistical analysis and the majority of the results obtained from 
econometric analysis support the main hypothesis of this thesis, which is that the oil crises 
negatively affected the economies of CMEA member countries through international trade and 
level of indebtedness channels. Better econometric results can be retrieved through applying 
more elaborate econometric models such as regime-switching, Markov-switching models, with 
higher quality datasets and a larger number of observations.  
 
Nonetheless, econometric results in this thesis and related literature also suggest that, the 
economies of CMEA member countries were not closed, autarkic, isolated from worldwide 
economic relationships, or immune to external economic fluctuations during the analysis period 
1960–1989. The CMEA member countries’ positions in the international division of labor were 
a significant determinant of their national economic performances. The effects of oil crises were 
one of the most crucial causes of economic decline for CMEA member countries in the second 
half of the 1970s. The governments’ of CMEA member countries in late 1980s openly stated 
that their radical economic and political reforms were a response to growing economic problems 
since the second half of the 1970s. Therefore, it can be firmly suggested that the oil crises were 
one of the major causes of the demise of the Soviet Union and CMEA per se. 
 
84 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abeysinghe, Tilak. 2001. “Estimation of Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price on 
Growth.” Economics Letters 73 (2): 147–53. doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00476-1. 
 
Balassa, Bela, and Laura Tyson. 1987. “Adjustment to External Shocks in Socialist and Private 
Market Economies.” In Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World 
Development, ed. Silvio Borner and Alwyn Taylor, 3:439–464. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Beckmann, Elisabeth, and Jarko Fidrmuc. 2012. “Oil Price Shock and Structural Changes in 
CMEA Trade: Pouring Oil on Troubled Waters?” The European Journal of Comparative 
Economics 9 (1): 31–49. http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979201201/182429792012090102.pdf. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Jordi Gali. 2007. “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why 
Are the 2000s so Different from the 1970s?” NBER Working Paper No. 13368, 
September. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
doi:10.3386/w13368. 
 
Bognar, Jozsef. 1979. “Relations of The CMEA With the World Economy at The Beginning of 
a New Era.” Acta Oeconomica 23 (1/2): 1–16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40728719. 
 
———. 1987. “World Economic Crisis, Adjustment Policies and Global Questions: An 
Introduction.” In Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World 
Development, ed. Luigi Pasinetti and Peter Lloyd, 3: 405–8. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Brown, Alan A., and Marton Tardos. 1980. “Transmission and Responses to External Economic 
Disturbances: Hungary.” In the Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Transmission and Response, ed. Egon Neuberger and 
Laura D’Andrea Tyson, 250–76. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 
 
Burkett, John, Richard Portes, and David Winter. 1981. “Macroeconomic Adjustment and 
Foreign Trade of Centrally Planned Economies.” NBER Working Paper No. 736, 
August. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w0736. 
 
Capolupo, Rosa, and Giuseppe, Celi. 2008. “Openness And Economic Growth: A Comparative 
Study Of Alternative Trading Regimes.” Economie Internationale 116 (4): 5–36. 
http://www.cepii.fr/IE/rev116/capolupo.pdf. 
 
Csaba, Laszlo. 1980. “Impacts of World Economic Changes on the CMEA.” Acta 
Oeconomica 25 (1/2): 93–115. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40728798. 
 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (DESA/UN). 
2017. “The End of the Golden Age, the Debt Crisis and Development Setbacks.” 
85 
 
Chapter. In World Economic and Social Survey 2017: Reflecting on Seventy Years of 
Development Policy Analysis, 49–72. New York, NY: United Nations. 
 
Dobrinsky, Rumen. 1986. “The Macroeconomic Data Base for the CMEA Countries” IIASA 
Working Paper WP-86-054, October. Laxenbourg, Austria: IIASA. 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/2805/. 
 
———. 1989. “The CMEA Country Models of the BONN-IIASA Project: Closed CPE Models 
in an Open Environment.” Acta Oeconomica 41 (3/4): 313–40. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40729408. 
 
Fallenbuchl, Zbigniew M. 1980. “The Impact of External Economic Disturbances on Poland 
since 1971.” In the Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe: Transmission and Response, ed. Egon Neuberger and Laura 
D’Andrea Tyson, 280–304. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 
 
Federalni Statisticky Urad. 1972. Statisticka Rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky 
1972. Prague: SNTL-Nakladatelsvi Technické Literatury. 
 
———.1973. Statisticka Rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky 1973. Prague: SNTL-
Nakladatelsvi Technické Literatury. 
 
———.1974. Statisticka Rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky 1974. Prague: SNTL-
Nakladatelsvi Technické Literatury. 
 
———.1975. Statisticka Rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky 1975. Prague: SNTL-
Nakladatelsvi Technické Literatury. 
 
FRED. 2018. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). Accessed February 2018, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS. 
 
Glowny Urzad Statystyczny. 1973. Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego 1972. Warsaw, 
Poland: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny. 
 
———. 1974. Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego 1973. Warsaw, Poland: Glowny 
Urzad Statystyczny. 
 
Hamilton, James D. 2011. “Historical Oil Shocks.” NBER Working Paper No. 16790, February. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w16790. 
 
Hewett, Edward A. 1980. “The Impact of the World Economic Crisis on Intra-CMEA Trade.” 
In the Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe: Transmission and Response, ed. Egon Neuberger and Laura D’Andrea Tyson, 
323–48. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 
 
Holzman, Franklyn Dunn. 1974. Foreign Trade Under Central Planning. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
86 
 
 
Kaser, M. (1967). Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies. London: Oxford 
University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Korhonen, Iikka, and Svetlana Ledyaeva. 2010. “Trade Linkages and Macroeconomic Effects of 
the Price of Oil.” Energy Economics 32 (4): 848–56. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2009.11.005. 
 
Kotz, David M., and Fred Weir. 1997. Revolution From Above: The Demise of the Soviet 
System. London: Routledge. 
 
———. 2007. Russia’s Path from Gorbachev to Putin: The Demise of the Soviet System and the 
New Russia. New York: Routledge. 
 
Krelle, Wilhelm, ed. 1989. The Future of the World Economy: Economic Growth and Structural 
Change. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Köves, Andras. 1981. “Turning Inward or Turning Outward: Reflections on the Foreign 
Economic Strategy of CMEA Countries.” Acta Oeconomica 26 (1/2): 51–69. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40728835. 
 
Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. 1973. Külkereskedelmi Statisztikai Evkönyv 1972. Budapest, 
Hungary: KSH-Központi Statistikai Hivatal. 
 
———. 1974. Külkereskedelmi Statisztikai Evkönyv 1973. Budapest, Hungary: KSH-Központi 
Statistikai Hivatal. 
 
———. 1975. Külkereskedelmi Statisztikai Evkönyv 1974. Budapest, Hungary: KSH-Központi 
Statistikai Hivatal. 
 
Joint Economic Committee, and Herbert S. Levine. 1983. “Possible Causes of the Deterioration 
of Soviet Productivity Growth in the Period 1976–80.” In Soviet Economy in the 1980's: 
Problems and Prospects, 1: 153–168. 99-530 O. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office. 
 
Marer, Paul. 1972. Soviet and East European Foreign Trade, 1946–1969. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Maximova, Margarita M. 1987. “World Markets and Socialist Economies.” In Structural 
Change, Economic Interdependence and World Development, ed. Silvio Borner and 
Alwyn Taylor, 3:427–37. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Ministersvto Vneshney Torgovli. 1972. Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR 1971. Moscow: Statistika 
 
———. 1976. Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR 1975. Moscow: Statistika 
 
Ofer, Gur. 1987. “Soviet Economic Growth: 1928–1985.” Journal of Economic Literature 25 
(4): 1767–1833. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2726445. 
87 
 
 
Portes, Richard. 1977. “East Europe’s Debt to the West: Interdependence Is a Two-Way 
Street.” Foreign Affairs 55 (4): 751–782. doi:10.2307/20039735. 
 
———. 1987. “The Impact of External Shocks on Centrally Planned Economies: Theoretical 
Considerations.” In Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World 
Development, ed. Silvio Borner and Alwyn Taylor, 3:409–25. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Raczkowski, Stanislaw. 1987. “The Influence of International Price Movements and Inflation on 
the Centrally Planned Economies.” In Structural Change, Economic Interdependence 
and World Development, ed. Silvio Borner and Alwyn Taylor, 3:359–80. New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Raheem, Ibrahim D. 2017. “Asymmetry and Break Effects of Oil Price – Macroeconomic 
Fundamentals Dynamics: The Trade Effect Channel.” The Journal of Economic 
Asymmetries 16: 12–25. doi:10.1016/j.jeca.2017.04.002. 
 
Rieffel, Lex. 2003. Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Rosefielde, Steven. 1980. “Was the Soviet Union Affected by the International Economic 
Disturbances of the 1970s?: An Exploratory Essay on the Macrostability of the Soviet 
Economic System.” In the Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe: Transmission and Response, ed. Egon Neuberger and Laura 
D’Andrea Tyson, 143–78. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 
 
Schrenk, M. 1991. “The CMEA System of Trade and Payments.” World Bank Working Paper 
No. 753,1–27. Accessed February 2018, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/686161468752076445/The-CMEA-system-
of-trade-and-payments-the-legacy-and-the-aftermath-of-its-termination. 
 
Schulzinger, R. D. 2010. “Détente in the Nixon–Ford Years, 1969–1976.” In the Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, Crises and Détente, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad, 2:373–394. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shmelev, Nikolay. 1979. “New Tendencies in the World Economy and Their Influence on the 
Economic Interests of CMEA Countries.” Acta Oeconomica 23 (3/4): 315–22. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40728761.  
 
Slantchev, B. L. 2014. National Security Strategy: The Rise and Fall of Détente, 1971–1980. 
Lecture presented in University of California, San Diego. Accessed February 2018, 
http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps142j/lectures/detente-malaise.pdf. 
 
Toda, Hiro Y., and Taku Yamamoto. 1995. “Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregressions 
with Possibly Integrated Processes.” Journal of Econometrics 66 (1-2): 225–50. 
doi:10.1016/0304-4076(94)01616-8. 
88 
 
  
 Treml, Vladimir G. 1980. “Foreign Trade and the Soviet Economy: Changing Parameters and 
Interrelations.” In the Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe: Transmission and Response, ed. Egon Neuberger and Laura 
D’Andrea Tyson, 184–207. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 
 
Trzeciakowski, Witold. 1987. “Impact of External Market Fluctuations on Centrally Planned 
and Market Economies: A Systematic Comparative Approach.” In Structural Change, 
Economic Interdependence and World Development, ed. Silvio Borner and Alwyn 
Taylor, 3:465–77. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
United Nations. 1974. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1972–1973. New York: United 
Nations. 
 
———. 1975. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1974. New York: United Nations. 
 
Vellai-Posta, Györgyi, Jozsef Veliczky, and Andras Boros-Kazai. 1987. “A Statistical Analysis 
of the "Openness" of Our Economic Processes.” Soviet and Eastern European Foreign 
Trade 23 (1): 89–110. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27748894. 
 
Venn, Fiona. 2002. The Oil Crisis. London: Longman. 
 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies (WIIW). 1979–1990. COMECON Data. 8 
vols. London: Macmillan. 
 
———. 1980–1986. COMECON Foreign Trade Data. 5 vols. London: Macmillan. 
 
Zimmerman, William. 1980. “The Energy Crisis, Western ‘Stagflation,’ and the Evolution of 
Soviet East European Relations: An Initial Assessment.” In the Impact of International 
Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Transmission and 
Response, ed. Egon Neuberger and Laura D’Andrea Tyson, 409–437. New York, NY: 
Pergamon Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
89 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A3. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, ADF Test, CSSR 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
nmp with intercept -0.1588 (0.9333) 0 N/A 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -2.7303 (0.0816) 0 N/A 
D(nmp,2) with intercept -5.9513 (0.0000) 0 N/A 
imtot with intercept 1.2789 (0.9979) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -1.3800 (0.5775) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,2) with intercept -2.8704 (0.0621) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,3) with intercept -4.3146 (0.0024) 0 N/A 
imsoc with intercept 1.4667 (0.9988) 0 N/A 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -2.6483 (0.0957) 0 N/A 
D(imsoc,2) with intercept -3.9709 (0.0052) 0 N/A 
imind with intercept 0.5297 (0.9849) 0 N/A 
D(imind,1) with intercept -0.6091 (0.8532) 0 N/A 
D(imind,2) with intercept -2.7059 (0.0861) 0 N/A 
D(imind,3) with intercept -4.4520 (0.0017) 0 N/A 
debtdomes with intercept 1.2926 (0.9980) 0 N/A 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -0.8620 (0.7851) 0 N/A 
D(debtdomes,2) with intercept -2.4493 (0.1386) 0 N/A 
D(debtdomes,3) with intercept -4.6479 (0.0011) 0 N/A 
intdomes with intercept -0.4650 (0.8844) 0 N/A 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -3.4107 (0.0191) 0 N/A 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A4. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, Breakpoint ADF Test, CSSR 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller with Break Test 
nmp with intercept -2.9939 (0.6895) 0 1965 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -3.6144 (0.3234) 0 1965 
D(nmp,2) with intercept -6.2549 (< 0.01) 0 1966 
imtot with intercept -3.2751 (0.5195) 7 1983 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -4.3549 (0.0644) 0 1988 
D(imtot,2) with intercept -6.4356 (< 0.01) 1 1988 
imsoc with intercept -3.1792 (0.5781) 7 1982 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -4.2419 (0.0872) 0 1988 
D(imsoc,2) with intercept -6.9854 (< 0.01) 0 1988 
imind with intercept -1.5051 (> 0.99) 0 1988 
D(imind,1) with intercept -4.1022 (0.1248) 0 1988 
D(imind,2) with intercept -8.3233 (< 0.01) 0 1988 
debtdomes with intercept -3.7222 (0.2711) 4 1984 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -12.6681 (< 0.01) 7 1979 
intdomes with intercept -3.7462 (0.2597) 6 1982 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -10.9908 (< 0.01) 7 1980 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A5. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 1–3, 
CSSR 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 1 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 7.6949 2 0.0213 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 6.8626 2 0.0323 
Both variables excluded 29.4899 4 0.0000 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.0405 2 0.5944 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.0920 2 0.9550 
Both variables excluded 1.1037 4 0.8937 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.4213 2 0.8100 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.0995 2 0.9515 
Both variables excluded 0.6096 4 0.9620 
Model 2 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 6.4927 2 0.0389 
Excluded variable: intdomes 4.2172 2 0.1214 
Both variables excluded 25.6349 4 0.0000 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.7264 2 0.4218 
Excluded variable: intdomes 1.6242 2 0.4439 
Both variables excluded 2.7088 4 0.6077 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.3275 2 0.3123 
Excluded variable: imtot 9.0074 2 0.0111 
Both variables excluded 9.8235 4 0.0435 
Model 3 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 1.3536 2 0.5082 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 2.1123 2 0.3478 
Both variables excluded 11.5568 4 0.210 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.6071 2 0.7382 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 1.3125 2 0.5188 
Both variables excluded 1.6167 4 0.8058 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.3153 2 0.8542 
Excluded variable: imsoc 2.2623 2 0.3227 
Both variables excluded 2.7784 4 0.5956 
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Table A6. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 4–6, 
CSSR 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 4 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 0.8738 2 0.6460 
Excluded variable: intdomes 1.9021 2 0.3863 
Both variables excluded 8.4780 4 0.0756 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.0906 2 0.5797 
Excluded variable: intdomes 3.8229 2 0.1479 
Both variables excluded 4.4059 4 0.3538 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.6232 2 0.7323 
Excluded variable: imsoc 9.4403 2 0.0089 
Both variables excluded 9.9730 4 0.0409 
Model 5 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 2.9236 2 0.2318 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 10.8095 2 0.0045 
Both variables excluded 13.8081 4 0.0079 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.2086 2 0.5465 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.0533 2 0.9737 
Both variables excluded 1.5645 4 0.8152 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.6606 2 0.7187 
Excluded variable: imind 0.1975 2 0.9060 
Both variables excluded 1.0947 4 0.8951 
Model 6 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 6.6856 2 0.0353 
Excluded variable: intdomes 10.7114 2 0.0047 
Both variables excluded 18.2666 4 0.0011 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.3284 2 0.8486 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.1838 2 0.9122 
Both variables excluded 0.8901 4 0.9260 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.2241 2 0.8940 
Excluded variable: imind 0.2027 2 0.9036 
Both variables excluded 0.4084 4 0.9818 
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Table A7. Johansen Cointegration Test Results, Models 1–4, CSSR 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Trace 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Trace 
Rank Test 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from 
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Rank Test 
VAR1: dnmp dimtot debtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and 
non-deterministic linear trend 
None  36.0802 
(0.0383) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
25.1944  
(0.0374) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 10.8857 
(0.3991) 
9.4112  
(0.4538) 
At most 2 1.4745 
(0.2246) 
1.4745  
(0.2246) 
VAR2: dnmp dimtot intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have 
intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
None  44.1117 
(0.0378) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
24.0117  
(0.0851) 
No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 20.1000 
(0.2209) 
16.7837  
(0.1148) 
At most 2 3.3163 
(0.8370) 
3.3163  
(0.8370) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and 
non-deterministic linear trend 
None  38.2183 
(0.0219) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
23.9999  
(0.0540) 
No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
(But 1 at 5.4 percent 
significance level) 
At most 1 14.2184 
(0.1744) 
13.7547 
(0.1459) 
At most 2 0.4637 
(0.4959) 
0.4637  
(0.4959) 
VAR3: dnmp dimsoc debtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and 
non-deterministic linear trend 
None  35.8950 
(0.0401) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
23.8632  
(0.0562) 
No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
(But 1 at 5.6 percent 
significance level) 
At most 1 12.0318 
(0.3067) 
8.6803  
(0.5292) 
At most 2 3.3516 
(0.0671) 
3.3516  
(0.0671) 
VAR4: dnmp dimsoc intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1  
No Cointegrating Equation in the Model at 5 percent significance level 
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Table A8. Johansen Cointegration Test Results, Models 5–6, CSSR 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Trace 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Trace 
Rank Test 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from 
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Rank Test 
VAR5: dnmp dimind debtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have 
only intercept 
None  31.2369 
(0.0339) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
19.2032  
(0.0911) 
No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 12.0337 
(0.1553) 
10.6517  
(0.1725) 
At most 2 1.3820 
(0.2398) 
1.3820  
(0.2398) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have 
intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
None  49.5873 
(0.0094) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
27.5257  
(0.0296) 
1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 22.0617 
(0.1387) 
18.2528 
(0.0725) 
At most 2 3.8088 
(0.7696) 
3.8088 
(0.7696) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and 
non-deterministic linear trend 
None  45.9831 
(0.0024) 
2 Cointegrating 
Equations in the 
Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
27.5191  
(0.0178) 
2 Cointegrating 
Equations in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 18.4640 
(0.0489) 
17.9401  
(0.0383) 
At most 2 0.5239 
(0.4692) 
0.5239 
(0.4692) 
VAR6: dnmp dimind intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1  
No Cointegrating Equation in the Model at 5 percent significance level 
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Table A9. VECM Estimation Results, Models 1 and 2, CSSR 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
C(7), 
(p-value) 
C(8), 
(p-value) 
C(9), 
(p-value) 
VECM1: dnmp dimtot debtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.0490*dimtot(-1)+0.4111*debtdomes(-1)-1440912213*t -500688117) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟓) 
-0.8518 
(0.0065) 
0.0761 
(0.6832) 
0.1132 
(0.4311) 
-0.0552 
(0.7599) 
2.40e+09 
(0.3041) 
-1.39e+08 
(0.2979) 
   
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.0490*dimtot(-1)+0.4111*debtdomes(-1)-1440912213*t -500688117) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟖, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.1061 
(0.9435) 
0.4523 
(0.6440) 
-0.9618 
(0.2077) 
-0.4059 
(0.6685) 
-1.08e+10 
(0.3784) 
1.04e+09 
(0.1438) 
   
D(debtdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.0490*dimtot(-1)+0.4111*debtdomes(-1)-1440912213*t -500688117) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.1318 
(0.9240) 
0.6025 
(0.5064) 
-0.4497 
(0.5177) 
0.3588 
(0.6819) 
-9.62e+09 
(0.3938) 
9.78e+08 
(0.1362) 
   
VECM2: dnmp dimtot intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -5.8326*dimtot(-1)+14.4058*intdomes(-1)-4304222887*t -16564641600) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C7*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 =
𝟎. 𝟓𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑) 
-0.1356 
(0.1553) 
-0.3796 
(0.0769) 
-0.0317 
(0.8505) 
1.0450 
(0.0325) 
0.7047  
(0.0073) 
0.2379  
(0.8206) 
0.5832 
(0.5387) 
3.34e+08 
(0.7674) 
 
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -5.8326*dimtot(-1)+14.4058*intdomes(-1)-4304222887*t -16564641600) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C7*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 =
𝟎. 𝟐𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.7185 
(0.1637) 
1.3308 
(0.2396) 
0.4129 
(0.6506) 
1.6049 
(0.5191) 
0.2188 
(0.8642) 
6.4922 
(0.2609) 
4.0812 
(0.4281) 
2.26e+09 
(0.7113) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -5.8326*dimtot(-1)+14.4058*intdomes(-1)-4304222887*t -16564641600) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C7*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 =
𝟎. 𝟓𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐) 
-0.1672 
(0.0009) 
0.1772 
(0.0745) 
0.0528 
(0.4998) 
0.6193 
(0.0083) 
0.1856 
(0.1025) 
1.7236 
(0.0020) 
0.8948 
(0.0523) 
-48883292 
(0.9245) 
 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -5.5859*dimtot(-1)+13.8650*intdomes(-1)-3901986046 *t -20214482345) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C7*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟔, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟎) 
-0.1486 
(0.1100) 
-0.4002 
(0.0492) 
-0.0368 
(0.8144) 
1.0427 
(0.0228) 
0.7160 
(0.0041) 
0.3302 
(0.7355) 
0.5208 
(0.5553) 
3.83e+09 
(0.1331) 
-2.12e+08 
(0.1200) 
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -5.5859*dimtot(-1)+13.8650*intdomes(-1)-3901986046 *t -20214482345) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C7*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
-0.7207 
(0.1653) 
1.4479 
(0.1918) 
0.4495 
(0.6118) 
1.6130 
(0.5017) 
0.1642 
(0.8942) 
6.1981 
(0.2689) 
4.4158 
(0.3784) 
-1.83e+10 
(0.2004) 
1.24e+09 
(0.1077) 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -5.5859*dimtot(-1)+13.8650*intdomes(-1)-3901986046 *t -20214482345) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C7*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟑) 
-0.1706 
(0.0011) 
0.1871 
(0.0607) 
0.0566 
(0.4670) 
0.6120 
(0.0084) 
0.1781 
(0.1123) 
1.6935 
(0.0024) 
0.9127 
(0.0473) 
-2.01e+09 
(0.1113) 
1.19e+08 
(0.0798) 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. C (1) means coefficient 1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag 
of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
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Table A10. VECM Estimation Results, Models 3 and 5, CSSR 
C(1), 
or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
C(7), 
(p-value) 
C(8), 
(p-value) 
C(9), 
(p-value) 
VECM3: dnmp dimsoc debtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1,  cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to 
nmp 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -1.8072*dimsoc(-1)+0.4432*debtdomes(-1)-1537730490*t +8005904168) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimsoc(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 =
𝟎. 𝟑𝟏) 
-0.4114 
(0.0290) 
-0.1535 
(0.3887) 
-0.2010 
(0.4877) 
-0.1305 
(0.5133) 
2.39e+09 
(0.3590) 
-1.26e+08 
(0.3965) 
   
D(dimsoc,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -1.8072*dimsoc(-1)+0.4432*debtdomes(-1)-1537730490*t +8005904168) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimsoc(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 =
𝟎. 𝟏𝟒) 
0.6352 
(0.0596) 
0.0228 
(0.9434) 
-0.0583 
(0.9113) 
-0.4953 
(0.1792) 
-3.94e+09 
(0.4036) 
4.34e+08 
(0.1150) 
   
D(debtdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -1.8072*dimsoc(-1)+0.4432*debtdomes(-1)-1537730490*t +8005904168) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimsoc(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 =
𝟎. 𝟎𝟐) 
0.3861 
(0.6087) 
0.4180 
(0.5770) 
-0.7645 
(0.5324) 
0.0066 
(0.9937) 
-9.02e+09 
(0.4119) 
9.96e+08 
(0.1206) 
   
VECM5: dnmp dimind debtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.1881*dimind(-1)+0.0833*debtdomes(-1) -14507953952) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟗) 
-0.4954  
(0.0238) 
-0.1999 
(0.3752) 
-0.0311 
(0.8650) 
0.3667 
(0.2725) 
0.4795 
(0.1136) 
-0.3336 
(0.0419) 
0.0339 
(0.8575) 
1.15e+09 
(0.3375) 
 
D(dimind,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.1881*dimind(-1)+0.0833*debtdomes(-1) -14507953952) +C(2)*D(dnmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.2336  
(0.7056) 
0.4833 
(0.4780) 
0.2622 
(0.6374) 
-0.8349 
(0.4067) 
-0.6182 
(0.4888) 
-0.1798 
(0.7018) 
0.1040 
(0.8562) 
2.79e+09 
(0.4409) 
 
D(debtdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.1881*dimind(-1)+0.0833*debtdomes(-1) -14507953952) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.8736 
(0.4443) 
0.6975 
(0.5757) 
0.4675 
(0.6469) 
0.8329 
(0.6497) 
0.1786 
(0.9126) 
0.1971 
(0.8188) 
0.6780 
(0.5217) 
4.72e+09 
(0.4766) 
 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.4468*dimind(-1)+0.4048*debtdomes(-1) -1209757950*t-4952701913) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟒) 
97 
 
-0.9667 
(0.0078) 
0.0965 
(0.7177) 
0.0758 
(0.6851) 
0.6269 
(0.0568) 
0.4959 
(0.0848) 
-0.0345 
(0.8668) 
0.2044 
(0.2905) 
-2.38e+08 
(0.8535) 
 
D(dimind,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.4468*dimind(-1)+0.4048*debtdomes(-1) -1209757950*t-4952701913) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.1035 
(0.9219) 
0.6798 
(0.4321) 
0.4018 
(0.5066) 
-0.8678 
(0.3933) 
-0.6554 
(0.4640) 
-0.0488 
(0.9413) 
0.1368 
(0.8235) 
2.27e+09 
(0.5849) 
 
D(debtdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.4468*dimind(-1)+0.4048*debtdomes(-1) -1209757950*t-4952701913) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.3450 
(0.8603) 
0.9924 
(0.5356) 
0.7409 
(0.5095) 
0.5925 
(0.7515) 
0.0782 
(0.9622) 
0.3310 
(0.7881) 
0.6528 
(0.5681) 
4.32e+09 
(0.5760) 
 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(dnmp,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.2340*dimind(-1)+0.3828*debtdomes(-1) -1298811521*t-2590060909) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟒) 
-0.8495 
(0.0208) 
0.0197 
(0.9415) 
0.0342 
(0.8556) 
0.5085 
(0.1162) 
0.4757 
(0.1067) 
-0.1087 
(0.5903) 
0.1861 
(0.3333) 
4.17e+09 
(0.0874) 
-2.49e+08 
(0.0631) 
D(dimind,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.2340*dimind(-1)+0.3828*debtdomes(-1) -1298811521*t-2590060909) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.7149  
(0.4861) 
1.0202 
(0.2178) 
0.5823 
(0.3108) 
-1.0434 
(0.2753) 
-0.9058 
(0.2967) 
0.1828 
(0.7631) 
0.1346 
(0.8138) 
-8.40e+09 
(0.2418) 
6.02e+08 
(0.1291) 
D(debtdomes,1)=C(1)*(dnmp(-1) -0.2340*dimind(-1)+0.3828*debtdomes(-1) -1298811521*t-2590060909) 
+C(2)*D(dnmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dnmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimind(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(debtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(debtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.7428 
(0.7021) 
1.6069 
(0.3039) 
1.0689 
(0.3273) 
0.3855 
(0.8292) 
-0.3060 
(0.8506) 
0.7654 
(0.5090) 
0.6754 
(0.5365) 
-1.43e+10 
(0.2926) 
1.04e+09 
(0.1653) 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. C (1) means coefficient 1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag 
of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
Table A11. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, ADF Test, GDR 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
nmp with intercept 4.5453 (1.0000) 0 N/A 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -2.7626 (0.0766) 0 N/A 
D(nmp,2) with intercept -1.7141 (0.4101) 6 N/A 
D(nmp,3) with intercept -6.1544 (0.0001) 5 N/A 
imtot with intercept 1.1174 (0.9967) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -0.6429 (0.8452) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,2) with intercept -2.2200 (0.2042) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,3) with intercept -3.6520 (0.0115) 0 N/A 
imsoc with intercept -0.5801 (0.8603) 0 N/A 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -4.8188 (0.0006) 0 N/A 
imind with intercept 0.9369 (0.9946) 0 N/A 
D(imind,1) with intercept -0.6401 (0.8459) 0 N/A 
D(imind,2) with intercept -1.9523 (0.3048) 0 N/A 
D(imind,3) with intercept -3.9433 (0.0058) 0 N/A 
debtdomes with intercept 3.5350 (1.0000) 7 N/A 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -0.1287 (0.9367) 0 N/A 
D(debtdomes,2) with intercept -0.2046 (0.9266) 0 N/A 
D(debtdomes,3) with intercept 3.5643 (1.0000) 6 N/A 
D(debtdomes,4) with intercept 2.7491 (1.0000) 6 N/A 
D(debtdomes,5) with intercept -9.5998 (0.0000) 5 N/A 
intdomes with intercept -0.5935 (0.8573) 0 N/A 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -2.4865 (0.1293) 0 N/A 
D(intdomes,2) with intercept -5.1088 (0.0003) 0 N/A 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A12. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, Breakpoint ADF Test, GDR 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller with Break Test 
nmp with intercept -2.5265 (0.8954) 7 1983 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -4.5474 (0.0381) 6 1982 
imtot with intercept -1.0782 (> 0.99) 0 1988 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -3.9559 (0.1707) 0 1988 
D(imtot,2) with intercept -5.6463 (< 0.01) 1 1988 
imsoc with intercept -1.5777 (> 0.99) 0 1984 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -5.0974 (< 0.01) 0 1977 
imind with intercept -1.1583 (> 0.99) 0 1988 
D(imind,1) with intercept -5.4656 (< 0.01) 0 1988 
debtdomes with intercept -3.0532 (0.6547) 3 1984 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -2.0269 (0.9810) 0 1988 
D(debtdomes,2) with intercept -4.5435 (0.0384) 0 1988 
intdomes with intercept -3.1153 (0.6177) 1 1977 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -8.4058 (< 0.01) 7 1980 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A13. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 1–3, 
GDR 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 1 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 1.1435 2 0.5645 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 9.1625 2 0.0102 
Both variables excluded 13.8144 4 0.0079 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.3501 2 0.5091 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.1770 2 0.9153 
Both variables excluded 2.2618 4 0.6877 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.6145 2 0.2706 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.0034 2 0.9983 
Both variables excluded 3.2335 4 0.5195 
Model 2 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 4.3522 2 0.1135 
Excluded variable: intdomes 11.1231 2 0.0038 
Both variables excluded 19.4135 4 0.0007 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 5.9430 2 0.0512 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.7874 2 0.6746 
Both variables excluded 6.2047 4 0.1844 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 10.6295 2 0.0049 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.7673  2 0.6814 
Both variables excluded 15.3327 4 0.0041 
Model 3 with three endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 13.1368 3 0.0043 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 27.3750 3 0.0000 
Both variables excluded 60.2264 6 0.0000 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 6.0512 3 0.1091 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 4.4796 3 0.2141 
Both variables excluded 20.3205 6 0.0024 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 6.2056 3 0.1020 
Excluded variable: imsoc 13.4464 3 0.0038 
Both variables excluded 26.0761 6 0.0002 
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Table A14. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 4–6, 
GDR 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 4 with two endogenous lags and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 4.7408 2 0.0934 
Excluded variable: intdomes 10.9530 2 0.0042 
Both variables excluded 16.4588 4 0.0025 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.6414 2 0.4401 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.6393 2 0.7264 
Both variables excluded 3.4269 4 0.4891 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 7.5763 2 0.0226 
Excluded variable: imsoc 0.5825 2 0.7473 
Both variables excluded 11.0930 4 0.0255 
Model 5 with three endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 5.8608 3 0.1186 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 12.5695 3 0.0057 
Both variables excluded 34.1296 6 0.0000 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 4.6902 3 0.1959 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 11.5500 3 0.0091 
Both variables excluded 22.6090 6 0.0009 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 8.8197 3 0.0318 
Excluded variable: imind 3.5911 3 0.3091 
Both variables excluded 13.9952 6 0.0297 
Model 6 with two endogenous lags and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 6.0440 2 0.0487 
Excluded variable: intdomes 13.8716 2 0.0010 
Both variables excluded 21.0375 4 0.0003 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 6.4804 2 0.0392 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.6857 2 0.7097 
Both variables excluded 6.6362 4 0.1564 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 4.7158 2 0.0946 
Excluded variable: imind 0.2706 2 0.8735 
Both variables excluded 7.7048 4 0.1030 
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Table A15. Johansen Cointegration Test Results, Models 1–3, GDR 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Trace Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Trace 
Rank Test 
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Maximum 
Eigenvalue Rank Test 
VAR1: nmp dimtot ddebtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  50.5449 (0.0073) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
34.9308 (0.0024) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 15.6141 (0.5238) 10.2150 (0.5958) 
At most 2 5.3991 (0.5401) 5.3991 (0.5401) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear 
trend 
None  36.1273 (0.0378) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
28.6942 (0.0121) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 7.4330 (0.7400) 6.5251 (0.7637) 
At most 2 0.9079 (0.3407) 0.9079 (0.3407) 
VAR2: nmp dimtot intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  27.2595 (0.0954) No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model at 
5 percent significance 
level 
21.1840 (0.0492) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
 
At most 1 6.0755 (0.6866) 5.2493 (0.7101) 
At most 2 0.8262 (0.3634) 0.8262 (0.3634) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  45.9371 (0.0242) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
32.9459 (0.0048) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 12.9912 (0.7389) 8.7386 (0.7510) 
At most 2 4.2526 (0.7053) 4.2526 (0.7053) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear 
trend 
None  33.7048 (0.686) No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model at 
5 percent significance 
level 
27.2244 (0.0196) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 6.4804 (0.8292) 6.4752 (0.7689) 
At most 2 0.0053 (0.9413) 0.0053 (0.9413) 
VAR3: nmp imsoc ddebtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=3 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  38.7390 (0.0036) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
31.4249 (0.0013) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 7.3141 (0.5414) 4.5138 (0.8015) 
At most 2 2.8003 (0.0942) 2.8003 (0.0942) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  52.0493 (0.0048) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
33.9368 (0.0034) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 18.1125 (0.3364) 15.1855 (0.1838) 
At most 2 2.9270 (0.8851) 2.9270 (0.8851) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear 
trend 
None  37.1219 (0.0293) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
25.6198 (0.0328) 1 Cointegrating Equation in 
the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 11.5021 (0.3474) 9.2799 (0.4669) 
At most 2 2.2222 (0.1360) 2.2222 (0.1360) 
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Table A16. Johansen Cointegration Test Results, Models 4–6, GDR 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Trace Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Trace 
Rank Test 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Maximum 
Eigenvalue Rank Test 
VAR4: nmp imsoc intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  38.6177 (0.0038) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
30.8286 (0.0016) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 7.7891 (0.4882) 7.7724 (0.4023) 
At most 2 0.0167 (0.8970) 0.0167 (0.8970) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  60.3844 (0.0004) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
38.1039 (0.0008) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 22.2806 (0.1313) 14.8990 (0.1992) 
At most 2 7.3816 (0.3064) 7.3816 (0.3064) 
VAR5: nmp imind ddebtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  58.0375 (0.0000) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
49.1296 (0.0000) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
 
At most 1 8.9079 (0.3740) 8.9070 (0.2940) 
At most 2 0.0009 (0.9777) 0.0009 (0.9777) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  80.6955 (0.0000) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
60.6251 (0.0000) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 20.0704 (0.2224) 11.2739 (0.4855) 
At most 2 8.7965 (0.1932) 8.7965 (0.1932) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  52.5476 (0.0003) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
41.0250 (0.0001) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 11.5226 (0.3458) 10.8216 (0.3259) 
At most 2 0.7010 (0.4024) 0.7010 (0.4024) 
VAR6: nmp imind intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  27.9622 (0.0802) No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
22.5510 (0.0314) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 5.4112 (0.7637) 4.2206 (0.8354) 
At most 2 1.1905 (0.2752) 1.1905 (0.2752) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  38.9157 (0.1187) No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
28.8606 (0.0193) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 10.0551 (0.9226) 6.1918 (0.9473) 
At most 2 3.8633 (0.7618) 3.8633 (0.7618) 
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Table A17. VECM Estimation Results, Models 1 and 2, GDR 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2),  
(p-value) 
C(3),  
(p-value) 
C(4), 
 (p-value) 
C(5), 
 (p-value) 
C(6),  
(p-value) 
C(7),  
(p-value) 
C(8),  
(p-value) 
C(9),  
(p-value) 
VECM1: nmp dimtot ddebtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear 
trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.1234*dimtot(-1)+1.6170*ddebtdomes(-1)-8793661388*t -16167864991) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟒) 
-0.1494  
(0.0002) 
0.0617 
(0.7698) 
-0.5253 
(0.0015) 
0.0074 
(0.9240) 
-0.0262 
(0.7220) 
0.4720 
(0.0002) 
0.1445  
(0.2735) 
9.78e+09 
(0.0000) 
 
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.1234*dimtot(-1)+1.6170*ddebtdomes(-1)-8793661388*t -16167864991) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.4238 
(0.2873) 
-2.1772 
(0.4067) 
-0.4788 
(0.7859) 
-0.6128 
(0.5232) 
-0.3678 
(0.6858) 
1.3291 
(0.2990) 
0.8913 
(0.5796) 
2.01e+10 
(0.3431) 
 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.1234*dimtot(-1)+1.6170*ddebtdomes(-1)-8793661388*t -16167864991) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.5041 
(0.3081) 
-1.9307 
(0.5522) 
-0.8814 
(0.6880) 
-0.2945 
(0.8042) 
-0.3289 
(0.7708) 
1.7102 
(0.2830) 
0.9217 
(0.6446) 
2.15e+10 
(0.4132) 
 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend, 
cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.7449*dimtot(-1)+1.5725*ddebtdomes(-1)-6836896668*t -49688687781) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟒) 
-0.2654 
(0.0000) 
-0.0993 
(0.5618) 
-0.3418 
(0.0120) 
0.1460 
(0.0409) 
0.0415 
(0.4884) 
0.5974 
(0.0000) 
0.3228 
(0.0101) 
5.34e+09 
(0.0000) 
2.61e+08 
(0.0000) 
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.7449*dimtot(-1)+1.5725*ddebtdomes(-1)-6836896668*t -49688687781) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒) 
0.9412 
(0.1127) 
-0.6067 
(0.7898) 
-2.5479 
(0.1349) 
-1.3102 
(0.1551) 
-0.6961 
(0.3855) 
0.0186 
(0.9873) 
-1.0098 
(0.5069) 
3.30e+09 
(0.7295) 
1.20e+09 
(0.0800) 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.7449*dimtot(-1)+1.5725*ddebtdomes(-1)-6836896668*t -49688687781) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(dimtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟐) 
1.2691 
(0.0883) 
0.3321 
(0.9068) 
-3.3628 
(0.1150) 
-1.2350 
(0.2756) 
-0.7859 
(0.4313) 
-0.0515 
(0.9717) 
-1.6472 
(0.3877) 
3.98e+08 
(0.9733) 
1.34e+09 
(0.1129) 
VECM2: nmp dimtot intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -6.8247*dimtot(-1)-18.9314*intdomes(-1) -105276628017) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟏) 
0.0113 
(0.2669) 
0.5069 
(0.0064) 
0.0820 
(0.4457) 
0.5017 
(0.0977) 
3.27e+09 
(0.0088) 
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D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -6.8247*dimtot(-1)-18.9314*intdomes(-1) -105276628017) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗) 
0.1577 
(0.0262) 
-1.2130 
(0.2910) 
0.1684 
(0.8128) 
2.3655 
(0.2335) 
9.76e+09 
(0.2113) 
    
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -6.8247*dimtot(-1)-18.9314*intdomes(-1) -105276628017) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟑) 
0.0306 
(0.0010) 
-0.3002 
(0.0396) 
0.0763 
(0.3848) 
0.5729 
(0.0240) 
2.23e+09 
(0.0253) 
    
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear 
trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.5428*dimtot(-1)+8.0853*intdomes(-1) -9374732526*t-29014962819) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟑) 
-0.0671 
(0.0128) 
0.3804 
(0.0200) 
0.1943 
(0.0764) 
0.5736 
(0.0352) 
4.07e+09 
(0.0006) 
    
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.5428*dimtot(-1)+8.0853*intdomes(-1) -9374732526*t-29014962819) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.2210 
(0.2860) 
-0.5043 
(0.6877) 
0.0138 
(0.9872) 
1.6413 
(0.4399) 
5.23e+09 
(0.5375) 
    
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.5428*dimtot(-1)+8.0853*intdomes(-1) -9374732526*t-29014962819) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏) 
-0.0724 
(0.0076) 
-0.2648 
(0.0931) 
0.1174 
(0.2709) 
0.5038 
(0.0602) 
2.00e+09 
(0.0626) 
    
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.4028*dimtot(-1)+7.5745*intdomes(-1) -7945653593*t-50604782203) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟐) 
-0.0695 
(0.0408) 
0.3556 
(0.0798) 
0.1947 
(0.0949) 
0.5642 
(0.0413) 
2.64e+09 
(0.0069) 
99933187 
(0.0907) 
   
D(dimtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.4028*dimtot(-1)+7.5745*intdomes(-1) -7945653593*t-50604782203) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒) 
0.0407 
(0.8681) 
-2.1936 
(0.1494) 
-0.4852 
(0.5720) 
0.9999 
(0.6205) 
1.19e+09 
(0.8609) 
9.51e+08 
(0.0374) 
   
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.4028*dimtot(-1)+7.5745*intdomes(-1) -7945653593*t-50604782203) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(dimtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔) 
-0.0678 
(0.0472) 
-0.3058 
(0.1311) 
0.1030 
(0.3689) 
0.4776 
(0.0850) 
4.58e+08 
(0.6118) 
1.13e+08 
(0.0594) 
   
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. C (1) means coefficient 1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag 
of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Table A18. VECM Estimation Results, Models 3 and 4, GDR 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
C(7), 
(p-value) 
C(8), 
(p-value) 
C(9), 
(p-value) 
VECM3: nmp imsoc ddebtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=3, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +33.8945*imsoc(-1)-24.5685*ddebtdomes(-1)-1.7224e+12) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟕) 
0.0004 
(0.8864) 
0.4650 
  (0.2349) 
-0.1934 
(0.4865) 
0.3147 
(0.2804) 
-0.1258 
(0.3027) 
-0.0219 
(0.8744) 
-0.0397 
(0.7622) 
0.2714 
(0.0295) 
-0.2431 
(0.1822) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
-0.2977 
(0.0362) 
3.22e+09 
(0.4337) 
       
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +33.8945*imsoc(-1)-24.5685*ddebtdomes(-1)-1.7224e+12) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟗) 
-0.0098 
(0.0419) 
0.8969 
(0.1648) 
-0.4773 
(0.2982) 
1.4260 
(0.0076) 
0.3568 
(0.0844) 
0.0998 
(0.6601) 
-0.3146 
(0.1565) 
0.2463 
(0.1996) 
-0.1945 
(0.5030) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
-0.3095 
(0.1625) 
-1.09e+10 
(0.1162) 
       
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +33.8945*imsoc(-1)-24.5685*ddebtdomes(-1)-1.7224e+12) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.0545 
(0.1585) 
-3.9404 
(0.4522) 
-3.2334 
(0.3943) 
-1.9443 
(0.6180) 
0.0143 
(0.9930) 
-0.3031 
(0.8722) 
0.2153 
(0.9038) 
1.9900 
(0.2152) 
1.7345 
(0.4738) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
0.6626 
(0.7103) 
6.41e+10 
(0.2579) 
       
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.2992*imsoc(-1)+1.7049*ddebtdomes(-1)-7974473857*t-42693862661) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟐) 
-0.2955 
(0.0039) 
-0.0027 
(0.9904) 
-0.4339 
(0.0581) 
0.1560 
(0.2707) 
-0.2291 
(0.0247) 
-0.1162 
(0.2295) 
-0.1484 
(0.1475) 
0.6447 
(0.0003) 
0.3518 
(0.0887) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
0.1992 
(0.2652) 
9.44e+09 
(0.0005) 
       
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.2992*imsoc(-1)+1.7049*ddebtdomes(-1)-7974473857*t-42693862661) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟕) 
-0.2738 
(0.2113) 
-0.6877 
(0.2196) 
-0.8027 
(0.1403) 
0.4313 
(0.2154) 
0.2048 
(0.3727) 
-0.2383 
(0.3091) 
-0.5493 
(0.0357) 
0.7724 
(0.0322) 
0.8988 
(0.0763) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
0.1105 
(0.7959) 
9.44e+09 
(0.0884) 
       
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.2992*imsoc(-1)+1.7049*ddebtdomes(-1)-7974473857*t-42693862661) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒) 
3.3395 
(0.0372) 
7.9969 
(0.0493) 
0.0773 
(0.9830) 
4.7463 
(0.0588) 
1.5064 
(0.3458) 
2.2112 
(0.1802) 
2.2175 
(0.1980) 
-3.2708 
(0.1690) 
-8.1214 
(0.0259) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
-4.7200 -9.06e+10        
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(0.1270) (0.0240) 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.0577*imsoc(-1)+1.9318*ddebtdomes(-1)-7028980779*t-47717009090) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11)+C(12)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟒) 
-0.3358 
(0.0022) 
-0.3320 
(0.3440) 
-0.4960 
(0.0342) 
-0.0494 
(0.8385) 
-0.2682 
(0.0115) 
-0.1942 
(0.0641) 
-0.2022 
(0.0577) 
0.7486 
(0.0002) 
0.5678 
(0.0457) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
0.2725 
(0.1415) 
8.11e+09 
(0.0010) 
3.26e+08 
(0.0298) 
      
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.0577*imsoc(-1)+1.9318*ddebtdomes(-1)-7028980779*t-47717009090) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11)+C(12)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏) 
-0.1325 
(0.5825) 
-0.1604 
(0.8610) 
-0.6384 
(0.2723) 
0.8287 
(0.2120) 
0.1892 
(0.4486) 
-0.2256 
(0.3924) 
-0.5383 
(0.0572) 
0.5921 
(0.1558) 
0.4741 
(0.4996) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
-0.1144 
(0.8084) 
3.47e+09 
(0.5090) 
-7666103 
(0.8323) 
      
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.0577*imsoc(-1)+1.9318*ddebtdomes(-1)-7028980779*t-47717009090) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imsoc(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11)+C(12)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗) 
2.3449 
(0.1481) 
3.1774 
(0.5949) 
-1.2943 
(0.7260) 
0.5514 
(0.8950) 
2.0416 
(0.2167) 
2.4582 
(0.1615) 
2.4631 
(0.1651) 
-2.1132 
(0.4224) 
-4.6451 
(0.3136) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
      
-3.2160 
(0.3035) 
-2.85e+10 
(0.4049) 
3.41e+08 
(0.8844) 
      
VECM4: nmp imsoc intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +5.4200*imsoc(-1)-28.4605*intdomes(-1)-348437424453) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟓) 
0.0002 
(0.9813) 
0.8142 
(0.0026) 
-0.1350 
(0.4327) 
-0.3407 
(0.0087) 
-0.0264 
(0.8681) 
0.3103 
(0.2143) 
-0.8260 
(0.0076) 
2.7e+09 
(0.1186) 
 
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +5.4200*imsoc(-1)-28.4605*intdomes(-1)-348437424453) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.0038 
(0.7818) 
0.4352 
(0.3881) 
-0.1435 
(0.6889) 
0.0585 
(0.8131) 
0.0721 
(0.8288) 
-0.2116 
(0.6806) 
0.0888 
(0.8798) 
-7e+08 
(0.8280) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +5.4200*imsoc(-1)-28.4605*intdomes(-1)-348437424453) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟕) 
0.0260 
(0.0004) 
-0.4655 
(0.0492) 
-0.2502 
(0.1316) 
-0.1736 
(0.1301) 
-0.0541 
(0.7185) 
0.3456 
(0.1454) 
0.5245 
(0.0587) 
5.1e+09 
(0.0037) 
 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend, 
cointegrating vector, 𝜷, is not normalized to nmp 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +1.2600*imsoc(-1)-7.7115*intdomes(-1)-11516791840*t-43945591713) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟖) 
-0.0472 
(0.1990) 
0.5470 
(0.0558) 
-0.1784 
(0.2719) 
-0.3064 
(0.0117) 
-0.1196 
(0.4054) 
0.4041 
(0.1086) 
-0.4941 
(0.1635) 
4.7e+09 
(0.0141) 
 
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +1.2600*imsoc(-1)-7.7115*intdomes(-1)-11516791840*t-43945591713) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.1045 
(0.1747) 
-0.2503 
(0.6605) 
-0.2711 
(0.4204) 
0.1136 
(0.6262) 
-0.1937 
(0.5171) 
-0.0213 
(0.9665) 
0.9116 
(0.2158) 
4.7e+09 
(0.2179) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +1.2600*imsoc(-1)-7.7115*intdomes(-1)-11516791840*t-43945591713) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟑) 
-0.1086 
(0.0185) 
-0.4959 
(0.1362) 
-0.1536 
(0.4216) 
0.0338 
(0.7980) 
0.1016 
(0.5495) 
0.6682 
(0.0300) 
0.7422 
(0.0823) 
4.2e+09 
(0.0576) 
 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, etc. C (1) means coefficient 
1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
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Table A19. VECM Estimation Results, Models 5 and 6, GDR 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2),  
(p-value) 
C(3),  
(p-value) 
C(4), 
 (p-value) 
C(5), 
 (p-value) 
C(6),  
(p-value) 
C(7),  
(p-value) 
C(8),  
(p-value) 
C(9),  
(p-value) 
VECM5: nmp imind ddebtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +17.0657*imind(-1)-17.0892*ddebtdomes(-1)-461569251780) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟐, 
𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟐) 
0.0098 
(0.0183) 
0.3719 
(0.1477) 
-0.4639 
(0.0244) 
0.0128 
(0.9302) 
-0.1526 
(0.2758) 
0.3281 
(0.0136) 
-0.0828 
(0.5398) 
7.39e+09 
(0.0028) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +17.0657*imind(-1)-17.0892*ddebtdomes(-1)-461569251780) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.0563 
(0.1139) 
-3.2830 
(0.1524) 
-0.5861 
(0.7324) 
-0.3998 
(0.7598) 
0.5577 
(0.6512) 
1.3455 
(0.2256) 
0.6705 
(0.5780) 
2.85e+10 
(0.1522) 
 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +17.0657*imind(-1)-17.0892*ddebtdomes(-1)-461569251780) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.0906 
(0.0575) 
-3.9939 
(0.1847) 
-1.9056 
(0.4028) 
-0.5231 
(0.7615) 
0.4553 
(0.7791) 
2.0326 
(0.1676) 
1.3440 
(0.4002) 
4.20e+10 
(0.1120) 
 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.5582*imind(-1)+3.0531*ddebtdomes(-1)-9250601402*t+19418668539) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟏) 
-0.0734 
(0.0013) 
0.1798 
(0.4347) 
-0.5294 
(0.0044) 
0.0041 
(0.9738) 
-0.1127 
(0.3578) 
0.4165 
(0.0014) 
0.0534 
(0.6832) 
9.09e+09 
(0.0002) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.5582*imind(-1)+3.0531*ddebtdomes(-1)-9250601402*t+19418668539) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.2581 
(0.2197) 
-2.9436 
(0.2334) 
-0.2054 
(0.9061) 
-0.1250 
(0.9243) 
0.6105 
(0.6337) 
1.2955 
(0.2824) 
0.6747 
(0.6253) 
2.35e+10 
(0.2628) 
 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.5582*imind(-1)+3.0531*ddebtdomes(-1)-9250601402*t+19418668539) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.4028 
(0.1562) 
-3.3357 
(0.3112) 
-1.2341 
(0.5985) 
-0.0555 
(0.9749) 
0.5265 
(0.7588) 
1.9088 
(0.2391) 
1.2903 
(0.4876) 
3.28e+10 
(0.2445) 
 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.4890*imind(-1)+2.9163*ddebtdomes(-1)-5822271945*t-38289042935) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟒) 
-0.1164 
(0.0013) 
0.1525 
(0.4873) 
-0.4618 
(0.0101) 
-0.0739 
(0.5624) 
-0.1823 
(0.1485) 
0.4823 
(0.0005) 
0.1244 
(0.3466) 
5.20e+09 
(0.0001) 
2.26e+08 
(0.0032) 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.4890*imind(-1)+2.9163*ddebtdomes(-1)-5822271945*t-38289042935) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟕) 
0.3121 
(0.3080) 
-2.5570 
(0.2425) 
-1.1955 
(0.4569) 
1.0071 
(0.4244) 
1.6176 
(0.1900) 
0.3451 
(0.7572) 
-0.3401 
(0.7911) 
3.99e+09 
(0.6921) 
1.33e+09 
(0.0567) 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.4890*imind(-1)+2.9163*ddebtdomes(-1)-5822271945*t-38289042935) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
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1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒) 
0.3080 
(0.4605) 
-2.8422 
(0.3408) 
-2.4665 
(0.2686) 
1.3619 
(0.4314) 
1.7837 
(0.2884) 
0.7170 
(0.6406) 
0.0170 
(0.9923) 
3.78e+09 
(0.7846) 
1.93e+09 
(0.0445) 
VECM6: nmp imind intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +2.0974*imind(-1)-13.0373*intdomes(-1)-169909418216) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟎, 
𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟗) 
-0.0038 
(0.7372) 
0.9662 
(0.0005) 
-0.1828 
(0.3525) 
0.1677 
(0.2367) 
-0.2584 
(0.0994) 
0.5635 
(0.0314) 
-0.8264 
(0.0133) 
1.54e+09 
(0.3724) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +2.0974*imind(-1)-13.0373*intdomes(-1)-169909418216) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐, 
𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎) 
0.2632 
(0.0027) 
-3.9431 
(0.0220) 
-1.1410 
(0.3926) 
0.1381 
(0.8839) 
1.1847 
(0.2570) 
1.4970 
(0.3752) 
3.4986 
(0.1056) 
3.44e+10 
(0.0074) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +2.0974*imind(-1)-13.0373*intdomes(-1)-169909418216) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟑) 
0.0416 
(0.0012) 
-0.5123 
(0.0361) 
-0.2843 
(0.1457) 
0.0281 
(0.8362) 
-0.0350 
(0.8128) 
0.4391 
(0.0794) 
0.4675 
(0.1306) 
5.39e+09 
(0.0040) 
 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend, 
cointegrating vector, 𝜷, is not normalized to nmp, 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.2729*imind(-1)+6.8190*intdomes(-1)-11309646748*t+6808488966) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎) 
-0.0211 
(0.3835) 
0.7836 
(0.0041) 
-0.3022 
(0.1289) 
0.1569 
(0.1289) 
-0.2014 
(0.1916) 
0.5809 
(0.0248) 
-0.5994 
(0.0720) 
3.44e+09 
(0.0686) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.2729*imind(-1)+6.8190*intdomes(-1)-11309646748*t+6808488966) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒) 
-0.4647 
(0.0180) 
-3.7677 
(0.0526) 
-0.8195 
(0.5767) 
0.2581 
(0.8030) 
1.1562 
(0.3179) 
1.4331 
(0.4373) 
3.3948 
(0.1708) 
3.12e+10 
(0.0324) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +0.2729*imind(-1)+6.8190*intdomes(-1)-11309646748*t+6808488966) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-
2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏) 
-0.0780 
(0.0066) 
-0.5136 
(0.0624) 
-0.2520 
(0.2348) 
0.0456 
(0.7568) 
-0.0304 
(0.8519) 
0.4317 
(0.1095) 
0.4875 
(0.1672) 
5.18e+09 
(0.0143) 
 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. C (1) means coefficient 1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag 
of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
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Table A20. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, ADF Test, Hungary 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
nmp with intercept -1.1129 (0.6969) 0 N/A 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -3.5352 (0.0144) 0 N/A 
imtot with intercept -1.2494 (0.6388) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -4.7264 (0.0008) 1 N/A 
imsoc with intercept -1.7443 (0.3994) 0 N/A 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -4.9370 (0.0004) 0 N/A 
imind with intercept 0.0208 (0.9531) 0 N/A 
D(imind,1) with intercept -7.0062 (0.0000) 0 N/A 
debtdomes with intercept 1.1529 (0.9970) 0 N/A 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -3.7073 (0.0096) 0 N/A 
intdomes with intercept -0.1025 (0.9401) 0 N/A 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -3.9464 (0.0054) 0 N/A 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A21. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, Breakpoint ADF Test, 
Hungary 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller with Break Test 
nmp with intercept -2.9002 (0.7389) 0 1968 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -4.4653 (0.0474) 0 1977 
imtot with intercept -3.8891 (0.1977) 0 1969 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -5.7344 (< 0.01) 0 1978 
imsoc with intercept -3.6141 (0.3235) 0 1969 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -6.0333 (< 0.01) 0 1975 
imind with intercept -1.2344 (> 0.99) 1 1969 
D(imind,1) with intercept -7.5285 (< 0.01) 0 1974 
debtdomes with intercept -1.5845 (> 0.99) 0 1974 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -6.4036 (< 0.01) 5 1975 
intdomes with intercept 7.5506 (> 0.99) 7 1984 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -6.3276 (< 0.01) 6 1983 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A22. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 1–3, 
Hungary 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 1 with one endogenous lag and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.4452 1 0.5046 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.1553 1 0.6936 
Both variables excluded 0.7314 2 0.6937 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 5.0148 1 0.0251 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.6925 1 0.4053 
Both variables excluded 5.4962 2 0.0640 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.0170 1 0.8962 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.9031 1 0.3420 
Both variables excluded 1.0086 2 0.6039 
Model 2 with one endogenous lag and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.0753 1 0.7838 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.7671 1 0.3811 
Both variables excluded 0.8009 2 0.6700 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 3.6219 1 0.0570 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.9628 1 0.3265 
Both variables excluded 5.5561 2 0.0577 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 3.5875 1 0.0582 
Excluded variable: imtot 0.1739 1 0.6767 
Both variables excluded 3.6535 2 0.1609 
Model 3 with one endogenous lag and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 0.7006 1 0.4026 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.0939 1 0.7593 
Both variables excluded 0.8403 2 0.6569 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.2615 1 0.6091 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.7484 1 0.3870 
Both variables excluded 1.0104 2 0.6034 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.0412 1 0.8391 
Excluded variable: imsoc 0.0007 1 0.9791 
Both variables excluded 0.0492 2 0.9757 
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Table A23. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 4-6, 
Hungary 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 4 with one endogenous lag and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 1.2211 1 0.2692 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.6531 1 0.4190 
Both variables excluded 1.4915 2 0.4744 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.1746 1 0.6761 
Excluded variable: intdomes 2.2050 1 0.1376 
Both variables excluded 2.8538 2 0.2401 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 4.5874 1 0.0322 
Excluded variable: imsoc 0.4537 1 0.5006 
Both variables excluded 4.7009 2 0.0953 
Model 5 with one endogenous lag and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 5.6963 1 0.0170 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.0024 1 0.9610 
Both variables excluded 6.0139 2 0.0494 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.4740 1 0.1157 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.0611 1 0.8048 
Both variables excluded 2.5981 2 0.2728 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.0913 1 0.7626 
Excluded variable: imind 1.5789 1 0.2089 
Both variables excluded 2.0880 2 0.3520 
Model 6 with one endogenous lag and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 5.1500 1 0.0232 
Excluded variable: intdomes 3.3840 1 0.0658 
Both variables excluded 6.2379 2 0.0442 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.0140 1 0.9059 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.0304 1 0.8617 
Both variables excluded 0.0787 2 0.9614 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.4152 1 0.2342 
Excluded variable: imind 0.0546 1 0.8153 
Both variables excluded 1.7388 2 0.4192 
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Table A24. Johansen Cointegration Test Results, Models 1–6, Hungary 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Trace Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Trace 
Rank Test 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Maximum 
Eigenvalue Rank Test 
VAR1: nmp imtot debtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
No Cointegrating Equation in the Model at 5 percent significance level 
VAR2: nmp imtot intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  34.0067 (0.0154) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
19.9068 (0.0735) No Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model at 
5 percent significance 
level 
At most 1 14.0999 (0.0802) 11.1801 (0.1454) 
At most 2 2.9198 (0.0875) 2.9198 (0.0875) 
VAR3: nmp imsoc debtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
No Cointegrating Equation in the Model at 5 percent significance level 
VAR4: nmp imsoc intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  30.9399 (0.0368) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
22.4912 (0.0320) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 8.4487 (0.4187) 5.4319 (0.6866) 
At most 2 3.0168 (0.0824) 3.0168 (0.0824) 
VAR5: nmp imind debtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  31.1189 (0.0350) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
22.6939 (0.0299) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
 
At most 1 8.4250 (0.4211) 6.3300 (0.5712) 
At most 2 2.0951 (0.1478) 2.0951 (0.1478) 
VAR6: nmp imind intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=1 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  37.4364 (0.0054) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
28.8514 (0.0034) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 8.5850 (0.4051) 6.3938 (0.5632) 
At most 2 2.1912 (0.1388) 2.1912 (0.1388) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  43.9682 (0.0391) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
31.8286 (0.0071) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 12.1396 (0.8023) 8.5393 (0.7708) 
At most 2 3.6003 (0.7988) 3.6003 (0.7988) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  41.4929 (0.0089) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
31.5235 (0.0046) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 9.9693 (0.4835) 8.4176 (0.5573) 
At most 2 1.5518 (0.2129) 1.5518 (0.2129) 
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Table A25. VECM Estimation Results, Models 2 and 4, Hungary 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
VECM2: nmp imtot intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.3871*imtot(-1)-0.9753*intdomes(-1) -101182824470) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.0283 
(0.8754) 
0.3242 
(0.2070) 
0.0424 
(0.8400) 
0.0312 
(0.9538) 
8.60e+09 
(0.0159) 
 
D(imtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.3871*imtot(-1)-0.9753*intdomes(-1) -101182824470) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒) 
0.6713 
(0.0003) 
-0.0079 
(0.9719) 
0.4007 
(0.0413) 
0.4070 
(0.4015) 
4.48e+09 
(0.1423) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -1.3871*imtot(-1)-0.9753*intdomes(-1) -101182824470) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗) 
-0.0243 
(0.7093) 
0.2430 
(0.0130) 
-0.0577 
(0.4497) 
0.2425 
(0.2208) 
-1.55e+09 
(0.2059) 
 
VECM4: nmp imsoc intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -2.2404*imsoc(-1)-3.9114*intdomes(-1) -90194797371) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓) 
0.0495 
(0.6739) 
0.3442 
(0.2029) 
-0.2422 
(0.2029) 
0.0792 
(0.8762) 
9.56e+09 
(0.0110) 
 
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -2.2404*imsoc(-1)-3.9114*intdomes(-1) -90194797371) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎) 
0.3402 
(0.0062) 
-0.2867 
(0.2726) 
0.2437 
(0.2857) 
0.2377 
(0.6311) 
5.54e+09 
(0.1126) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -2.2404*imsoc(-1)-3.9114*intdomes(-1) -90194797371) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎) 
0.0389 
(0.3823) 
0.1532 
(0.1346) 
0.0185 
(0.8323) 
0.3061 
(0.1193) 
-1.06e+09 
(0.4242) 
 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. C (1) means coefficient 1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag 
of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
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Table A26. VECM Estimation Results, Models 5 and 6, Hungary 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
VECM5: nmp imind debtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -5.0587*imind(-1)+0.7012*debtdomes(-1) -120115972980) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-
1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟏) 
-0.1424 
(0.0071) 
-0.0027 
(0.9889) 
-0.0961 
(0.6993) 
0.1033 
(0.2004) 
1.22e+10 
(0.0006) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -5.0587*imind(-1)+0.7012*debtdomes(-1) -120115972980) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-
1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎) 
0.0804 
(0.1258) 
0.3115 
(0.1404) 
-0.1610 
(0.5390) 
-0.0138 
(0.8682) 
1.49e+09 
(0.6473) 
 
D(debtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -5.0587*imind(-1)+0.7012*debtdomes(-1) -120115972980) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(4)*D(debtdomes(-
1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑) 
-0.0772 
(0.6341) 
-0.1554 
(0.8116) 
-1.3904 
(0.1019) 
0.4630 
(0.0885) 
1.67e+10 
(0.1127) 
 
VECM6: nmp imind intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=1, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -6.0195*imind(-1)+9.5921*intdomes(-1) -76568017066) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎) 
-0.1253 
(0.0098) 
-0.0769 
(0.7271) 
-0.1566 
(0.5562) 
0.1239 
(0.7771) 
1.45e+10 
(0.0005) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -6.0195*imind(-1)+9.5921*intdomes(-1) -76568017066) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓) 
-0.0366 
(0.4477) 
0.0409 
(0.8587) 
-0.5655 
(0.0547) 
0.5715 
(0.2276) 
5.72e+09 
(0.1452) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -6.0195*imind(-1)+9.5921*intdomes(-1) -76568017066) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-
1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟔, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓) 
-0.0282 
(0.1481) 
0.1222 
(0.1895) 
-0.1458 
(0.2022) 
0.3361 
(0.0797) 
-43729119 
(0.9771) 
 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, is not normalized 
to nmp, 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.0721*imind(-1)+10.2337*intdomes(-1) -4193106611*t-76911389358) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-
1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗) 
-0.1162 
(0.0108) 
-0.1020 
(0.6486) 
-0.1715 
(0.5289) 
0.0504 
(0.9076) 
1.50e+10 
(0.0005) 
 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.0721*imind(-1)+10.2337*intdomes(-1) -4193106611*t-76911389358) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-
1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑) 
-0.0131 
(0.7738) 
0.1064 
(0.6577) 
-0.4765 
(0.1115) 
0.5129 
(0.2770) 
4.60e+09 
(0.2580) 
 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.0721*imind(-1)+10.2337*intdomes(-1) -4193106611*t-76911389358) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-
1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟒) 
-0.0238 
(0.1952) 
0.1248 
(0.1978) 
-0.1386 
(0.2374) 
0.3153 
(0.0980) 
-82888736 
(0.9585) 
 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.0504*imind(-1)+10.2310*intdomes(-1) +3024747199*t-60253163937) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-
1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗) 
-0.1161 
(0.0110) 
-0.1519 
(0.5075) 
-0.1598 
(0.5568) 
0.1004 
(0.8180) 
2.09e+10 
(0.0013) 
-3.49e+08 
(0.1273) 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.0504*imind(-1)+10.2310*intdomes(-1) +3024747199*t-60253163937) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-
1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐) 
-0.0140 
(0.7611) 
0.1493 
(0.5467) 
-0.4894 
(0.1051) 
0.4712 
(0.3228) 
1.27e+09 
(0.8386) 
1.87e+08 
(0.4413) 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.0504*imind(-1)+10.2310*intdomes(-1) +3024747199*t-60253163937) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(imind(-
1),1)+C(4)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(5)+C(6)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟏) 
-0.0241 
(0.1695) 
0.1606 
(0.0933) 
-0.1473 
(0.1893) 
0.2813 
(0.1220) 
-2.57e+09 
(0.2769) 
1.36e+08 
(0.1414) 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, etc. C (1) means coefficient 
1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
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Table A27. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, ADF Test, Poland 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
nmp with intercept -1.0866 (0.7061) 2 N/A 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -2.9085 (0.0575) 1 N/A 
D(nmp,2) with intercept -3.7742 (0.0084) 0 N/A 
imtot with intercept -1.3199 (0.6060) 1 N/A 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -2.5015 (0.1258) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,2) with intercept -5.5175 (0.0001) 0 N/A 
imsoc with intercept -1.7691 (0.3873) 1 N/A 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -2.7496 (0.0786) 0 N/A 
D(imsoc,2) with intercept -6.7206 (0.0000) 0 N/A 
imind with intercept -1.1666 (0.6743) 1 N/A 
D(imind,1) with intercept -2.1865 (0.2152) 0 N/A 
D(imind,2) with intercept -6.4043 (0.0000) 0 N/A 
debtdomes with intercept 8.6366 (1.0000) 7 N/A 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept 5.4969 (1.0000) 7 N/A 
D(debtdomes,2) with intercept -5.9516 (0.0001) 3 N/A 
intdomes with intercept 4.3014 (1.0000) 7 N/A 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -5.7979 (0.0000) 0 N/A 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A28. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, Breakpoint ADF Test, Poland 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller with Break Test 
nmp with intercept -2.4617 (0.9122) 3 1982 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -3.8254 (0.2248) 1 1981 
D(nmp,2) with intercept -5.8555 (< 0.01) 1 1981 
imtot with intercept -3.2482 (0.5365) 1 1971 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -3.8995 (0.1937) 0 1981 
D(imtot,2) with intercept -7.0375 (< 0.01) 0 1981 
imsoc with intercept -2.8786 (0.7488) 0 1969 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -5.1633 (< 0.01) 3 1980 
imind with intercept -3.6254 (0.3182) 2 1971 
D(imind,1) with intercept -3.0583 (0.6517) 0 1981 
D(imind,2) with intercept -7.4591 (< 0.01) 0 1975 
debtdomes with intercept -2.2924 (0.9479) 0 1980 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -26.3330 (< 0.01) 5 1981 
intdomes with intercept -1.4350 (> 0.99) 0 1979 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -19.0668 (< 0.01) 4 1981 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A29. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 1–3, 
Poland 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 1 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 1.2599 2 0.5326 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 2.8893 2 0.2358 
Both variables excluded 3.5290 4 0.4735 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 13.0915 2 0.0014 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 7.0114 2 0.0300 
Both variables excluded 20.8662 4 0.0003 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.6686 2 0.7158 
Excluded variable: imtot 5.8879 2 0.0527 
Both variables excluded 6.9774 4 0.1371 
Model 2 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 1.3580 2 0.5046 
Excluded variable: intdomes 3.2222 2 0.1997 
Both variables excluded 3.9337 4 0.4151 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 14.9038 2 0.0006 
Excluded variable: intdomes 5.8594 2 0.0534 
Both variables excluded 17.5209 4 0.0015 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.5429 2 0.7623 
Excluded variable: imtot 4.5263 2 0.1040 
Both variables excluded 8.1748 4 0.0854 
Model 3 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 0.3224 2 0.8511 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 3.4407 2 0.1790 
Both variables excluded 4.4534 4 0.3481 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 8.6900 2 0.0130 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 7.9767 2 0.0185 
Both variables excluded 16.6582 4 0.0023 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 3.1748 2 0.2045 
Excluded variable: imsoc 2.8322 2 0.2427 
Both variables excluded 3.7602 4 0.4394 
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Table A30. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 4–6, 
Poland 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 4 with four endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 2.5650 4 0.6330 
Excluded variable: intdomes 4.0576 4 0.3983 
Both variables excluded 11.9888 8 0.1517 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.9871 4 0.5600 
Excluded variable: intdomes 3.5430 4 0.4714 
Both variables excluded 7.2946 8 0.5052 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 7.5648 4 0.1089 
Excluded variable: imsoc 2.9849 4 0.5603 
Both variables excluded 24.4637 8 0.0019 
Model 5 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 1.0219 2 0.5999 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 4.3529 2 0.1134 
Both variables excluded 4.407 4 0.3472 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.4394 2 0.2953 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.2004 2 0.9046 
Both variables excluded 2.5236 4 0.6404 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.1492 2 0.9281 
Excluded variable: imind 2.9176 2 0.2325 
Both variables excluded 4.5874 4 0.3323 
Model 6 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 0.9568 2 0.6198 
Excluded variable: intdomes 6.1434 2 0.0463 
Both variables excluded 6.2766 4 0.1794 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 3.4429 2 0.1788 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.9319 2 0.6275 
Both variables excluded 3.8261 4 0.4300 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.4258 2 0.2973 
Excluded variable: imind 0.9965 2 0.6076 
Both variables excluded 2.9634 4 0.5640 
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Table A31. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, ADF Test, USSR 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
nmp with intercept -0.1485 (0.9346) 0 N/A 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -4.6024 (0.0011) 0 N/A 
imtot with intercept 0.4167 (0.9802) 0 N/A 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -4.5292 (0.0013) 0 N/A 
imsoc with intercept 4.0355 (1.0000) 6 N/A 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -4.0400 (0.0043) 0 N/A 
imind with intercept -0.7125 (0.8271) 2 N/A 
D(imind,1) with intercept -3.8635 (0.0068) 1 N/A 
debtdomes with intercept 0.8726 (0.9935) 1 N/A 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -1.6792 (0.4300) 1 N/A 
D(debtdomes,2) with intercept -8.3528 (0.0000) 0 N/A 
intdomes with intercept -0.9726 (0.7489) 1 N/A 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -4.0243 (0.0054) 5 N/A 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A32. Unit Root Test Results of Variables of Interest, Breakpoint ADF Test, USSR 
Variable and Specification t-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Lag 
Length 
Break Date 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller with Break Test 
nmp with intercept -1.4925 (> 0.99) 0 1965 
D(nmp,1) with intercept -5.3742 (< 0.01) 1 1984 
imtot with intercept -1.2572 (> 0.99) 0 1974 
D(imtot,1) with intercept -5.0991 (< 0.01) 4 1975 
imsoc with intercept 0.1242 (> 0.99) 0 1966 
D(imsoc,1) with intercept -6.0037 (< 0.01) 5 1981 
imind with intercept -2.7370 (0.8159) 2 1971 
D(imind,1) with intercept -5.4547 (< 0.01) 1 1975 
debtdomes with intercept -0.5739 (> 0.99) 0 1986 
D(debtdomes,1) with intercept -3.2702 (0.5528) 1 1986 
D(debtdomes,2) with intercept -9.1123 (< 0.01) 0 1984 
intdomes with intercept -3.4666 (0.4054) 7 1985 
D(intdomes,1) with intercept -4.6170 (0.0313) 5 1978 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. 
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Table A33. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 1–3, 
USSR 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 1 with four endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 27.8855 4 0.0000 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 19.0712 4 0.0008 
Both variables excluded 38.6014 8 0.0000 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 5.5122 4 0.2387 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 1.7398 4 0.7835 
Both variables excluded 12.8006 8 0.1189 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 3.5475 4 0.4707 
Excluded variable: imtot 5.0100 4 0.2863 
Both variables excluded 10.1159 8 0.2570 
Model 2 with two endogenous lags and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imtot 2.1748 2 0.3371 
Excluded variable: intdomes 2.2220 2 0.3292 
Both variables excluded 3.7276 4 0.4441 
Dependent variable: imtot 
Excluded variable: nmp 6.8923 2 0.0319 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.8663 2 0.6485 
Both variables excluded 6.9783 4 0.1370 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.0420 2 0.9792 
Excluded variable: imtot 2.8375 2 0.2420 
Both variables excluded 2.9153 4 0.5721 
Model 3 with three endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 1.0647 3 0.7856 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 6.4342 3 0.0923 
Both variables excluded 8.8125 6 0.1844 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 5.9545 3 0.1138 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 2.1308 3 0.5457 
Both variables excluded 8.2188 6 0.2225 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.7645 3 0.8579 
Excluded variable: imsoc 5.1315 3 0.1624 
Both variables excluded 6.6553 6 0.3539 
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Table A34. Toda-Yamamoto Version of the Granger Causality Test Results, Models 4–6, 
USSR 
Variable Chi-Square Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Block Exogeneity Wald Test, based on VAR 
Model 4 with three endogenous lags and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imsoc 1.7178 3 0.6330 
Excluded variable: intdomes 1.3623 3 0.7144 
Both variables excluded 3.1713 6 0.7871 
Dependent variable: imsoc 
Excluded variable: nmp 2.2549 3 0.5212 
Excluded variable: intdomes 8.5897 3 0.0353 
Both variables excluded 10.4811 6 0.1058 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 3.2450 3 0.3554 
Excluded variable: imsoc 6.4927 3 0.0900 
Both variables excluded 8.7661 6 0.1872 
Model 5 with two endogenous lags and extra two exogenous lags 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 1.6960 2 0.4283 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 0.2935 2 0.8635 
Both variables excluded 1.8565 4 0.7621 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 4.9685 2 0.0834 
Excluded variable: debtdomes 1.3835 2 0.5007 
Both variables excluded 8.2949 4 0.0814 
Dependent variable: debtdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 0.3550 2 0.8374 
Excluded variable: imind 1.3194 2 0.5170 
Both variables excluded 2.0608 4 0.7246 
Model 6 with two endogenous lags and extra one exogenous lag 
Dependent variable: nmp 
Excluded variable: imind 1.3737 2 0.5031 
Excluded variable: intdomes 0.6592 2 0.7192 
Both variables excluded 1.6121 4 0.8066 
Dependent variable: imind 
Excluded variable: nmp 4.7628 2 0.0924 
Excluded variable: intdomes 3.1859 2 0.2033 
Both variables excluded 6.8652 4 0.1432 
Dependent variable: intdomes 
Excluded variable: nmp 1.3334 2 0.5134 
Excluded variable: imind 1.3584 2 0.5070 
Both variables excluded 3.6827 4 0.4506 
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Table A35. Johansen Cointegration Test Results, Models 1–6, USSR 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Trace Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Trace 
Rank Test 
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Result from Maximum 
Eigenvalue Rank Test 
VAR1: nmp imtot ddebtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=3 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  35.7243 (0.0092) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
20.7679 (0.0561) No Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
(But 1 at 5.6 percent 
significance level) 
At most 1 14.9573 (0.0601) 10.6304 (0.1737) 
At most 2 4.3269 (0.0375) 4.3269 (0.0375) 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  57.1881 (0.0011) 2 Cointegrating 
Equations in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
29.0558 (0.0181) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 28.1323 (0.0257) 18.3870 (0.0766) 
At most 2 10.0531 (0.1248) 10.0531 (0.1248) 
VAR2: nmp imtot intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 1: Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
None  32.1985 (0.0260) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
22.1916 (0.0354) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
 
At most 1 10.0070 (0.2820) 6.7745 (0.5162) 
At most 2 3.2325 (0.0722) 3.2325 (0.0722) 
VAR3: nmp imsoc ddebtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 2: Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-
deterministic linear trend 
None  48.5349 (0.0124) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
35.9431 (0.0017) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 12.5918 (0.7694) 7.7770 (0.8410) 
At most 2 4.8147 (0.6231) 4.8147 (0.6231) 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  43.7869 (0.0046) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
34.1332 (0.0018) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 9.6537 (0.5143) 4.8554 (0.9129) 
At most 2 4.7983 (0.0285) 4.7983 (0.0285) 
VAR4: nmp imsoc intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
No Cointegrating Equation in the Model at 5 percent significance level 
VAR5: nmp imind ddebtdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=4 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  39.8276 (0.0142) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
25.2470 (0.0368) 1 Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 14.5806 (0.1578) 8.5038 (0.5480) 
At most 2 6.0768 (0.0137) 6.0768 (0.0137) 
VAR6: nmp imind intdomes, all endogenous variables, lag length=2 
Test Version 3: Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
None  37.0311 (0.0300) 1 Cointegrating 
Equation in the Model 
at 5 percent 
significance level 
19.8791 (0.1707) No Cointegrating Equation 
in the Model at 5 percent 
significance level 
At most 1 17.1520 (0.0740) 11.5347 (0.2717) 
At most 2 5.6173 (0.0178) 5.6173 (0.0178) 
126 
 
Table A36. VECM Estimation Results, Models 1 and 2, USSR 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, etc. C (1) means coefficient 
1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag of variable, etc., and t means time t 
C(1), 
or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
C(7), 
(p-value) 
C(8), 
(p-value) 
C(9), 
(p-value) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
VECM1: nmp imtot ddebtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=3, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -5.9646*imtot(-1)-1.0452*ddebtdomes(-1)-97413091978) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-
3),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imtot(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔) 
0.0492 
(0.6736) 
-0.3372 
(0.2920) 
-0.1973 
(0.5428) 
-0.1385 
(0.6537) 
1.0008 
(0.2023) 
1.0611 
(0.2566) 
-1.7239 
(0.1436) 
-0.6524 
(0.2853) 
-1.0688 
(0.1480) 
1.6771 
(0.0467) 
2.49e+10 
(0.0077) 
D(imtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -5.9646*imtot(-1)-1.0452*ddebtdomes(-1)-97413091978) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-
3),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imtot(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟑) 
0.1317 
(0.0018) 
-0.1053 
(0.2730) 
-0.0204 
(0.8326) 
-0.2550 
(0.0137) 
0.6765 
(0.0092) 
0.0257 
(0.9253) 
0.2422 
(0.4795) 
-0.1411 
(0.4361) 
0.1055 
(0.6219) 
-0.0216 
(0.9265) 
5.90e+09 
(0.0274) 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -5.9646*imtot(-1)-1.0452*ddebtdomes(-1)-97413091978) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imtot(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟒) 
0.0325 
(0.5637) 
0.0654 
(0.6653) 
-0.0142 
(0.9270) 
0.0748 
(0.6146) 
-0.1414 
(0.7001) 
-0.8997 
(0.0558) 
1.3110 
(0.0280) 
-0.3876 
(0.1914) 
0.5365 
(0.1322) 
-0.7623 
(0.0583) 
-2.3e+09 
(0.5486) 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -0.2791*imtot(-1)-1.5364*ddebtdomes(-1)-14678901317*t -101265203294) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imtot(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟔, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐) 
-0.9345 
(0.0224) 
0.1177 
(0.6831) 
0.0910 
(0.7314) 
0.1770 
(0.5049) 
0.9413 
(0.1100) 
1.5763 
(0.0488) 
-0.2390 
(0.8300) 
-1.9386 
(0.0115) 
-2.3735 
(0.0083) 
0.0683 
(0.9408) 
5.86e+09 
(0.5380) 
D(imtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -0.2791*imtot(-1)-1.5364*ddebtdomes(-1)-14678901317*t -101265203294) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imtot(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-
2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗) 
0.3617 
(0.0423) 
-0.1207 
(0.3525) 
0.0266 
(0.8214) 
-0.2420 
(0.0539) 
0.2427 
(0.3390) 
-0.6489 
(0.0655) 
-0.6690 
(0.1901) 
0.1443 
(0.6340) 
0.6310 
(0.0875) 
0.7914 
(0.0690) 
9.39e+09 
(0.0390) 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -0.2791*imtot(-1)-1.5364*ddebtdomes(-1)-14678901317*t -101265203294) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(6)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(7)*D(imtot(-3),1)+C(8)*D(ddebtdomes(-
1),1)+C(9)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-3),1)+C(11) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟖) 
0.2436 
(0.2508) 
-0.0049 
(0.9757) 
-0.0417 
(0.7780) 
0.0332 
(0.8215) 
-0.2632 
(0.4072) 
-1.1768 
(0.0120) 
0.8228 
(0.1990) 
-0.1161 
(0.7597) 
0.8828 
(0.0600) 
-0.2857 
(0.5804) 
1.43e+09 
(0.7868) 
VECM2: nmp imtot intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
Variables have deterministic linear trends but the cointegrating equation have only intercept 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.7021*imtot(-1)+26.7206*intdomes(-1)-51701291020) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imtot(-
1),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟖, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
0.1254 
(0.1014) 
-0.1051 
(0.6701) 
-0.4121 
(0.0816) 
0.9517 
(0.1199) 
0.2537 
(0.7276) 
-1.7015 
(0.6574) 
-6.9066 
(0.1621) 
2.01e+10 
(0.0002) 
   
D(imtot,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.7021*imtot(-1)+26.7206*intdomes(-1)-51701291020) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imtot(-
1),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟑) 
0.0512 
(0.0548) 
0.1073 
(0.2139) 
0.0097 
(0.9015) 
0.0462 
(0.8204) 
-0.2412 
(0.3402) 
-1.9884 
(0.1419) 
-0.4198 
(0.7997) 
1.29e+09 
(0.4012) 
   
D(intdomest,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -7.7021*imtot(-1)+26.7206*intdomes(-1)-51701291020) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-
2),1)+C(4)*D(imtot(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imtot(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟓, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟖) 
0.0085 
(0.0484) 
0.0090 
(0.5095) 
0.0112 
(0.3753) 
-0.1042 
(0.0044) 
-0.0140 
(0.7274) 
0.5231 
(0.0212) 
0.2497 
(0.3520) 
22987063 
(0.9251) 
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Table A37. VECM Estimation Results, Model 3, USSR 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
C(7), 
(p-value) 
C(8), 
(p-value) 
C(9), 
(p-value) 
VECM3: nmp imsoc ddebtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2 
Variables have deterministic linear trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic 
linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.1300*imsoc(-1)-0.8791*ddebtdomes(-1)-19669394465*t-113880771292) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟕) 
-0.7956 
(0.0000) 
0.0777 
(0.5563) 
-0.2405 
(0.0927) 
2.0596 
(0.0033) 
2.3263 
(0.0034) 
-0.9167 
(0.0073) 
-1.3581 
(0.0003) 
1.17e+10 
(0.0018) 
 
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.1300*imsoc(-1)-0.8791*ddebtdomes(-1)-19669394465*t-113880771292) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
0.0174 
(0.7463) 
0.0359 
(0.5398) 
0.0310 
(0.6116) 
0.2895 
(0.2971) 
-0.2869 
(0.3608) 
-0.0933 
(0.4960) 
0.0569 
(0.6750) 
4.39e+08 
(0.7596) 
 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.1300*imsoc(-1)-0.8791*ddebtdomes(-1)-19669394465*t-
113880771292) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8) (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑) 
0.2903 
(0.0032) 
-0.1311 
(0.1742) 
0.0772 
(0.4355) 
-0.8936 
(0.0547) 
-1.4520 
(0.0087) 
-0.3645 
(0.1097) 
0.2891 
(0.1959) 
4.50e+09 
(0.0640) 
 
Variables have quadratic trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend, 
cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp, 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.1510*imsoc(-1)-0.7990*ddebtdomes(-1)-20242107646*t-105095918926) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟕, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟔) 
-0.8131 
(0.0000) 
0.0793 
(0.5583) 
-0.2369 
(0.1185) 
2.0603 
(0.0045) 
2.3413 
(0.0042) 
-0.8887 
(0.0113) 
-1.3561 
(0.0005) 
1.81e+10 
(0.0001) 
-3e+08 
(0.0056) 
D(imsoc,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.1510*imsoc(-1)-0.7990*ddebtdomes(-1)-20242107646*t-105095918926) 
+C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.0065 
(0.9068) 
0.0361 
(0.5295) 
0.0539 
(0.3901) 
0.2496 
(0.3626) 
-0.2890 
(0.3499) 
-0.1237 
(0.3641) 
0.0167 
(0.9018) 
-9.3e+08 
(0.5512) 
68503638 
(0.2153) 
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +3.1510*imsoc(-1)-0.7990*ddebtdomes(-1)-20242107646*t-
105095918926) +C(2)*D(nmp(-1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imsoc(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imsoc(-
2),1)+C(6)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟏) 
0.2715 
(0.0090) 
-0.1314 
(0.1818) 
0.0998 
(0.3437) 
-0.9353 
(0.0518) 
-1.4595 
(0.0100) 
-0.4056 
(0.0857) 
0.2467 
(0.2854) 
8.57e+08 
(0.7437) 
2.07e+08 
(0.0328) 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, 
etc. C (1) means coefficient 1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag 
of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
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Table A38. VECM Estimation Results, Models 5 and 6, USSR 
C(1), or 𝜶, 
(p-value) 
C(2), 
(p-value) 
C(3), 
(p-value) 
C(4), 
(p-value) 
C(5), 
(p-value) 
C(6), 
(p-value) 
C(7), 
(p-value) 
C(8), 
(p-value) 
C(9), 
(p-value) 
VECM5: nmp imind ddebtdomes, all endogenous, lag length=4, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp,     Variables have quadratic 
trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -0.5103*imind(-1)-0.7228*ddebtdomes(-1)-15002448812*t-102972221526) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(nmp(-4),1)+C(6)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(7)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(8)*D(imind(-
3),1)+C(9)*D(imind(-4),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(11)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(12)*D(ddebtdomes(-
3),1)+C(13)*D(ddebtdomes(-4),1)+C(14)+C(15)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟐, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟎) 
-3.0107 
(0.0017) 
1.2868 
(0.0197) 
0.8042 
(0.0704) 
0.5637 
(0.0856) 
0.4230 
(0.1330) 
0.6435 
(0.4840) 
3.4602 
(0.0256) 
2.4078 
(0.0875) 
3.3139 
(0.0029) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
C(13), 
(p-value) 
C(14), 
(p-value) 
C(15), 
(p-value) 
   
-3.1411 
(0.0005) 
-4.4208 
(0.0004) 
-2.7233 
(0.0136) 
-1.5401 
(0.0245) 
-5.37e+10 
(0.0447) 
1.12e+09 
(0.0115) 
   
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -0.5103*imind(-1)-0.7228*ddebtdomes(-1)-15002448812*t-102972221526) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(nmp(-4),1)+C(6)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(7)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(8)*D(imind(-
3),1)+C(9)*D(imind(-4),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(11)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(12)*D(ddebtdomes(-
3),1)+C(13)*D(ddebtdomes(-4),1)+C(14)+C(15)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟗, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟔) 
0.3416 
(0.2377) 
-0.2217 
(0.2499) 
-0.1193 
(0.4624) 
-0.2829 
(0.0372) 
0.1196 
(0.2693) 
1.2783 
(0.0053) 
-1.3568 
(0.0269) 
0.1590 
(0.7569) 
-0.3328 
(0.3313) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
C(13), 
(p-value) 
C(14), 
(p-value) 
C(15), 
(p-value) 
   
0.1050 
(0.6689) 
0.3922 
(0.2504) 
0.3822 
(0.3073) 
0.1609 
(0.4956) 
1.19e+10 
(0.2238) 
-2.18e+08 
(0.1538) 
   
D(ddebtdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) -0.5103*imind(-1)-0.7228*ddebtdomes(-1)-15002448812*t-102972221526) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(nmp(-3),1)+C(5)*D(nmp(-4),1)+C(6)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(7)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(8)*D(imind(-
3),1)+C(9)*D(imind(-4),1)+C(10)*D(ddebtdomes(-1),1)+C(11)*D(ddebtdomes(-2),1)+C(12)*D(ddebtdomes(-
3),1)+C(13)*D(ddebtdomes(-4),1)+C(14)+C(15)*t (𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟒, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟗) 
1.3334 
(0.0316) 
-0.8364 
(0.0406) 
-0.2979 
(0.3495) 
-0.1162 
(0.6179) 
-0.4596 
(0.0447) 
-0.4138 
(0.5574) 
-0.3813 
(0.7114) 
-1.5081 
(0.1536) 
-3.1489 
(0.0007) 
C(10), 
(p-value) 
C(11), 
(p-value) 
C(12), 
(p-value) 
C(13), 
(p-value) 
C(14), 
(p-value) 
C(15), 
(p-value) 
   
0.7456 
(0.1405) 
1.6598 
(0.0253) 
1.7243 
(0.0331) 
1.5236 
(0.0071) 
3.69e+10 
(0.0673) 
-4.71e+08 
(0.1169) 
   
VECM6: nmp imind intdomes, all endogenous, lag length=2, cointegrating vector, 𝜷, normalized to nmp,          Variables have quadratic 
trends and cointegrating equation have intercept and non-deterministic linear trend 
D(nmp,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +16.0308*imind(-1)-77.0709*intdomes(-1)-18561721912*t-168212378932) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎) 
-0.0202 
(0.6235) 
-0.0015 
(0.9950) 
-0.2689 
(0.3282) 
1.4773 
(0.1965) 
0.9410 
(0.5395) 
-0.5331 
(0.8915) 
-4.6006 
(0.3453) 
1.78e+10 
(0.0093) 
-12834675 
(0.9511) 
D(imind,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +16.0308*imind(-1)-77.0709*intdomes(-1)-18561721912*t-168212378932) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟖) 
-0.0115 
(0.1710) 
0.0583 
(0.2224) 
0.0593 
(0.2805) 
0.3504 
(0.1275) 
-0.2332 
(0.4465) 
0.2506 
(0.7477) 
-0.0136 
(0.9887) 
-1.10e+09 
(0.3795) 
784850 
(0.9850) 
D(intdomes,1)=C(1)*(nmp(-1) +16.0308*imind(-1)-77.0709*intdomes(-1)-18561721912*t-168212378932) +C(2)*D(nmp(-
1),1)+C(3)*D(nmp(-2),1)+C(4)*D(imind(-1),1)+C(5)*D(imind(-2),1)+C(6)*D(intdomes(-1),1)+C(7)*D(intdomes(-2),1)+C(8)+C(9)*t 
(𝑹𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟏, 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒) 
0.0068 
(0.0028) 
0.0046 
(0.6877) 
-0.0203 
(0.1363) 
-0.1366 
(0.0204) 
-0.1772 
(0.0266) 
0.4884 
(0.0181) 
0.4840 
(0.0509) 
5.41e+08 
(0.0859) 
-7435612 
(0.4693) 
Note: D (variable, 1) means first difference of the variable, D (variable, 2) means second difference of the variable, etc. C (1) means coefficient 
1, C (2) means coefficient 2, etc., (-1) means first lag of variable, (-2) means second lag of variable, etc., and t means time trend. 
